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ABSTRACT

Wiest, Sara L. PhD, Purdue University, May 2018. It’s All Local: Civil Society and the
CDBG Program . Major Professors: Eric N. Waltenburg, Daniel P. Aldrich, James A.
McCann, and S. Laurel Weldon.
This research seeks to explain contrasting patterns of population stability and decline at
both the city and neighborhood levels. Existing research on urban decline identiﬁes several
factors that can facilitate or impede population stability, including: the amount of socioeconomic disadvantage, the physical and economic characteristics of a city, local government
responsiveness, and the strength of civil society. Using a mixed methods approach combining
multilevel modeling and spatial analysis techniques, I test the hypothesis that stronger civil
society, characterized by greater collective capacity and a denser organizational resource
base, is the key determinant in whether a city will stabilize, grow, or decline. First, the
analysis explores divergent patterns of population change at the city level using an original time-series, cross-sectional dataset on 231 cities over four decades. At the city level,
strengthening the collective capacity of civil society is an eﬀective way to mitigate decline.
Targeting local allocations of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding and
reducing socioeconomic disadvantage can also stimulate population growth over time. To
see how these forces work at the local level, I explore neighborhood variation in Detroit, MI.
The analysis looks ﬁrst at local CDBG allocation decisions and then examines the forces
that inﬂuence population change in Detroit neighborhoods. Geographically weighted regression results reveal signiﬁcant nonstationarity in relationships between the explanatory
variables and population change. In general, stronger civil society leads to greater population stability. Local CDBG investment strategies, however, tend to weaken the positive
eﬀect of civil society with a few notable exceptions. In more racially and ethnically diverse
and residentially stable areas, neighborhood organizations eﬀectively broker resources. In

xii
these neighborhoods, the combination of a strong civil society and local government investment best predict population stability. Additionally, concentrated disadvantage consistently
proves the greatest obstacle to population stability or growth at the city and neighborhood
levels.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

Throughout history, cities have served as epicenters of innovation, intimately linked to
advancements as historic as the rise of the factory system and as modern as the “garage
startups” of Silicon Valley. Today, urban population in the U.S. continues to grow, surpassing 80% of the total population in 2010. Despite the growing number of citizens residing in
urban areas, several older industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest are losing inhabitants at an alarming rate (see Figure 1.1). Population in many of these cities peaked in the
1950s and 1960s before dropping sharply. Mismanaged federal transportation and housing
policies combined with the decline of the automotive and manufacturing industries led to an
out-migration of residents from central cities to surrounding suburban areas (Accordino and
Johnson 2000). For some cities, this decline slowed in the wake of mass suburbanization, but
for others population continued to dwindle as the share of manufacturing employment fell
from 28% in 1965 to 16% in 1994 (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997, 2). Not all manufacturing cities, however, continue to decline. A few successfully diversiﬁed their economies or
found other means of keeping inhabitants and attracting new ones (Garcia and Judd 2012;
Mallach 2015). At the same time, other cities made similar attempts to implement policies
but were considerably less successful in remedying their situations.
The exodus of central city residents causes grave problems for local municipalities. City
coﬀers dry up as citizens exit, taking much needed tax revenue with them. City governments
face serious ﬁscal constraints as they attempt to deal with abandonment, falling housing
and property values, and growing concentrations of disadvantaged citizens (e.g., Judd and
Swanstrom 2008). At the neighborhood level, the pattern of decline is often inconsistent.
Even when a city suﬀers tremendously from blight and abandonment as a whole, a few stable,
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even vibrant, neighborhoods often remain scattered throughout the urban landscape. The
variation in patterns of population change, both across cities and within cities, generates
my core research question: why are some cities better able to overcome the challenges of
deindustrialization and economic restructuring?
Many scholars agree that economic conditions—especially changing industrial landscapes
and unemployment—aﬀect the exit rate of a population (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982;
for a review see Kantor and Turok 2012). Political economists argue that mobile citizens
“vote with their feet” and relocate to municipalities that oﬀer them the best package of
taxes and services (Tiebout 1956). Urban historians point to the role of institutionalized
racism and politically motivated decision-making in facilitating decline (e.g., Avila and Rose
2009; Teaford 2000). There is a general consensus across the urban politics literatures that
poor governance and economic turmoil cause residents to relocate, but we lack suﬃcient
empirical knowledge about why others choose to stay. Experts have only begun to explore
how resource distribution, civic activism, and government responsiveness at the local level
can aﬀect urban decline. I argue that in a postindustrial, global world the strength of
civil society serves as the key determinant in whether a city will stabilize, grow, or decline.
Cities with a stronger, more vibrant civil society are more likely to overcome the obstacles
associated with deindustrialization and economic restructuring.
To test this theory, I explore factors inﬂuencing changes in population at both the local
and national level. At the national level, city is the unit of analysis—speciﬁcally, the 231
cities in the U.S. with population greater than 100,000 for at least one year between 1970 and
2010. At the local level, neighborhood serves as the unit of analysis. For the neighborhood
level investigation, I turn to Detroit, Michigan. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be
noted that this project evolved from a personal interest in Detroit. The recent indictment
and subsequent conviction of [former] Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick on charges of racketeering
and extortion (among others), the city’s epic ﬁnancial crisis, and the continued outmigration
of residents over the last few decades sparked my curiosity. This curiosity led me to wonder:
What is happening in other cities? Is Detroit really so unique? And is there anything that
can be done to stop the exodus of Detroit residents? I wanted to learn more about what was
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Fig. 1.1. Population Change for 231 of the Largest U.S. Cities by Census Region
Notes: Plots show decennial population change by census region for each of the 231 cities in the
dataset.

happening in Detroit and about how Detroit compared to peer cities. It was out of these
musings that a dissertation was born.

1.2

Project Background

This project is concerned with the long-term viability of cities, speciﬁcally looking at
patterns of urban growth and decline. Economic indicators, including changes in income,
employment, and housing prices, are all valid indicators of urban change. Nevertheless,
this research follows Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982) and uses population change as
a proxy for urban decline (see also Beauregard 2001). Declining population levels can be
directly linked to geographically deﬁned regions—cities or neighborhoods. In contrast, falling
income and employment levels within a particular location may be the byproduct of changing
economic conditions in the surrounding area. While the existence and well-being of cities
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does, indeed, depend on economic stability, it also depends on retaining people. The two are
intimately related. People pay taxes and provide the work force necessary to grow business;
they also grow the local economy as consumers. There can be no city without people.
Out of the 231 cities to be examined in Chapter 4, 130 experienced decline in at least one
of the four decades covered. Of the four census regions depicted in Map 1.1, the Northeast
and Midwest regions are home to nearly all of the post-industrial cities that have been
especially prone to population loss. To illustrate, Figure 1.1 displays population change for
each city by census region and decade. Figure 1.1 conﬁrms that, in each period, there are
more declining cities in the Northeast and Midwest than there are in the South or the West.
This regional disparity is a corollary of rapid industrialization followed by a momentous
period of deindustrialization. To expound on this point, a brief digression is in order.
During U.S. industrialization, the American Manufacturing Belt emerged as a network of
industrial hubs for steel and automotive manufacturing spanning from the Atlantic seaboard
to the Mississippi River (de Geer 1927). Railways and canal systems connected ports along
the eastern seaboard to the resource rich Great Lakes region. The regional development of
this “belt” followed steel from port to manufacturer; canals and waterways, for example,
connected shipping ports in Baltimore to Detroit and then on to Saint Louis. In the aftermath of World War II, cities in the region experienced a great surge in manufacturing, but
this war-era boom was quickly followed by economic decline and by 1970 deindustrialization
was in full swing (e.g., Beauregard 2009). Cities lost large shares of their industrial bases,
while factories aged and suburbanization ﬂourished. As Garcia and Judd (2012) explain,
“the deindustrialization of the 1970s exerted its eﬀects most deeply in the cities and regions
that relied upon extractive and manufacturing activities” (487). The Steel City (Pittsburgh)
and Motor City (Detroit) alike lost manufacturing jobs and swarms of people. Once America’s great Manufacturing Belt, this web of aging (“rusting”) industrial cities is now more
commonly known as the Rustbelt.
Rustbelt cities in particular have suﬀered some of the greatest losses in population.
Reaching this conclusion requires committing to a concrete geographic demarcation, but
scholars and laymen alike disagree on the exact boundaries of the Rustbelt (Wilson and
Anderson 2013). The general consensus, however, is that the Rustbelt includes the manu-
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facturing and industrial areas in the Midwestern and Northeastern census regions. Michigan,
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are the states most often associated with the term. To produce
the best, evidence-based representation of the Rustbelt, I examined historical mappings of
the Manufacturing Belt dating as far back as 1919 alongside newer mappings of the Rustbelt.
The images depicted in Map 1.2 represent a sample of the various geographic conceptualizations of the Manufacturing Belt and Rustbelt. Using GIS software, I created a geographic
boundary for the Rustbelt that includes the area where at least 2 of the previous mappings
overlap.
As Map 1.3 illustrates, 68 of the 231 cities in the dataset fall within the resulting bounds.
Not all of the 68 cities, however, follow the same path of decline. Some, like Green Bay, WI,
do not experience decline during any of the decades under study. Cities like Chicago1 and
New York also fall within the bounds of the Rustbelt, yet are rarely thought of as similar
to Detroit, MI; Gary, IN; or Buﬀalo, NY—all of which match conventional descriptions of
industrial cities on the decline. Interestingly, population change for New York follows the
same course as most of the other Rustbelt cities. Levels of population change rise and fall
during the same decades. In reality, these cities are more alike than they are diﬀerent. Even
though this classiﬁcation is clearly imperfect, it provides a useful division for looking at how
cities in the region diﬀer from cities elsewhere in the country. The classiﬁcation is also a
practical reference point for comparing Detroit to “peer cities.”
Table 1.1 compares demographic averages for Rustbelt cities to averages across all of
the cities in the sample (i.e., grand means). According to the table, the grand mean for
population change is positive for each decade. In contrast, average population change for
Rustbelt cities is negative in 1980 and 1990 while in 2000 and 2010 population is relatively
stable. Rustbelt cities are in fact seeing more decline than cities in general, even when the
geographic classiﬁcation is less than perfect.
Consistent with conventional thinking, manufacturing is a larger share of industry in
the Rustbelt compared with all large cities. But, in all cities—Rustbelt cities included—
manufacturing as a share of industry drops in every decade, though, these decade drops are
1

Fun fact: In a recent book, Andrew Diamond (2017) calls Chicago “a combination of Manhattan smashed
against Detroit.”
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consistently larger for Rustbelt cities. By 2010, the average share of manufacturing for the
Rustbelt is much closer to the national average for large cities. At the same time, economic
diversity2 —a measure of industry variety based on employment—is only slightly lower for
Rustbelt cities compared to all cities in each decade. For all cities, including those in the
Rustbelt, economic diversity changes very little between 1970 and 1990 but then declines
signiﬁcantly in 2000 and 2010. This means that, on average, city inhabitants are employed
in a narrower range of industries during more recent decades.
Note, that as the diversity of employment contracts, average unemployment grows; this
trend is especially apparent in the Rustbelt. In 1970, average unemployment for Rustbelt
cities was almost identical to average unemployment for all cities. Over time, average unemployment increased faster in Rustbelt cities compared to all large cities. By 2010, cities were,
in general, characterized by less manufacturing, less economic diversity, and more unemployment than they had been in previous decades. These economic trends are a manifestation
of deindustrialization.
Detroit’s economic diversity looks very similar to the average Rustbelt city. The share
of manufacturing in Detroit is higher than in peer Rustbelt cities for every decade. The
decline in manufacturing share is, however, much more pronounced in Detroit, dropping
from 35.78% in 1970 to 12.44% in 2010. The increase in unemployment in Detroit is also
substantial. In 1970, large U.S. cities averaged 4.66% unemployment while Detroit was at
7.19%, a diﬀerence of 2.53 percentage points. By 2010, this unemployment gap had spread to
16.35 percentage points (26.38% in Detroit compared to 10.03% for all cities). With respect
to economic characteristics, Detroit experiences trends similar to its peer cities, but these
trends are much more pronounced in Detroit.
Bradburry, Downs, and Small (1982) observe that “once begun, big-city population decline sets in motion certain self-reinforcing forces likely to perpetuate it” (12). Tax revenues
fall as people exit leaving cities unable to sustain their infrastructure (Chernick, Langley,
and Reschovsky 2011). Physical decay and abandonment lower surrounding property values
2

Economic diversity is measured using the Gini-Simpson Index, which accounts for both richness (the number
of industries) and evenness (the relative abundance of the diﬀerent industries making up the richness).
Diversity ranges from 0 to 100 where cities have higher diversity scores when their residents are employed in
a wider array of industries with more abundant employment in many of the industries. The operationalization
of economic diversity is explained in detail in Chapter 4.
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Table 1.1. Demographic and Socioeconomic Averages for 231 Large U.S. Cities Compared with Rustbelt Cities and Detroit
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and increase the likelihood of crime. More residents exit as living conditions decline. The
most mobile residents are the ﬁrst to leave. These citizens are better oﬀ ﬁnancially, tend to
be more educated, and are disproportionately White.
In their summary of previous work on population change, Chi and Ventura (2011) explain
that “population growth (or decline) is determined jointly by demographic, social, economic,
political, geographic, and cultural forces as well as temporal and spatial inﬂuences” (1).
When mobile residents ﬂee from deteriorating communities, the poorest citizens with the
fewest resources at their disposal are left behind. Table 1.1 conﬁrms that, in general, median
income for large cities continues to decline while the share of impoverished residents steadily
increases over time, especially in Rustbelt cities.
Over time, poverty becomes more geographically concentrated as middle and upperincome people move out, contributing to the social isolation of poor neighborhoods (Wilson
1987). A long history of de jure and de facto discriminatory urban policy practically ensures
that these neighborhoods are home to people of color (e.g., Massey and Denton 1993; Sugrue
1996; Rothstein 2017). In fact, Greenblatt, Clark, and Wanlund (2013) report that “between
1960 and 1970, the white population of the 20 largest Northeastern and Midwestern cities
fell by more than 2.5 million, or 13 percent” (100). On average, the share of White residents
continues to shrink for large cities in the Rustbelt and elsewhere, as can be seen in Table
1.1. Indeed, the aggregate trends for race and ethnicity across all cities reﬂect theories of
white ﬂight. The share of White residents declines each decade while the shares of Black and
Hispanic populations increase at the same time. Compared to the sample average across all
cities, the share of Black residents is higher while the share of Hispanic residents is lower in
the Rustbelt for every decade.
For Detroit, median income is well below the mean for Rustbelt cities. Similarly, Detroit’s
share of poverty far exceeds the average across peer cities in the Rustbelt. Racially, the
cleavages that develop over time in Rustbelt cities are more expansive in Detroit. The
proportion of Black residents in Detroit in 1970 was already much higher than in peer cities.
This gap widened even more over the next few decades. At the same time, the share of
White residents plummeted. In 2010, Detroit was 82.69% Black and 10.61% White, whereas
the average Rustbelt city had 26.51% Black residents and 57.58% White.

12
1.3
1.3.1

“Solutions” to Population Decline

Typical“Solutions”

The existing literature on urban decline has done much to explain the causes and consequences of population loss, but explanations of how decline can be mitigated or reversed
remain quite rudimentary. Mitigation strategies concerned with the economic health of a
city are the solutions most often cited for curbing decline (e.g., Kantor and Turok 2012).
Purely economic solutions to “bring back jobs,” diversify the economy, or revitalize downtown work for some cities, but they fail for others. While there is certainly evidence that
economic diversiﬁcation and investment can help to stabilize an urban area—think Chicago’s
successful downtown expansion of tourist and entertainment destinations—there are also
plenty of instances where similar strategies have met with less success and, in some cases,
have inﬂamed already tenuous circumstances—the St. Louis Rams’ departure for Los Angeles, for example, left the city with an empty stadium and $144 million of debt (Respaut
2016; Schrotenboer 2017).
Even when economic solutions do bring jobs and people back, the residents who weathered
the tough times are unlikely to beneﬁt from the growth. In fact, downtown revitalization
eﬀorts, whether they work or not, tend to concentrate new jobs and new people in small
portions of the city, “further exacerbating the economic, spatial, and racial divides that have
historically characterized these cities” (Mallach 2015, 444). Furthermore, economic solutions
of this type are notorious for heightening existing inequalities even when they fail.
The budgets of many struggling cities, especially the large, post-industrial cities of the
Rustbelt, are stretched thin, forcing local decision makers to rely on infusions of federal
funding. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program has been an essential
source of funding for cities in decline since the mid 1970s. The CDBG program is the longest
continually running block grant program administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The longevity of this particular style of funding program presents a
unique opportunity to explore the eﬀects of local allocations over time on population change.
Additionally, the program has endured for over 40 years despite various attempts to do away
with it entirely (Rich 2014). Accordingly, the time period for my research inquiry begins
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in 1970, prior to the enactment of the CDBG program, and chronicles its evolution over 40
years (1970-2010).
Targeted government investments can provide relief for cities and neighborhoods facing
urban decay, at least in theory. In practice, citizens’ needs often take a back seat to electoral considerations and economic interests. In their examination of the ﬁrst seven years of
the CDBG program, Wong and Peterson (1986) show how the program’s “loosely deﬁned
requirements” led to electorally rewarding policy choices over redistributive, needs-based
targeting in Baltimore and Milwaukee (297). When urban conditions deteriorate and local
government fails to respond, dissatisﬁed residents are left with a choice—exit or voice.

1.3.2

Civil Society Explanation

Building on Albert Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework, I argue in
the chapters to follow that the strength of civil society serves as the key determinant in
whether a city or neighborhood will stabilize, grow, or decline. As I explain in Chapter 3,
Hirschman (1970) recognizes that real life decision-making is often a choice between leaving
or making one’s concerns known. His framework explains that citizens base their residential
location decisions on the quality of their neighborhood. When confronted with decline,
residents choose to exit or voice. Exit is a market mechanism in the traditional economic
sense—moving to a new community. Voice is a political mechanism whereby consumervoters articulate their dissatisfaction with declining conditions. The third component in
the framework, loyalty, is the attachment individuals feel toward their community. Loyalty
aﬀects decisions to exit or voice.
In Chapter 3, I argue that loyalty is one component of a larger force—civil society.
Stronger civil societies maintain a larger stock of social capital. Lin (2001) deﬁnes social
capital as “resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized
in purposive actions” (29). Neighborhood social institutions provide a forum for deliberation and participation in political life and provide places where citizens come together and
learn“habits of co-operation” (Fukuyama 2001, 11). These organizations coordinate action
and broker resources—speciﬁcally, CDBG funding—while fostering strong social ties among
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community members (Small 2006). Community ties dissuade residents from moving elsewhere. Where connections between neighbors and people’s networks are stronger and trust
is deeper, there is a greater sense of community and an increased likelihood that citizens
will mobilize collectively in pursuit of a common goal. Instead of exiting in reaction to signs
of decline, citizens embedded in a stronger civil society will be more likely to voice their
preferences instead.

1.4

Chapter Overview and Important Operationalizations

My aim in the chapters to follow is to explore the ways in which civil society inﬂuences
population change while considering the appropriate historical, social, economic, and political
contexts. I also evaluate local leaders’ ability to leverage CDBG funding in ways that help
to slow the outmigration of their residents. I empirically test these hypotheses using a mixed
methods approach combining historical narrative, multilevel modeling, and spatial analysis.
Freeman (2006) writes that “the principal condition both of and for current decisions
is previous policy. Policy makers rarely ﬁnd themselves in uncharted territory. They are
much more often confronted by the legacy of previous decisions and the problems they have
addressed, solved, and sometimes reproduced” (373). To this end, Chapter 2 begins with
the historical legacy of federal housing and community development policies and ends with
a discussion of the current state of the CDBG program.
Prior to the authorization of the CDBG program, federal policies enacted between 1930
and 1950 played a dual-role in facilitating urban decline. Homeownership and highway assistance programs incentivized Whites to move to surrounding suburban areas while explicitly
denying the same access to Black Americans (Rothstein 2017). The resulting white ﬂight
contributed to depopulation and increased the share of impoverished residents in central
cities. Federal policies concerned with urban renewal and public housing dislocated poor,
minority residents to neighborhoods already in decline further segregating cities (Avila and
Rose 2009; Massey and Denton 1993).
President Johnson’s Great Society programs and the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s
oﬀered hope to central city inhabitants. But sweeping legislation and the largest social
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movement in modern American history failed to achieve lasting change. Segregation and
discrimination persisted while poverty continued to concentrate in the most deteriorating
quarters of urban America. In the 1970s, deindustrialization and economic stagﬂation added
new economic woes to the growing list of urban problems. It was within this context that
the CDBG program was formulated and authorized.
As Davis B. Bobrow (2006) reminds us, “public policy never begins with a blank slate”
(573). Indeed, the CDBG program built on previous policies—policies that essentially failed
for the most marginalized groups in America’s central cities. For decades, federal housing,
transportation, and community development policies facilitated segregation and restricted
the social and economic mobility of the most underrepresented factions in society. “The
public policies of yesterday,” according to Rothstein (2017),“still shape the racial landscape
of today” (178). It would be nonsensical to think that decades of institutional inequality
would have no bearing on the more recent state of cities or their ability to eﬀectively mitigate
decline. Consequently, local decision makers’ eﬀorts to halt decline are constrained by past
policy decisions in addition to economic and social pressures. Given these constraints, I test
the eﬀectiveness of civil society and CDBG investment strategies on mitigating decline while
accounting for changing socioeconomic dynamics—speciﬁcally, deepening concentrations of
disadvantage—and underlying spatial and temporal inﬂuences. The exposition to follow also
explores new, innovative ways of examining urban processes at various levels of analysis.
Before turning to the empirical assessments, Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical argument. The chapter expands on some of the classic work from urban political economy (e.g.,
Fukuyama 2001; Tiebout 1956; Peterson 1981) and sociology (e.g., Putnam 1993, 2000;
Small 2006). Building from Hirschman’s (1970) theory of loyalty, the chapter explains how
stronger civil societies foster community attachments and facilitate collective action. I posit
that the strength of civil society, measured by its organizational infrastructure and the collective capacity of its citizens, determines whether population will remain stable or decline.
Communities endowed with an abundance of social capital are in a better position to maintain their residents and express their preferences to local governments. In turn, governments
that meet the needs of their residents increase the likelihood that those residents will remain.
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Existing research, however, shows that local governments often prioritize economic interests and mobile citizens over disadvantaged residents. What local level decision makers
choose to do or not do inﬂuences residents’ decisions to exit or voice. Self-interested decision
making on the part of local oﬃcials can mean neglecting some of the most deteriorating areas
in a city. The same can happen when local leaders focus solely on stimulating the economy.
Poor decision-making by local government weakens civil society. Consequently, urban conditions worsen causing residents who feel ignored or disenfranchised to abandon the city. This
dynamic between civil society and local government decision making is explored in Chapter
4.
Speciﬁcally, Chapter 4 looks at how local CDBG investment strategies and civil society
inﬂuence population change while controlling for traditional determinants of growth and decline. In testing the theoretical framework, the analysis also considers the changing dynamics
of socioeconomic disadvantage while allowing cities to vary in their internal processes. To
do this, multilevel modeling techniques account for changes over time within cities and also
diﬀerences among cities.
Existing scholarship conceptualizes the interconnectedness of social and economic disadvantages associated with cities and urban neighborhoods in a variety of ways (discussed in
Chapter 5). As such, the analytical chapters to follow use two diﬀerent operationalizations,
each appropriate to the particular scale of analysis. In Chapter 4, I use an index measure
to capture multiple dimensions of social and economic disadvantage at the city level similar
to measures used by Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997). Five variables are highly associated
and load on a single factor of socioeconomic disadvantage: racial composition (percentage
black), poverty, percentage female-headed households with children, unemployment, and
median household income.
Chapter 4 uses a city’s collective capacity and its associational membership density to
assess the relative strength of civil society (detailed descriptions are provided in Chapter
4). Data availability proved to be an important obstacle in operationalizing social capital
at the city level.3 Consistent, historical data collected speciﬁcally at the city level going
back to 1970 are quite limited. Consequently, the collective capacity of a city is measured
3

The United States Census Bureau classiﬁes cities as “places.”
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only by its voter turnout. Voter turnout measures the relative “loudness” of citizen voice
and indicates a communities’ potential for collective action (e.g., Aldrich 2012; Aldrich and
Crook 2008; Coﬀe and Geys 2005; Grimes and Esaiasson 2014; Go 2014; Hamilton 1993;
Putnam 2000). Membership in religious institutions measures the density of associational
life. Although various other membership organization types have been used to measure social
ties, data at the city level dating back to 1970 are either unavailable or inconsistent. Urban
religious institutions are, however, a reasonable proxy as they are well-known for providing
community services (Putnam 2000) and have special historical importance for community
organizing, especially among Black communities (McAdam 1982).
The results from Chapter 4 provide a ﬁrst look at the eﬀectiveness of civil society and
government investment for 231 large U.S. cities over the span of four decades. Increased
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage are consistently linked to population decline. Stronger
civil society, measured by the collective capacity of its members, has a positive longitudinal
eﬀect on population change, meaning individual cities beneﬁt from increasing the capacity
of civil society over time. Government investment strategies can also stimulate growth over
time within cities. Interestingly, comparing across cities, levels of social capital and CDBG
investment cannot discern which cities will grow or decline.
Although multilevel models can empirically test causal relationships, the city level results
are interpreted more as “sophisticated descriptive statistics” that inform the neighborhood
level examination of Detroit (Dekker 2007). City level analysis tells us something very
general about aggregate processes while ignoring the possibility that there may be quite a
bit of variation at the local level, meaning within cities. The multilevel modeling technique
used in Chapter 4 looks at both within-city and between-city eﬀects, taking the ﬁrst step in
moving away from these broad generalizations. The results from Chapter 4 do not, however,
reﬂect neighborhood variation or explain how these processes work in practice at the local
level. Writing in 2015, Weaver and Holtkamp explain that “analyzing urban change demands
attention to multiple spatial scales and location-speciﬁc features, particularly the distribution
of social capital within a city” (286). Most of the existing work on urban decline, however,
is at the city level. To ﬁll this gap, Chapters 5 and 6 examine neighborhoods in Detroit,
Michigan.
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At the aggregate, Detroit is an extreme case of decline. But upon closer inspection it is
clear that, like most cities, neighborhoods in Detroit vary substantially. Doucet and Smit
(2016) observe that “rather than being unique, Detroit is an extreme example of fragmented
and polarized urbanism which is part and parcel of contemporary cities” (635). From this
perspective, Detroit is more than a case with a dramatic outcome; it is a potential bellwether
for cities facing some of the very same obstacles. Kirkpatrick (2016) echoes this thinking,
stating that “although the ‘Motor City’ is an extreme case, it is by no means anomalous. In
fact, quite the opposite is true: Detroit ‘ampliﬁes’ and displays in ‘microcosm’ the large, and
incredibly complex socioeconomic and political structures and processes that shape the fate
of cities and urban communities” (67). Neighborhood level results from Detroit, therefore,
may provide important lessons for cities facing similar circumstances.
The neighborhood level examination proceeds in two steps. First, Chapter 5 looks at
local CDBG allocation decisions. The chapter asks: Are local decision makers targeting
communities most in need? Does the strength of local civil society help neighborhoods secure
needed resources? Chapter 6 builds on the insights gained from the city-level analysis in
Chapter 4 and the research on CDBG funding allocations in Chapter 5. Speciﬁcally, Chapter
6 examines the forces that inﬂuence population growth and decline in Detroit neighborhoods.
The chapter addresses the hypothesis that combined civil society and local government
investment best predict population stability.
To gauge the extent of community need, Chapters 5 and 6 use an index of concentrated
disadvantage similar to the one used by Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush (2008; see also
Morenoﬀ, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson 2012). The measure of concentrated
disadvantage used for the neighborhood-level analysis diﬀers slightly from the measure of
socioeconomic disadvantage used for the city-level analysis in Chapter 4. Although slightly
diﬀerent, both operationalizations are well-suited to their speciﬁc level of analysis.
For the concentrated disadvantage index, six variables are highly associated and load
on a single factor: percentage poverty, unemployment, share of single mothers, percentage
children under 5, percentage of households receiving public assistance, and percentage of the
population with a high school degree or less. Detroit neighborhoods are predominately Black
so, not surprisingly, measures of racial composition did not load with the other variables
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typically included in such indices. Detroit’s ethnic and racial composition is the product
of enduring segregation—a problem closely linked to theories of decline and urban politics
more broadly. The politics of race have played an important role in urban development for
decades and will be discussed throughout the chapters.
The index of concentrated disadvantage is also distinct from other measures of disadvantage (in Chapter 4 and elsewhere) because it includes a measure of educational attainment.
Hartley (2013) notes that when compared to peer cities, educational attainment is especially
low for Detroit residents. When it comes to improving urban conditions, Hartley points out
that higher educational attainment is linked to increases in income and housing prices as well
as population growth in other Rustbelt cities. For Detroit, this missing “human capital” is
just one more characteristic working against recovery.
The neighborhood-level measures of civil society used in Chapters 5 and 6 also diﬀer
slightly from the city-level operationalizations used in Chapter 4. The analyses in Chapters
5 and 6 utilize more recent data providing a wider range of measures from which to draw.
Using data from 2000 and 2010, a single index measure of collective capacity was developed
for the neighborhood level analyses. As in Chapter 4, the measure of collective capacity
captures citizen voice (turnout in the mayoral election). A proxy for socially cooperative
attitudes (census response rate) was also available at the neighborhood level for the time
period under investigation. This proxy, along with the proxy for citizen voice loaded on a
single dimension of civil society representing collective capacity.
At the neighborhood level, the density of neighborhood institutions captures the organizational dimension of civil society. As in Chapter 4, religious institutions are considered an
important part of local social networks. Instead of measuring membership, though, I use the
number of organizations (per capita) following previous scholarship (Aldrich 2011b; Curley
2010; Go 2014; Sampson 2012). Childcare centers are also included as appropriate neighborhood institutions for brokering resources (Small 2006). The two types of institutions are
accounted for in a single index of organizational density that measures the strength of civil
society’s organizational infrastructure.
The analysis in Chapter 5 provides partial support for the civil society argument. When
it comes to securing resources, civil society’s organizational infrastructure proves to be an
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important means for obtaining urban goods and services. Neighborhoods with a larger
organizational resource base are better at attracting CDBG projects. Organizational density
performs especially well in better-oﬀ neighborhoods—meaning those with very low levels of
disadvantage. In these communities, civil society’s organizational infrastructure provides an
eﬀective means to broker resources.
Collective capacity, in contrast, has no eﬀect in these well-to-do neighborhoods. In communities with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, the collective capacity of neighborhood residents turns out to be a liability rather than an asset. Greater collective capacity
actually weakens the prospects of gaining a CDBG project in these communities.
Chapter 6 tests the extent to which civil society’s strength can inﬂuence population
change while also considering social, economic, and spatial context. Social data have, almost by default, a spatial component. Simply mapping population change across Detroit
neighborhoods, for example, reveals clusters of neighborhoods in decline. Furthermore, population change in one neighborhood may be aﬀected by crime rates or property abandonment
in an adjacent neighborhood. In addition, explanatory variables may vary geographically in
their eﬀects. I utilize spatial analysis techniques in Chapter 6 to capture these “neighborhood
eﬀects” (e.g., Sampson 2012).
Mapping and then comparing the spatial distributions of individual variables also gives
initial insights on how relationships may vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. Local
regression techniques (i.e., Geographic Weighted Regression) reveal that eﬀects do in fact
vary spatially for almost every covariate tested. One of the more novel contributions of this
research is the identiﬁcation of various spatial processes that aﬀect the relationships between
key variables and population change.
The local regression model performs quite well in various quarters of the city, but for
diﬀerent reasons. Racial and ethnic diversity, for instance, predicts population growth in
the southwestern portion of the city and predicts population decline in the northern part
of the city. The measures of civil society also vary geographically in their eﬀects as do the
conditional eﬀects of CDBG spending. Consequently, the theory that combined strong civil
society and targeted government investment best predict population stability only plays out
in parts of the city. It is not always clear why such variations exist—a point I return to
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when discussing future avenues of inquiry in Chapter 7. But, in some cases, additional
research reveals something unique about a given region in the city. Take, for instance, the
southwestern neighborhoods in Detroit, these neighborhoods are home to a large Hispanic
population with a long history of congregation-based organizing. Latino churches in the area
were instrumental in forming a larger network of congregations in the Detroit area and have
previously been successful in soliciting local government for goods and services (Rusch 2010,
2012). In these neighborhoods, organizational density and CDBG spending on public service
projects are the key to a stable population.
As Chapter 6 will make clear, understanding neighborhood eﬀects is essential to understanding how civil society and local government investment strategies can work together to
mitigate decline. Aggregates tend to hide important variation across neighborhoods within
cities. Thus, spatial models are a valuable tool for discovering the nuances that underlie broader (aggregate) generalizations. Finally, Chapter 7 oﬀers concluding remarks and
suggestions for additional research.
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CHAPTER 2. HISTORY OF URBAN POLICY

“To understand urban politics in the United States today, the best
place to start is with the cities of the past”
– Judd and Swanstrom 2008, 13.

2.1

The Rise of the American City

Since the mid-nineteenth century, extensive urbanization—a by-product of the Industrial Revolution—has radically transformed the landscape, economy, and culture of the U.S.
(Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982; Hall, Finkelman, and Ely 2005). Technological advancements and innovation shifted the U.S. from an agrarian to industrial (and rural to urban)
society. A surplus of steel and a vast supply of natural resources helped to facilitate the
growth of automotive and manufacturing industries particularly in the Great Lakes region.
The growing network of transportation routes—including new railways and canal systems—
connected the eastern seaboard to the resources of the Midwest forming one of the most
successful manufacturing regions in the world (de Geer 1927).1 At the start of the nineteenth century less than 1% of the labor force was employed in the manufacturing sector;
this portion increased to 16.1% by 1850, 22.1% by 1900, and 25.3% by 1950.2 Consequently,
mass production and the development of the factory system drew an unprecedented number
of people to the newly emerging manufacturing cities of the Northeast and Midwest.
1

Writing in 1927, Sten de Geer claimed that the U.S. Manufacturing Belt was “by far the most important
economic region of America” and “second in the world only to the corresponding region in Europe” (235).
2
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1949. Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945: A Supplement to the
Statistical Abstract of the United States. United States Department of Commerce, Washington D.C. U.S.
Government Printing Oﬃce.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1. United States Department of Commerce, Washington D.C. U.S. Government
Printing Oﬃce.
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Immigration and the demand for labor spurred the growth of American cities into the
twentieth century subsequently altering racial, ethnic, and class dynamics in American society (Tolnay 2003). Rapid expansion and diversiﬁcation of city populations led to social
tensions and problems with overcrowding. Native-born Protestants, whose ancestors had
doubtlessly immigrated to America themselves, welcomed newer immigrants with hostility and disdain (Judd and Swanstrom 2008). Not surprisingly, immigrants concentrated in
neighborhoods based on shared ethnic and cultural identities in reaction to this social intolerance. African Americans faced similar resentments throughout the twentieth century as
millions moved north (Gregory 2009). Especially in the post-WWII industrial cities, racial
redlining and racially restrictive covenants dictated where newly arriving Black Americans
could live and what housing they could buy. The resulting residential settlement patterns
exempliﬁed the growing economic and social inequality brought on by rapid urbanization.
Social tensions rose throughout the 1900s, exacerbated by the economic shock of the Great
Depression and the expansion of federal intervention into economic and social policy. Racist
attitudes and discriminatory practices forced urban Blacks into the worst neighborhoods and
lowest paying jobs. Discrimination in housing and labor markets limited residential choice for
Black Americans, further segregating cities and concentrating poverty geographically (e.g.,
Massey and Denton 1993). Overcrowding became more proliﬁc while physical conditions in
many of these neighborhoods deteriorated rapidly (Avila and Rose 2009). As more minorities
relocated to central cities, the white middle class moved out of the central city in reaction
to changing racial compositions. Eventually, middle-class Black Americans would follow in
pursuit of better employment opportunities and housing (Wilson 1987). Even before the
onset of deindustrialization, urban conditions for many of the manufacturing cities of the
Rustbelt were in decline and people had already begun to leave in record numbers (Rich
2014).
Research in the areas of urban history, geography, and policy suggests that historically,
federal homeownership, public housing, and urban renewal policies meant to help cities ultimately facilitated racially segregated patterns of urban development, which are still proliﬁc in
cities today (Avila and Rose 2009; Judd and Swanstrom 2008). Sanctioned and unsanctioned
discrimination alike institutionalized discriminatory policies and practices while helping to
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create neighborhood hierarchies based on race and class. As the following sections will make
clear, federal policy, economic changes, and racism in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century
all contributed to post-industrial urban decline in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest.
The forces that determine urban growth and decline in the twenty-ﬁrst century are constrained by a long history of policy favoring particular groups and interests over others. The
following narrative explains the formation of enduring political and structural constraints
on urban growth and decline starting with housing and community development policies in
the 1930s and building to the implementation of the Community Development Block Grant
Program. Drawing on Thomas J. Sugrue’s (1996) seminal work, The Urban Crisis, I include
historical examples from Detroit, Michigan to illustrate how large-scale processes happening
across urban America manifested in a local setting.

2.2

The Postindustrial City, 1930-Present

“Rob a people generationally and there will be eﬀects”
– Ta-Nehisi Coates 2017, 289.

2.2.1

Prior to the CDBG

Federal urban policy was virtually unheard of prior to the Great Depression. In the
early 1930s, city mayors across the country, struggling with the economic and emotional
devastation brought on by the Great Depression, organized to petition their states and
the federal government for redress (Judd and Swanstrom 2008; see also Barnes 2005). When
state governments, concerned with their own ﬁscal challenges, ignored pleas from city mayors
and councils, the federal government was forced to step in. The Roosevelt administration
responded with a number of New Deal policies targeted speciﬁcally at cities.
The administration created a series of new programs and institutions such as the Federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC),3 the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
3

The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Act of 1933 created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation as part of
the New Deal “to provide relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness, to reﬁnance home mortgages,
to extend relief to the owners of homes occupied by them and who are unable to amortize their debt” (Pub.
L. 73-43 page 1, 48 Stat.128)
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Corporation, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)4 in an eﬀort to ease access to
homeownership for new homeowners and also assist current homeowners struggling to make
mortgage payments. By providing ﬁnancial support for homeownership, the administration
hoped to increase demand for new housing construction and create jobs to stimulate the
economy (Mantel 2012, 1074). Homeownership, particularly new suburban homeownership,
“became a symbol, and perhaps a stereotype, of ‘the American way of life’” (Jackson 1980,
433). But the middle-class beneﬁted at the expense of core urban neighborhoods, as these
programs did more to spur new residential growth in suburban areas than they did to improve
the living conditions of central cities (e.g., Sugrue 1996).
Federally sanctioned discriminatory underwriting practices greatly restricted neighborhood choice for African Americans who were excluded from federal home loan programs until
the late 1940s. Ideologically, federal housing oﬃcials aligned themselves with “the real estate and banking industry’s view that racially segregated neighborhoods were the soundest
investments” (Judd and Swanstrom 2008, 144). The HOLC developed a real estate appraisal system based on “Residential Security Maps” that assigned a rating for every block
in the city (Jackson 1980; Light 2010). Ratings were based primarily on race, ethnicity, and
aﬄuence with little weight given to the quality of the housing stock in a neighborhood.
Eligibility for FHA-backed loan guarantees depended on a system of maps illustrating
mortgage risk ratings much like the maps used by the HOLC. The 1938 Underwriting Manual distributed by the FHA explicitly communicated their stance: “If a neighborhood is to
retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to
instability and a decline in values” (as cited in Halley, Eshleman, and Vijaya 2011, 110; see
also Jackson 1980). The FHA even went so far as to recommend to its ﬁeld agents the use
of racially restrictive covenants despite attempts made by the NAACP to have these recommendations removed from their underwriting manuals (Tushnet 1994). Under the FHA
rating procedures, neighborhoods with even one Black household were often declared ineli4

The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation under
Title IV, Section 402 (Pub. L. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246). The 1934 Act also created the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) under Title I “to encourage improvements in housing standards and conditions and
to provide a system of mutual mortgage insurance” (Pub. L. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246).
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gible for loan guarantees. In short, through a combination of federal and local policies, it
was eﬀectually impossible for African Americans to secure the federally subsidized mortgages
that fueled suburban growth. So while many praised Roosevelt’s New Deal for protecting the
disadvantaged, one segment of the population found themselves—in the words of Langston
Hughes—“still waitin’ on Roosevelt” (Hughes 1934).
In the 1930s and 1940s, Black neighborhoods were rarely safe from developer, business,
and local government interests. The Eight Mile–Wyoming neighborhood in Detroit, Michigan
exempliﬁes the predicament faced by Black residents wanting to improve their circumstances.
In 1941, a “developer of a proposed all-white subdivision” in northwest Detroit was rejected
for FHA-backed loans because the area he was seeking funds for was adjacent to an African
American neighborhood (Sugrue 1996, 64). As Sugrue (1996) explains, “the FHA viewed
the neighborhood as an obstacle to subsidies and insurance for the construction of singlefamily residential areas in northwest Detroit” (64). The developer eventually negotiated a
deal with the FHA whereby he committed to erecting a wall to separate White and Black
neighborhoods in return for the FHA-backed loan. Much of the wall still stands today and
digital copies of the HOLC Residential Security Maps from the time are shaded red (meaning
undesirable, high-risk investments) where the Black community resided. This last point
also helps explain why, despite owning their own land, applications for federal assistance
submitted by residents of the Eight Mile community were continually rejected.
In 1948, Thurgood Marshall, backed by the NAACP and joined by a team of lawyers5 including the Solicitor General of the United States, challenged the constitutionality of raciallybased restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1.6 In an opinion written by Chief
Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court ruled against the use of restrictive covenants, arguing
“that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States
have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the
state courts cannot stand.” Even landmark legislation, however, failed to alter the patterns
of lending in local housing markets and “it took until the late 1960s, when open-housing leg5

Speciﬁcally: Messrs. George L. Vaughn and Herman Willer, both of St. Louis, MO, for petitioners Shelley.
Messrs. Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, Loren Miller, for petitioners McGhee.
6
Mr. Philip B. Perlman, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special
leave of Court.
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islation was passed, for African American families to be able to enter the real estate market
in any meaningful sense” (Judd and Swanstrom 2008, 151).
Homeownership policies failed to address the growing concentration of low-income citizens and deteriorating housing conditions within central cities. For this reason, the United
States Housing Act of 1937 was designed, at least in theory, to improve living conditions for
disadvantaged citizens (Pub. L. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888). The Housing Act authorized federal grants-in-aid to local housing authorities for the construction of low-rent public housing
(Avila and Rose 2009; Lawrence et al. 2010) and created the United States Housing Authority. The next public Housing Act, authorized in 1949, provided cities with federal funding for
slum clearance and community redevelopment (Pub. L. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413). Slum clearance often involved bulldozing low-income neighborhoods and forcing the most marginalized
citizens to relocate to new public housing, which was almost always built in neighborhoods
already destitute and overcrowded. Teaford (2000) argues that instead of helping minorities,
public housing projects actually “preserved a pattern of residential apartheid” (448).
Returning to the Eight Mile–Wyoming area example, Sugrue (1996) explains how “the
United States Housing Authority eyed the Eight Mile area as a site for slum clearance and
the construction of public housing” (64). Likewise, the City of Detroit felt the area was
blight ridden and wanted to relocate residents to clear the way for public housing or other
redevelopment purposes. The Citizens Housing and Planning Council (CHPC), an organization that studied the area, recommended Black residents be relocated near other Black
neighborhoods so that White middle-class homeowners could buy the land thereby keeping the value of nearby neighborhoods higher. Detroit’s City Plan Commission proposed a
range of schemes from turning the neighborhood into an airport site to constructing temporary housing for war workers. Residents of the Eight Mile–Wyoming area stood their
ground, organized, and ultimately retained their neighborhood, but not without a ﬁght and
considerable concessions.
Black residents formed the Eight Mile Road Civic Association and Carver Progressive
Association and fought for their right to obtain FHA funding for single-family homes. Black
developers joined forces with the neighborhood organizations. The Federal Public Housing
Authority sided with the CHPC and city oﬃcials in favor of building temporary public
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housing on vacant lots in the area. Contentious negotiations eventually led to “a compromise,
backed by the FHA and city planning oﬃcials, to construct six hundred units of temporary
war housing—the Robert Brooks Homes—and to allow FHA subsidy of the construction of
single-family homes in the neighborhood” (Sugrue 1996, 71). In some ways, the compromise
was a win for urban Blacks ﬁnally able to secure FHA assistance to build single-family homes.
At the same time, the compromise failed to address the persistent problem of residential
segregation and actually served to undermine public housing initiatives in Detroit during a
period of serious housing shortages.
Since the 1930s, support for public housing had largely been divided along party lines.
Big-city mayors were traditionally aligned with Democratic legislators in support of public
housing.7 As the focus of the “urban problem” shifted from economic decline in the 1930s to
suburbanization in the 1950s, liberal mayors realigned themselves with business interests and
Republican congressmen in promoting urban renewal policies over public housing (Flanagan
1997). Throughout the 1950s, a number of Amendments to the 1949 Housing Act broadened
the scope of the program and signiﬁcantly increased the percentage of funds available for
nonresidential projects (Slayton 1966). Flanagan (1997) claims that the 1954 Amendment8
essentially “replaced public housing with commercially oriented urban renewal,” thereby
marking a new direction in urban policy (265). The 1949 Act was amended again in 1956 to
authorize relocation payments to persons displaced by urban renewal.9 Despite the changes,
many urban residents, especially minorities, continued to be forced out of their neighborhoods
without reparations.
While federal policies concerned with urban renewal and public housing dislocated poor,
minority residents to neighborhoods already in decline, homeownership and highway assistance programs worked to segregate “inner-city blacks from suburban whites and middle
class from poor” (Judd and Swanstrom 2008, 129). Federal transportation and housing policies of the 1950s and 1960s fueled the out-migration of white, middle-class residents from the
city core to the newly developing suburbs (Accordino and Johnson 2000). Policies oﬀered
7

The U.S. Council of Mayors actually endorsed public housing in 1933 although the federal government failed
to pass legislation on public housing until 1937 (Flanagan 1997).
8
The Housing Act of 1954 (Pub. L. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590).
9
The Housing Act of 1956 (Pub. L. 84-1020, 70 Stat. 1091).
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mortgage subsidies geared towards suburban home ownership and low tax rates on surrounding land in order to develop highway systems. As a result, middle-income neighborhoods in
the city were either abandoned completely or taken over by low-income residents.
In the 1960s, as industrial cores hollowed out, racial tensions and persistent poverty
shaped the federal policy agenda. The powerful African American voting bloc, especially in
the densely populated cities of the Midwest and Northeast, and the looming national crisis
helped elect John F. Kennedy and pushed the Kennedy administration to focus more on civil
rights. Not surprisingly, the number of grant programs intended to address social problems
in urban areas tripled in the period between 1960 and 1968 (Sapotichne 2010).
In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063, which prohibited discrimination in federally funded housing.10 Civil rights legislation in the 1960s also took aim
at discriminatory practices in housing and community development. Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, initiated by the Kennedy administration and passed during the Johnson
administration, prohibited discrimination based on “race, color, or national origin” for “any
program or activity receiving Federal ﬁnancial assistance” (Pub. L. 88-352, Title VI, Section
601, 78 Stat. 241).11 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 explicitly prohibited discrimination in
housing and entrusted the newly created Department of Housing and Urban Development
with enforcing the law (Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73).12 Yet, even with these advancements
in federal legislation, local communities remained segregated by race.
Prior to his assassination, President Kennedy had fought for a cabinet-level department to
address growing problems in central cities “in part so that he could appoint Robert C. Weaver
as its head, thereby seating the ﬁrst African American in the cabinet” (Kernell, Jacobson, and
Kousser 2009, 376). The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was ﬁnally
10

Kennedy, John F. 1962. Executive Order no. 11063, Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, p. 652 (19581963).
11
Language speciﬁcally from Title VI, Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352, July 2,
1964, p. 252).
12
According to HUD, “Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental and ﬁnancing of dwellings based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin”
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/progdesc/title8 (Accessed: March
25, 2018). This 1968 Act was not, however, the ﬁrst law to determine that housing discrimination was unconstitutional. As Rothstein (2017) explains, “in 1866, Congress enforced the abolition of slavery by passing
a Civil Rights Act, prohibiting actions that it deemed perpetuated the characteristics of slavery. Actions
that made African Americans second-class citizens, such as racial discrimination in housing, were included
in the ban” (viii).
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created in 1965 under President Johnson.13 The new cabinet-level agency and President
Johnson’s War on Poverty symbolized a renewed commitment to urban inhabitants. Many of
the programs and policies enacted under the Johnson administration were designed to reduce
poverty and improve urban conditions. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, for example,
created Community Action Agencies to provide local assistance with the implementation of
Great Society programs (Pub. L. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508).14 The Agencies were charged with
promoting citizen participation, facilitating neighborhood and community organizing, and
providing a variety of training programs with the overall intention of ﬁghting poverty through
empowerment of the disadvantaged (Orlebeke and Weicher 2014).
Two years later, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966
created the Model Cities Program in an eﬀort to target neighborhoods in the most need of
assistance (Pub. L. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255). Weber and Wallace (2012) write that the Model
Cities program was the “most comprehensive, urban-focused eﬀort in the nation’s history”
(175). Despite the plethora of new programs and policies designed to rectify urban inequalities, racial tensions in the industrial cities of the north intensiﬁed as minority occupants
continued to be uprooted from one slum and moved into another. In addition, many White
urban inhabitants fought to “defend” their neighborhoods against the encroachment of dislocated, as well as upwardly mobile, Black Americans, often taking violent measures (Sugrue
1996). Discrimination also limited economic opportunities for Black Americans. Combined,
social and economic forces increased and concentrated poverty in the most deteriorating
quarters of urban America. For all the promise of the Great Society, its programs failed
to address and remedy the discrimination and inequality facing urban Black Americans.
Consequently, many large U.S. cities experienced urban riots throughout the 1960s.
Among the most notorious of the 1960s urban uprisings was the Detroit riot in the summer
of 1967. Sugrue (1996) explains how “the problems of limited housing, racial animosity, and
reduced economic opportunity for a segment of the black population in Detroit had led to
embitterment” (260-261). Central city Blacks were hit the hardest by deindustrialization
13

Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667).
Other legislation includes the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-117, 79 Stat.
451); the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476); and the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1969 (Pub. L. 91-152, 83 Stat. 379).
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because discriminatory housing practices and racist attitudes prevented them from pursuing
employment opportunities in the surrounding suburban areas (Massey and Denton 1993).
According to Sugrue (1996), “growing resentment, fueled by increasing militancy in the black
community, especially among youth, who had suﬀered the brunt of economic displacement,
fueled the ﬁres of 1967” (261). Those “ﬁres” raged for ﬁve days and left 43 dead.15

2.3

The CDBG Era

Although economic and social inequalities lingered in the decades to follow, the federal
urban policy agenda was dramatically redeﬁned in the 1970s under the Nixon and Ford administrations. The economic stagﬂation associated with the 1970s recession and the 1973
oil crisis exacerbated ﬁscal problems for central cities (Swanstrom 1985). These negative
economic shocks coupled with accelerating deindustrialization strained the U.S. economy.
As a result, policy makers shifted their focus to scaling back federal government overreach.
Indeed, one of the chief objectives of the Nixon administration was to reduce the powers
of the federal government by restoring political authority to state and local governments.
President Nixon’s New Federalism “gave local oﬃcials extraordinary latitude in deciding
how to spend federal money” (Judd and Swanstrom 2008, 165; see also Rich 1993). Nixon
wanted an expansive overhaul of housing and community development legislation (Keating
and Smith 1996). In 1971, Nixon sent Congress a general revenue-sharing program and six
special revenue-sharing proposals, including a special revenue-sharing program for community development (Rich 2014; see also Orlebeke and Weicher 2014). Congress failed to enact
“any of the special revenue-sharing proposals,” so after winning reelection in 1973 Nixon
called a moratorium on all major housing and community development programs in 1974 to
force Congress into action (Orlebeke and Weicher 2014, 25). Nixon, however, resigned before
a ﬁnal bill could make it to his desk.
Within a few weeks of assuming oﬃce, President Ford signed into law the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633). The measure had
passed Congress with wide support—377 to 21 in the House and 84 to 0 in the Senate. The
15
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1974 Act combined 7 categorical grant programs16 into one Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG). The new block grant was intended to reduce federal government intervention
and give local municipalities more decision-making autonomy (Barnes 2005; Sapotichne 2010;
Wong and Peterson 1986).
The CDBG program was designed speciﬁcally to address community needs with a focus on
housing, neighborhood rehabilitation, and economic development. Section 104 (b)(2) of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 laid out three broad national objectives
for the program: “giving maximum feasible priority to activities which will beneﬁt low- or
moderate-income families; aiding in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight; or
meeting other community development needs having a particular urgency” (as summarized
by Rich 2014, 54). Funding allocations were based on a formula that gave weight to three
factors: population (25%), extent of poverty (50%), and extent of housing overcrowding
(25%). The formula-based method for determining allocations and the non-speciﬁc language
of the national objectives have been two major points of contention since the program’s
inception.
The original allocation formula put industrial cities of the Midwest and Northeast at
a disadvantage (Rich 2014). The cities most in need of aid in these regions were losing
the greatest number of inhabitants (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 for an illustration) and
had the largest stock of older—often deteriorating—housing (e.g., Orlebeke and Weicher
2014). Under the 1974 formula, as a city’s population continued to decline, so too would its
allocation of CDBG funding.
In 1977, the Carter administration and critics of the current CDBG allocation formula
pressed Congress for changes that would beneﬁt older cities that were more in need of
assistance. The administration proposed “changing the population measure to a growth-lag
factor to take into account both population loss and slow growth” (Dommel and Rich 1987,
554). Additionally, proponents of a new formula argued that funding allocations needed
to account for physical distress. A Brookings Institute study on the matter reported that
16
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measures for the extent of poverty and overcrowded housing were strongly correlated and
that given this association “the overcrowded housing factor has the eﬀect of further weighting
the poverty criterion” (Nathan et al. 1977, 186). The Brookings report also argued in favor
of “speciﬁc measures of physical need to serve as an index of the conditions of a community’s
physical environment” (Nathan et al. 1977, 187). In response, House Bill 6655 proposed a
new formula that substituted a population growth lag measure in place of total population,
reduced the weight given for the extent of poverty, and replaced the extent of housing
overcrowding with the age of housing stock. Supporters of the new formula argued that it
better accounts for cities that are losing population while more adequately capturing physical
need.
The proposed House bill increased overall CDBG funding, “but the dual formula boosted
the share of money going to entitlement communities in the Northeast and Midwest” [emphasis in original] (Dommel and Rich 1987, 554). Not surprisingly, during congressional
negotiations over formula revisions representatives were divided geographically with an overwhelming bi-partisan majority of legislators from the South and West opposing the changes.
On May 10, 1977, Representative Mark Hannaford (D-CA34) put forth an amendment to
strike the new alternative formula from the bill. The amendment was rejected 149-261. Map
2.1 illustrates the clear geographic split. Those opposed to the bill were largely from districts
in the Northeast and Midwest. In fact, 95% of the votes cast in the Northeast and 88% of
the votes cast in the Midwest were in opposition to the bill. Not surprisingly, legislators from
the South and West were more likely to vote in favor of the bill (72% and 60% of favorable
votes cast, respectively).
After much debate, Congress established a dual formula system for allocating CDBG
funding. In the ﬁnal bill, the original allocation formula was retained and the House bill
formula was added as an alternative option. As part of the compromise, the dual formula
system requires HUD to calculate the amount for each grantee under both formulas and
then award the larger of the two amounts (Rich 2014). A comparison of the two formulas is
provided in Table 2.1.
The Carter administration was also concerned that local communities were not prioritizing lower-income neighborhoods. In 1977, HUD Secretary Patricia Harris urged Congress

Map 2.1. Roll Call Vote 199 (May 10, 1977) Amendment to Strike Dual Formula
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Table 2.1. Community Development Block Grant Formulas
Formula A

Formula B

25% * population
50% * poverty
25% * housing overcrowding

20% * population growth lag
30% * poverty
50% * pre-1940 housing

Note: A ratio is calculated for each factor comparing the particular city to all
metropolitan areas. The amount of funding is equal to the weighted average
of the three ratios based on the percentages listed.

to include language that made low- and moderate-income targeting a clear priority in the
CDBG’s reauthorization legislation (Rich 1993). The Senate attempted to comply with
Secretary Harris’s request, but was rebuked by members of the House. Consequently, the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 changed only the language of the national
objectives from “low or moderate income” to “low- and moderate-income” (Lovell 1983; Orlebeke and Weicher 2014).17 Dismayed, HUD proposed a rule requiring grantees to allocate
at least 75% of their CDBG funds toward projects that beneﬁt low- and moderate-income
(LMI) areas. At the time, House members and local government oﬃcials opposed this move.
In an eﬀort to appease resistant parties, “the 75 percent beneﬁt ﬁgure was retained for the
communities’ three year development and housing plans but was not applied to the annual
application” in the 1977 reauthorization of the program (Lovell 1983, 87-88).18
The political dynamics surrounding LMI targeting changed dramatically after the 1980
presidential election. Within a few months of assuming the oval oﬃce, the Reagan administration and his newly appointed HUD Secretary, Samuel Pierce, eliminated reviews
of program beneﬁts entirely,19 including the 75% threshold for LMI targeting, despite a reported increase in activities beneﬁting LMI persons. Prior to the 1980 election, congressional
support for LMI targeting had resided in the Senate. When Republicans took control of the
Senate in 1981, it was House members who took over the ﬁght for targeting thresholds (Rich
1993). In 1983, Congress stipulated that 51% of grant funds be used for activities that
17

The 1977 Act (Pub.L. 93-383) changed language in Section 104(b)(2) of the 1974 Act (Pub.L. 95-128)
concerning requirements for application approval.
18
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Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978 (Pub.L. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2080).
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beneﬁt LMI persons.20 The percentage of funds required to target activities beneﬁting LMI
persons increased from 51% to 60% in 198721 and then increased again to 70% in 1990.22
Throughout the 1980s, the focus on residents most in need increased—at least in Congress—
while the total amount of funding (in real dollars) appropriated to the CDBG program declined (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, by the end of President Reagan’s second term, HUD’s
budget had dropped to one third of the amount it had been during his ﬁrst year in oﬃce
and many housing and community development programs were eliminated entirely in order
to scale back federal intervention (Horak and Blokland 2012; Keating and Smith 1996). Appropriations to entitlement communities (cities with populations greater than 50,000 and
counties with population greater than 200,000)23 decreased even more because of the State
Administered CDBG program initiated in 1981.24 Under the original 1974 CDBG program,
80% of funds were reserved for entitlement communities and 20% of funds were designated for
non-entitlement communities—“cities with populations of less than 50,000” and “counties
with populations of less than 200,000.”25 The Reagan administration proposed transferring
the administration of non-entitlement grants, referred to as the small cities CDBG program,
“from federal to state administration” (Rich 1993, 110). Consequently, upon passage of the
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981 (under Title III of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981),26 the proportion of CDBG money going to entitlement
communities dropped from 80% to 70% while the share of funds going to non-entitlement
areas increased from 20% to 30%.
During George H. W. Bush’s State of the Union address in 1991, he proposed consolidating the CDBG program and several other grant programs into one mega-block grant (Rich
20
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Fig. 2.1. Annual CDBG Funding in 2010 Dollars

2014). Local government oﬃcials, fearing the loss of “local ﬂexibility,” strongly objected to
the president’s proposal (Rich 2014, 60). The only substantial change to the law during the
Bush era was the increase in LMI targeting from 60% to 70%.
Initially, appropriations to the program continued to decline under the Bush administration as did the number of HUD staﬀers tasked with administering community development
programs. HUD ﬁeld oﬃces were forced to cut monitoring of grantees substantially to handle the growing number of entitlement communities with their shrinking staﬀ. Democratic
pressure from Congress, however, drove increases in CDBG appropriations for the next few
years until Republicans claimed both the House and Senate in 1994. Thus, funding in real
dollars continued to increase initially under Bill Clinton and then dropped after 1995 when
Republicans took control over budget appropriations. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, other than
a slight uptick between 2000 and 2001, total CDBG appropriations continued their steady,
slow decline through the Clinton and George W. Bush years. At the same time, the number
of communities eligible for funding steadily increased as urban populations in the U.S. con-
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tinued to expand (see Figure 2.2 for a comparison). These processes have resulted in smaller
and smaller appropriations for individual grantees.
In general, the CDBG program received very little attention during the Clinton years; instead, the primary advancements in federal urban policy involved tax incentive programs to
stimulate economic growth (e.g., Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities) (Rich
2014). Compared to his predecessor, George W. Bush gave the program considerably more
attention. The Bush administration wanted to consolidate a number of housing and community development programs, including the CDBG program, into a single block grant while
signiﬁcantly reducing funding. The proposed consolidated block grant would also move oversight to the Department of Commerce (Rich 2014). Congress rejected most of the Bush era
reform attempts with the exception of funding reductions; annual appropriations continued
to decline.
The subprime mortgage crisis and Great Recession in the late 2000s intensiﬁed structural and economic challenges facing cities. Federal policy makers’ inadequate regulation of
subprime and high-risk mortgage markets, along with restrictions on state intervention, left
local communities to face tremendous ﬁscal pressure (Immergluck 2011). Urban areas, and
especially inner core neighborhoods, were disproportionately plagued by an accumulation of
foreclosed homes and declining property values. Cities had not experienced economic turmoil
of this magnitude since the Great Depression.
In response to the national foreclosure crisis, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The Act appropriated $3.92 billion to HUD’s Neighborhood
Stabilization Program—a new area program under the CDBG umbrella. Through this program, HUD provides grant money to state and local governments to assist them in addressing
the problems associated with abandonment and foreclosure. In 2009, the American Recovery Act appropriated an additional $2 billion to the program; these funds were distributed
through a competitive system instead of the formula distribution used for the ﬁrst wave of
funding. A third round of funding was authorized under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
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Fig. 2.2. Annual CDBG Funding in 2010 Dollars & Number of Grantees

and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act 2010). Under the Dodd-Frank Act
funds are once again granted to all states and select governments on a formula basis.27
Through proposed changes, performance criticisms, and occasional neglect, the CDBG
program has endured and remained quite stable since the 1980s. Even so, population loss
and decaying infrastructure continue to impede the economic recovery and sustainability of
many urban localities in the Northeast and Midwest. As the preceding narrative demonstrates, historical context has played a considerable role in shaping policy and the urban
environment. The remnants of de facto segregation linger throughout modern cities. Still
today, gentriﬁcation displaces local residents in the name of economic development. At the
same time, failed development projects are abandoned and left to deteriorate in the backyards of the poorest citizens who continue to be, more often than not, people of color. It is
within this context that the analyses to follow are situated.
27

Department of Housing and Urban Development: http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=
/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg (Last Accessed:
June 2, 2014).
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Urban political economists argue that economic agents make decisions that will maximize
their utility. When it comes to evaluating the causes of depopulation and the potential
mitigating factors, two categories of utility maximizers warrant scrutiny: local government
decision makers and citizens. Existing scholarship reveals a variety of channels through
which local leaders inﬂuence population levels. The economic, distributive, and electoral
concerns of local governments have all been linked to changing population levels.
From one viewpoint, politicians allocate eﬀort and resources in a way that maximizes their
probability of winning reelection (Downs 1957). In the absence of monitoring, government
oﬃcials may even behave opportunistically (Kleiman and Teles 2006). Evidence of these selfinterested tendencies spans decades of urban politics. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, for
instance, local politicians were more concerned with the economic conditions of their central
business districts than the need for public housing (Judd and Swanstrom 2008). As the
percentage of urban renewal funds available for nonresidential projects increased (Slayton
1966) public housing policies were essentially replaced by “commercially oriented urban
renewal” (Flanagan 1997, 265). Accordingly, it was not uncommon for local oﬃcials to take
advantage of loopholes or vague language in program guidelines during this period in order
to beneﬁt their own political careers. Reﬂecting on the ﬁrst seven years of the Community
Development Block Grant, Wong and Peterson (1986) explain how, two decades later, local
leaders in Baltimore and Milwaukee channeled grant money toward “major revitalization
projects” in pursuit of “their own electoral ambitions” (307).
Other scholars take a less pessimistic view of local decision-making. Instead of seeing local
politicians as corrupt utility maximizers, they argue that local leaders recognize that the only
way to improve the wellbeing of their municipality is through economic means. Wolman and
McManmon (2012) explain that “since most city governments are overwhelmingly dependent
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on the local property tax, a city gains ﬁscal beneﬁt” from enacting policies that appeal to
businesses and improve employment and income opportunities (427). When a city suﬀers
from ﬁscal constraints and high unemployment, it is in the city’s interest to diversify its
economy by increasing the share of high paying professional or technical jobs (Peterson
1981). The cities most in need of an improved economy, however, tend to be inhabited by
an abundance of low-income, unskilled or semiskilled workers, which increase the cost of
providing social services. Even so, Peterson (1981) argues that “policies which enhance the
desirability or attractiveness of the territory are in the city’s interest, because they beneﬁt all
residents” (21). Attracting professionals and highly skilled workers fuels economic expansion
by making the city more competitive (Peterson 1981). Thus, acting in the city’s interest,
local decision makers pursue policies that draw a better-educated, wealthier class of workers
rather than policies to help their less well-to-do residents (Wolman and McManmon 2012).
Peterson gives short shrift to the negative externalities associated with the changing
socioeconomic status of residents. As aggregate income and education levels rise, so too do
housing and property values. Consequently, the cost of living in gentrifying neighborhoods
increases to the point where the original inhabitants can no longer aﬀord to live there and are
pushed out of the community. From a market perspective this is a natural process. According
to Charles Tiebout (1956), citizens locate to municipalities that oﬀer their preferred tax and
services package. In Tiebout’s model, the market is composed of many local municipalities
in competition for residents. Unlike Peterson (1981), who says economic objectives deﬁne a
city’s political agenda, Tiebout (1956) argues that cities seek an optimal size at which they
can provide services with the greatest eﬃciency. Tiebout assumes that local governments are
concerned with lowering the cost of providing public goods and that all residents are equally
mobile. Consumer-voters reveal their demands for public goods by “voting with their feet.”
Tiebout’s ideal market solution results in a number of heterogeneous communities each
comprised of households with relatively homogenous preferences. The Tiebout model is essentially a market model of suburbanization with communities stratiﬁed by income (Oates
2006). Critics of Tiebout argue that the “eﬃciency” predicted by the model is in its very
nature discriminatory towards the most disadvantaged citizens (Greene 2008). In fact, many
researchers point out that the Tiebout model accurately predicts white ﬂight and increas-
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ingly segregated neighborhoods as a result of increased citizen mobility in large industrial
urban areas (Dawkins 2005). Whether Tiebout articulated the social ramiﬁcations of this
point or not,1 the implications are quite clear—a Tiebout world may be eﬃcient, but it is
certainly not equitable. Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982) oﬀer proof of this point; namely,
that neighborhoods in large urban areas diﬀer signiﬁcantly in “average levels of household
income and social status,” but exhibit “relative homogeneity of these traits within each
neighborhood” (170).
Economic perspectives like Tiebout’s and Peterson’s have been criticized for focusing
almost exclusively on market exchanges while largely ignoring how power and politics intervene in decision making (Oates 2006; Hirschman 1970; Swanstrom 1985). When urban
conditions deteriorate, the Tiebout model, for instance, posits that consumer-voters will reveal their dissatisfaction with declining conditions by “voting with their feet” and relocating
to a diﬀerent municipality, but makes no mention of actual voting. Todd Swanstrom (1985)
argues that many economic perspectives do not recognizes that policymakers answer to two
constituencies—“mobile wealth and the voters who put them in oﬃce” (22).2 While local
oﬃcials are indeed concerned with attracting “residents or investors who generate more in
local taxes than they take back in city services,” they are still beholden to their constituents
(Swanstrom 1985, 15). Put simply, elected oﬃcials are rewarded or punished at the ballotbox for their decisions.
Consequently, local oﬃcials are not the only ones forced to make tough decisions when
faced with urban decline. Citizens—the second group of utility maximizers—may choose to
exit a municipality in reaction to such forces as local policies, neighborhood conditions, and
their economic situation. Alternatively, they may choose to express their dissatisfaction with
current circumstances through civic engagement and electoral participation. Hirschman’s
(1970) “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” framework (hereafter EVL-framework) looks at “responses
1

As others (e.g., Keating 1995) have pointed out, Tiebout (1956) does note that residential location decisions
may be motivated by a desire “to associate with ‘nice’ people” (418 f.n.12). However, Keating (1995) argues
that Tiebout views this desire “entirely in terms on inclusion rather than the segregation and exclusion which
is a pervasive feature of American cities” (128-129).
2
Swanstrom (1985) makes this speciﬁc criticism of Peterson’s (1981) city interest argument and Tiebout’s
(1956) model of residential location. Mobile wealth refers to economic interests—“capital and labor, or
residents” (Swanstrom 1985, 15).
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to decline in ﬁrms, organizations, and states”3 and provides an important lens for examining
citizen decision-making. A ﬁrm’s deterioration in performance is revealed through one of two
options—exit or voice. In the local government context, the exit option resembles Tiebout’s
consumer-voter model of residential choice. Exit is a market mechanism in the traditional
economic sense—moving to a new producer or demanding less of a product or service. This
framework explains that citizens (consumers) base their residential location decisions on the
quality of their neighborhood (the product or service that is deteriorating).
Unlike Tiebout, Hirschman recognizes that real life decision-making is often a choice
between leaving or making one’s concerns known. Voice is a political mechanism whereby
consumers articulate their dissatisfaction with the deteriorating product. Consumers choose
to voice because they assume they can inﬂuence the quality of a product or service. When it
comes to local government, citizens who are dissatisﬁed with government performance may
actually voice their discontent rather than simply exiting.
Hirschman recognizes that not all citizens are equally mobile and that the most mobile
citizens also tend to be the citizens who place the most value in quality goods and services (see
also Orbell and Uno 1972, 471).4 He argues that “when general conditions in a neighborhood
deteriorate, those who value most highly neighborhood qualities such as safety, cleanliness,
good schools, and so forth will be the ﬁrst to move out” (Hirschman 1970, 51). Those who
value neighborhood quality also tend to be the same people who are more likely to voice.
Thus, a deteriorating neighborhood will be depleted of the very people who have the greatest
ability to eﬀectively communicate discontent.
Loyalty, according to Hirschman, can mitigate this eﬀect. Citizens with a deep attachment to their community possess a type of loyalty, which makes them speak up when they
see a problem. Place attachment, in Hirschman’s model, anchors residents to their community and increases the costs of exit along with the beneﬁts to be derived from voice.
3

This quote is referencing the title of Albert O. Hirschman’s 1970 book: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses
to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
4
In economic theory, the marginal consumer is the ﬁrst to drop out or move to product B when the price
of product A increases. Hirschman is not, however, discussing exit in terms of price and quantity; rather,
he is discussing the relationship between quality and quantity. In particular, Hirschman is distinguishing
consumers of “connoisseur goods” from traditional price-sensitive consumers—the former is concerned with
quality decline while the latter is concerned with price increase (1970, Chapter 4).
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Although the EVL-Framework has received much praise,5 Hirschman’s conceptualization of
loyalty has been heavily criticized (e.g., Barry 1974). Indeed, John (2017) argues that “most
researchers believe that loyalty is a slippery concept and hard to operationalize” (517-518).
For the better part of two decades, Dowding and John (together and individually) have been
advocating for loyalty to be reformulated as a measure of social investment (Dowding et al.
2000; Dowding and John 2008, 2012; John 2017).
In 2000, Dowding et al. argued that social investments, such as “buying a house, working
to improve local schools, [or] developing a large number of friends,” increase loyalty to a community and make voice activities more likely (478).6 Following this logic, in 2008, Dowding
and John provided empirical evidence that social investments—measured by knowledge of
one’s neighbors, social trust, and voluntary involvement in local membership organizations—
increase the likelihood of voice. The authors used “social investments” and “social capital”
interchangeably, but their rationale for doing so was not thoroughly explained. In later work,
John (2017) maintains that “social investment is akin to social capital as it comes from
forming social networks and trusting others in a particular environment to which individuals
become more attached over time” (518). This more recent scholarship better articulates the
overlap between social capital and social investments; but, like previous work, the concept of
loyalty is unjustiﬁably extended to capture much more than just conventional understandings
of what loyalty is.
A related strand of research looks at the mitigating role of social ties and social resources
without attempting to “ﬁt” them into a conception of loyalty. Dawkins (2006), for instance,
shows that families with stronger local social ties are less likely to leave their neighborhood.
In other research, Skifter Andersen (2008) provides evidence that “strong social relations”
within a neighborhood signiﬁcantly reduce one’s “intention to move” (79; but see Kleinhans
2009 for contradictory ﬁndings). Aldrich (2011a), referencing Hirschman’s work, explains
that social ties “raise the cost of ‘exit’ from a community and increase the probability that
residents will use ‘voice’” (85). In a similar manner, I argue that when urban conditions de5

Barry (1974) goes so far as to compare Hirschman’s work to that of Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory
of Democracy) and Mancur Olson (The Logic of Collective Action) despite his own reservations about
Hirschman’s conceptualization of loyalty.
6
Notably, buying a house is arguably more of an economic investment than a social investment, but this
criticism is not central to the larger argument laid out in this dissertation.
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cline, social ties and social resources inﬂuence decisions to exit or voice. Instead of stretching
the concept of loyalty to take on an extended meaning, I argue that loyalty is one component
of a larger force—civil society.
Fukuyama (1995) describes civil society as “the realm of spontaneously created social
structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions” (8). As
Edwards (2004) notes, “it is civil society that provides the channels through which most people can make their voices heard in government decision-making” (15). Stronger civil societies
are endowed with an abundance of social capital, deﬁned as “resources embedded in a social
structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions” (Lin 2001, 29). Formal
and informal organizations and local social networks make up the necessary infrastructure
for developing community attachment, coordinating action, and brokering resources. Social
capital is the intangible resource derived from this infrastructure. Accordingly, I maintain
that the strength of civil society determines whether a citizen will exit or voice.
In later work, Hirschman (1993) points out that “eﬀective voice often requires group
action and is thus subject to all the well-known diﬃculties of organization, representation,
and free riding” (176). Where large groups of individuals suﬀer the same conditions, individuals can free ride on the eﬀorts of others (Olson 1965). Without norms of reciprocity
and trust among a group of individuals, there is very little incentive for citizens to express
discontent with government or to voluntarily engage in any activity that may better their
community’s circumstances (Knack 2002). Furthermore, there is no incentive for individuals to expend their own resources (time, money, energy, etc.) when beneﬁts will accrue
regardless of whether or not they participate.
Residents who feel deep connections to their community are more likely to mobilize
voluntarily when confronted with an issue. Social networks provide individuals a forum for
discussions of community dilemmas and the means to achieve collective action (Hopkins
and Williamson 2012). As Fukuyama (2001) explains, social capital is a “product of iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games...if individuals interact with each other repeatedly over time, they
develop a stake in a reputation for honesty and reliability” (16). This repeated interaction is
key in motivating citizens to cooperate for mutual beneﬁt. Norms of reciprocity develop and
are sustained through reoccurring contact (Ostrom 1999). Trust among neighbors provides
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assurance that community members are empathetic to each other’s problems and needs. At
the same time, when community ties are stronger, neighbors hold one another accountable
(Ostrom 1999). Thus, neighborhoods that possess a greater stock of social capital are better
able to collectivize to overcome the free-rider problem.
Stronger civil societies are also better equipped to monitor local government and hold
leaders accountable for their policy decisions. Residents living in areas with a strong civil society are more likely to voice their concerns through political activism and civic engagement
(Hirschman 1970; see also Aldrich 2011a; Dowding and Feiock 2012). According to Besley
and Burgess (2002), “having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens
incentives for governments to be responsive” [emphasis added] (1415). By expressing dissatisfaction with government performance, civil society acts as a “counterweight to the state”
(Foley and Edwards 1996, 39 and 45). Using forms of active citizenship as a proxy for social capital, researchers have shown how the strength of local political activism deters the
siting of unwanted facilities (e.g., Aldrich and Crook 2008; Grimes and Esaiasson 2014) and
positively aﬀects the delivery of urban services (Go 2014).
Hirschman (1970) also acknowledges that some residents remain not out of loyalty but
because they lack the resources to relocate. Resource-deﬁcient residents are not, however,
without an exit option. When faced with declining urban conditions, these residents still
have a choice. Some will choose to “exit” by retreating from civic life and community
engagement.7 Others will choose the voice option to express feelings of frustration rather
than feelings of loyalty. In reference to the latter situation, these voice activities ultimately
contribute to the larger public good—a community’s reservoir of social capital—regardless
of where they derive from, be it loyalty or frustration.
To summarize the argument presented thus far, strong civil society promotes community
attachments and provides the infrastructure and social resources needed for coordinated
action. When faced with declining urban conditions, citizens embedded in stronger civil
societies are more likely to voice. Through voice, communities express their preferences and
needs to local government, thereby gaining more resources and generating signs of stability.
7

In a recent paper, Jones-Correa and McCann (2017) make the useful distinction between “a ‘soft’ exit—
withdrawing from political engagement” and “a ‘hard exit’—physically departing, leaving the U.S. behind”
(16).
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Governments that meet citizens’ demands are more likely to prevent exit. The voice option
also allows citizens to express opposition to government decisions they deem unacceptable.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the overarching theoretical framework for this dissertation and captures the dynamic relationship between civil society and local government. Participants of
collective action expect to gain from that action. Cycle A in Figure 3.1 shows that when
local government is responsive to community needs, it will prevent exit and strengthen the
capacity of civil society. In contrast, when government institutions are unresponsive, citizens
may become indiﬀerent or contentious (Foley and Edwards 1996). Over time, the repeated
failure of local government will erode whatever social capital originally existed, as illustrated
by Cycle B in Figure 3.1. As citizens become accustomed to the unresponsiveness of local
government, neighborhoods and individuals alike begin to feel cut oﬀ from the political process. As a result, citizens stop expressing their concerns through the voice option. Without
“voice” or other methods of accountability, decision makers are free to pursue their own political agenda and have very little incentive to worry about citizens’ needs (Clark and Krebs
2012). Consequently, government performs less well. To citizens, this simply conﬁrms that
government is incapable of meeting their needs. When government is not responsive to its
citizens in this fashion, residents who feel ignored and disenfranchised will exit.
From a market perspective, expressions of dissatisfaction and the mass exodus of citizens
are both price signals to local government. Just as producers compete for customers, governments compete for citizens (Tiebout 1956). Since mobility is largely dependent on wealth,
local governments tend to be most responsive to mobile citizens. This puts low-status residents at a disadvantage. Strong, vocal civil society can counter this tendency. Residents of
poorer communities that are rich in social capital maintain stronger attachments to the community and are in a better position to eﬀectively oppose government decisions they consider
unsuitable.
Even though disadvantaged communities would certainly beneﬁt from a greater stock of
social resources, there seems to be an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and
social capital. Scholars recognize that civil society is weakest among minority and low-income
groups (Putnam 2000). Disadvantaged neighborhoods, especially those with high levels of
crime or dangerous activity, promote a sense of powerlessness, which decreases levels of trust
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Initial Signs of
Urban Decline

when there is...
Strong
Civil Society

Weak
Civil Society

VOICE
A
Government
Responsive

EXIT
B
Government
Not Responsive

A = Government responsiveness maintains or strengthens civil society and signals to citizens that government listens when they voice their dissatisfaction.

B = Where government is unresponsive and civil society is strong, citizens will
continue to voice in hopes that government will respond. Continued unresponsiveness will weaken civil society to the point that citizens will begin to exit.

Fig. 3.1. Theoretical Framework

(Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh 2001). Residents in these neighborhoods feel cut oﬀ from
the policy process and are less likely to organize around common objectives (Putnam 2000,
343). As Putnam explains “social networks are absent in precisely the places where they
are needed most” (2000, 321). This logic is also consistent with Kleiman and Teles’ (2006)
discussion of non-market failures—neighborhoods are unable to get the help they need from
government because they are incapable of communicating that need in the ﬁrst place. In
sum, low-status citizens are at a double disadvantage—they are less mobile and less capable
of expressing their preferences.
In an urban context, this last point is especially important. Historically, housing and
community development policies meant to help cities combat decline ultimately facilitated
racially segregated patterns of urban development that remain entrenched in many urban
layouts (Avila and Rose 2009; Marsh, Parnell, and Moss Joyner 2010). As population declines
in many post-industrial cities, socioeconomic disadvantages concentrate leaving many of
these cities with populations composed primarily of low-status residents. Such residents
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lack the very resources needed to alter neighborhood conditions and improve their situation.
Consequently, examinations of civil society in an urban setting need to take into consideration
how the spatial distribution of race and class may limit the capacity of civil society.
A clear understanding of the reciprocal relationship between government responsiveness
and civil society is a necessary prerequisite for the accurate assessment of civil society’s
inﬂuence on patterns of urban decline and stability. This study seeks to empirically model the
relationship between policy choices and civic activism and then explores how the interaction
between the two can inﬂuence particular outcomes—in the present case, the decision to exit
or voice. In sum, the following chapters test the extent to which civil society stimulates voice
and mitigates exit while accounting for the inﬂuence of local decision-making.
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CHAPTER 4. CITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF POPULATION CHANGE

4.1

Introduction

Chapter 2 chronicles the events that led to the current paradox facing large U.S. cities:
Despite the growing number of citizens residing in urban areas, many of the older industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest have been shrinking rapidly since the onset of
deindustrialization in the 1970s (Garcia and Judd 2012). The deindustrialization and suburbanization of the 1970s left behind poor, predominantly minority residents who lacked
the resources to improve their condition. Poverty became more geographically concentrated
(Massey and Eggers 1990) and the income inequality gap grew (Levy 1987). The poverty
rate in central cities has been, and still is, consistently higher than the national average.
Economic conditions—especially changing industrial landscapes and unemployment—also
aﬀect the exit rate of a population (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982; for a review see Kantor and Turok 2012). City coﬀers dry up as citizens exit, taking much-needed tax revenue
with them. Abandonment and blight are left behind, as is the ﬁscal burden of supporting
an aging, outsized infrastructure.
In the 1970s, the policy remnants of urban renewal and a miscellany of housing and
community development programs were replaced with the Community Development Block
Grant program. The new inﬂux of federal money combined with a concerted eﬀort to diversify
industry was enough to insulate some cities from the eﬀects of post-industrialization. Other
cities have been considerably less successful in remedying their situations. We know a great
deal about the causes of depopulation in cities but lack suﬃcient empirical knowledge about
what forces can mitigate population loss. Chapter 3 describes my adaptation of Hirschman’s
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty framework. I argue that in a postindustrial, global world the
strength of civil society serves as the key determinant in whether a city will stabilize, grow,
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or decline. Cities with a stronger, more vibrant civil society are more likely to overcome the
obstacles associated with deindustrialization and economic restructuring.
This chapter takes an empirical look at the framework developed in the previous chapter
and tests the eﬀect of civil society on population change over the lifetime of the Community
Development Block Grant program. The analysis presented below conﬁrms established explanations of population decline and begins to disentangle the relationships between civil society, government performance, and population change. The city level investigation pursued
in this chapter is exploratory in nature. I state and test hypotheses with the acknowledged
objective of informing the case study to follow. The link between government responsiveness
and civil society is explored in more detail at the neighborhood level in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.2

Explanations

Research on urban decline has identiﬁed several factors that can facilitate or impede
population stability, including: the amount of socioeconomic disadvantage, the physical and
economic characteristics of a city, government performance, and the strength of civil society.
Urban decline is commonly viewed as a product of changing economic and social conditions (Temkin and Rohe 1998). Bradbury, Downs, and Small’s (1982) exhaustive study of
urban decline from 1960 to 1975 found that cities with a larger share of poor residents were
more likely to experience decline. The authors also link more drastic rates of population loss
to cities with higher concentrations of Blacks and fewer employment opportunities.
Urban sociologists recognize that various dimensions of social and economic disadvantage tend to operate simultaneously in urban settings (e.g., Morenoﬀ and Sampson 1997).
As explained by Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush (2008), poverty does not occur in isolation from other disadvantages; rather, “poverty is strongly associated with other ecological
characteristics, such as percentage of single-parent families, percentage of family members
on welfare and unemployed, and racial segregation”1 (846; See also Sampson, Raudenbush,
and Earls 1997, 920; Sampson 2012, 100). Although poverty is typically deﬁned in economic
1
Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush generated a single factor of concentrated disadvantage based on six
characteristics: “welfare receipt, poverty, unemployment, female-headed households, racial composition (percentage black), and density of children” (2008, 848).
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terms, “the experience of poverty,” according to Rodrigue, Kneebone, and Reeves (2016), is
more than just a matter of “household ﬁnances.”2
Whereas Bradbury, Downs, and Small’s (1982) work captures the individual eﬀects that
these demographic mechanisms have on population change, Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997)
predict population change using an index of socioeconomic disadvantage that “captures the
entanglement of poverty, racial composition, and other social dislocations” (41). The authors use principal components analysis to create a measure of socioeconomic disadvantage
based on the share of the population receiving public assistance, unemployment, poverty,
percentage of families headed by females, and racial composition. The authors show that
prior levels of socioeconomic disadvantage are a strong predictor of neighborhood depopulation.3 Following Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997), I use an index to measure the level of
socioeconomic disadvantage for each city and then test its eﬀect on population change. In
line with previous research, I expect cities with more socioeconomic disadvantage to exhibit
less stability and greater incidents of population loss.
With declining population comes vacant and abandoned property.4 Many older industrial
cities are disproportionately plagued by an accumulation of foreclosed homes and declining
property values. Vacancy and abandonment reduce the value of surrounding property (Accordino and Johnson 2000), further aggravating an already shrinking tax base and thus
inhibiting economic recovery (Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky 2011). New businesses
are reluctant to invest in properties for fear they will be saddled with the liability for environmental hazards. At the same time, abandoned property signals blight and decline, thus
deterring potential investors.
Local government budgets depend largely on taxes and intergovernmental revenue. Property taxes are “the single most important source of city government tax revenues” (Chernick,
Langley, and Reschovsky 2011, 373; see also Wolman and McManmon 2012). A limited tax
base impedes attempts at rebuilding a city’s population although federal funding can subsi2

This point is made in a summary of their recent article posted on The Brookings Institute website.
Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997) also link neighborhood homicide to population loss.
4
Physical decline and population decline tend to reinforce one another. Although I expect there to be a
positive relationship between the two (more physical decline corresponds to greater population loss), I do
not make any deﬁnitive claims about the causal direction of the relationship. In other words, I recognize
that the two inﬂuence each other in a way that intensiﬁes the eﬀects of urban decline (Bradbury, Downs,
and Small 1982).
3
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dize this eﬀect to a certain extent. Accordingly, I expect to see more decline in cities with a
declining tax base.
As Wolman and McManmon (2012) have noted, “the incentives facing local government
are to undertake policies (particularly favorable tax and expenditure policies and infrastructure policies) to attract business within its boundaries” (427). As the U.S. economy
transitions away from its industrial roots, manufacturing cities must do the same. According to Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982), “locations that oﬀer relatively poor economic
opportunities are likely to experience net outmigration, while those that oﬀer better economic
opportunities are likely to experience net inmigration” (80). In the aftermath of deindustrialization, cities that diversify their economic industries are more likely to maintain job
opportunities, residents, and economic stability (Garcia and Judd 2012). Based on existing
work, I expect that cities with greater economic diversity will be more likely to retain their
residents.
The more resources local governments have at their disposal, the better prepared they
are to address local needs. Many cities have been able to weather the postindustrial storm by
utilizing federal disbursements of funding aimed to facilitate community development. The
creation of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was intended to
streamline the operation of federal programs while giving local politicians signiﬁcantly more
ﬂexibility in determining how to allocate funds (Barnes 2005; Sapotichne 2010; Wong and
Peterson 1986). The program was designed speciﬁcally to address community needs with a
focus on housing, neighborhood rehabilitation, and economic development.5 The allocation
of federal CDBG money is formula based, meaning local decision makers have no control
over the annual amount of grant money they receive. They do, however, have substantial
control over how the money is allocated at the local level.
Local service provisions or ﬁnancial policy outputs are commonly used to measure government responsiveness (see Clark and Krebs 2012 for a review). Accordingly, my research uses
CDBG funding allocations and local housing and community development expenditures to
gauge the extent to which local governments are responding to community need. A positive
relationship between CDBG funding and population change reveals two things. First, federal
5

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633.
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investment in local housing and community development is a successful means of mitigating
decline. Second, local leaders appear to be making ﬁnancial decisions that are in the interest of maintaining or growing their populations. In other words, local decision makers are
eﬀectively working to address the needs of their citizens. A positive relationship between local housing and community development expenditure and population change would provide
additional support for this theory. The extent to which local oﬃcials are making thoughtful,
targeted decisions is explored in more detail in subsequent chapters where I evaluate several
factors that inﬂuence local targeting decisions in Detroit, Michigan.
Previous literature on urban decline has done much to explain the causes and consequences of population loss, but we lack substantial empirical evidence for how decline can
be mitigated or reversed. This chapter addresses the question: Does a strong civil society
mitigate exit? I argue that the strength of civil society aﬀects decisions to exit or voice when
citizens are confronted with signs of decline (e.g., an outmigration of people and jobs, depreciating property values, government neglect, etc.). Stronger civil societies are those that
maintain deeper reservoirs of social capital (Fukuyama 2001), deﬁned as “social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, 19).
Dense networks of associational ties facilitate formal and informal interactions that sustain
and strengthen relationships among community members (Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Curley
2010; Small 2006).
When urban conditions deteriorate, citizens who feel very little, or no, attachment to
their community are likely to exit. Of the residents who remain, some do so because they
lack the resources to exit, but others stay because they feel a deep attachment to their
community (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the diﬀerences among individuals in
terms of exit). Dowding and John (2008) explain “that households are less likely to exit from
one local authority jurisdiction if they have social ties to that area” (292). Place attachment
and social networks make exit a less desirable solution and increase the likelihood that
citizens will voice their discontent (Aldrich 2011a). Residents living in areas with a strong
civil society feel a sense of loyalty to their community and are more likely to express their
concerns through political activism and civic engagement (Hirschman 1970; see also Aldrich
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2011b, 2012; Dowding and Feiock 2012). Community ties and a strong capacity for voice
should lead to population stability.
In sum, residents who feel connected to their communities and a sense of belonging are
more likely to remain and voice dissatisfaction with policies they deem unacceptable. These
residents are also more likely to cooperate with one another in pursuit of a common goal.
Stronger community ties increase the probability of mutual collaboration to solve problems
for the common good. As such, I argue that greater levels of social capital will decrease exit
and strengthen voice; where civil society is stronger, I expect population to stabilize or grow.
All hypothesized relationships are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Summary of Hypothesized Relationships
#
H
H
H
H

Hypothesis
4.1:
4.2:
4.3:
4.4:

H 4.5:

Cities with greater socioeconomic disadvantage will exhibit less stability.
Cities with a larger property tax base will exhibit more stability or growth.
Cities with greater economic diversity will exhibit more stability or growth.
Cities with more housing and community development resources from
which to draw will exhibit more stability or growth.
Cities with stronger civil societies will exhibit more stability or growth.

4.3
4.3.1

Data and Methods

Unit of Analysis and Data

The data for this analysis are organized in a time-series, cross-sectional structure. The
dataset includes 231 cities at ﬁve time points (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010). The time
period under study begins in 1970, prior to the start of the Community Development Block
Grant program, and ends in 2010. Annual city-level data going back to 1970 are not available
for most of the variables used in this analysis. As a result, the distance between time points
is 10 years, corresponding to the decennial censuses.
Because the dataset extends back to 1970, some data were only available at the county
level. Consistent social capital variables for each of the time points in the dataset, for
example, were not available at the city level. Thus, county level data were collected for voter
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turnout, churches, and church membership. County data were assigned to corresponding
cities using GIS software. I acknowledge that these are imperfect measures and remind the
reader that the hypothesized relationships based on these variables will be ﬂeshed out with
more precise data in the case study chapters to follow.
The cities included in the dataset are cities in the U.S. with population greater than
100,000 for at least one year between 1970 and 2010. The universe of cities is also limited
to those with a population of at least 50,000 as of 1970 to guarantee that every city in
the sample frame met the minimum eligibility requirement for at least one wave of CDBG
funding (i.e., population of at least 50,000).
Unless otherwise noted, all demographic and socioeconomic data for this project come
from the U.S. Census Bureau. Decennial census data were downloaded from the Minnesota
Population Center’s National Historic Geographic Information System website. Whenever
possible, data were downloaded as time-series datasets to ensure comparability over time.
Median household income data for 1970 come from the County and City Data Book [United
States] Consolidated File: City Data, 1944-1977. City ﬁnance data are from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Annual Survey of Local Government Finances and Census of Governments (19702006) historical database on individual governments. Data on CDBG funding allocations
were collected from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development data portal.
Voter turnout data are from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. Data on churches
and church membership come from the Association of Religion Data Archives.
The time-series, cross-sectional nature of the data presents a number of problems for
standard OLS models. (These problems are addressed in turn below.) When time is nested
within unit, as is the case with multiple decennial observations for each city, multilevel
models are often more appropriate as these models can account for time-varying as well as
time-invariant covariates. Both types of covariates are described below and are included in
the ﬁnal models.
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4.3.2

Dependent Variable

Although changes in income, employment, and population levels are all valid indicators of
urban decline, this research follows Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982) and focuses primarily on population change as a proxy for urban decline (see also Beauregard 2001). Moreover,
declining population levels can be directly linked to a geographically deﬁned region—a particular city or neighborhood. In contrast, falling income and employment levels within a
particular location may be the byproduct of changing economic conditions in the surrounding area.
The distribution of population change is heavily skewed because some cities experienced
rapid growth during the ﬁrst few decades under study. Consequently, population change is
measured as the logarithm of the true change: ((populationt−1 −populationt )/populationt−1 ).
Since a true change can take on both positive and negative values, population change had
to be converted into positive scores before taking the logarithm. Thus, logged population
change was calculated as: log(Y + 1 − min(Y )).

4.3.3

Level-1 Independent Variables

Following Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997), I used principal component analysis to generate
an index of socioeconomic disadvantage. The index is based on ﬁve characteristics: racial
composition (percentage Black), poverty, family disintegration (percentage female-headed
households with children), unemployment, and median household income. Consistent with
expectations, all ﬁve variables are highly associated and load on a single factor with an
eigenvalue of 3.34. As Table 4.2 illustrates, each item has a high loading well over the 0.4
threshold (Acock 2008, 302). The factor loadings were used to calculate a regression-weighted
index of socioeconomic disadvantage with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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Table 4.2. Factor Loadings from Principal Component Analysis
Variable

Factor loading

% Black
% Poverty
% Single mothers
Unemployment
Median incomea

0.794
0.905
0.820
0.752
0.837

Eigenvalue
N

3.386
1142

a

The inverse of median household income was used so that all factor loadings would be positive.

Three measures of the physical conditions of a city—percentage of vacant housing, percentage of housing stock built before 1940, and persons per household—were tested during
model speciﬁcation. The measures were highly correlated with one another and with the
socioeconomic disadvantage index. For this reason, their summary statistics are listed in
Table 4.3, but the variables themselves were dropped from the ﬁnal set of models.
The economic character of a city is measured by its economic diversity, average property
tax per person, and a measure of per capita debt. Economic diversity is calculated following
the Gini-Simpson Index of diversity6 where 0=least diverse and 1=most diverse. The original
measure was multiplied by 100 to make interpretation easier.
Numerous ﬁnancial variables measuring taxes, revenues, expenditures, and debt were
examined during model speciﬁcation. Importantly, there are several potential issues to consider when looking at ﬁnancial data. Comparing ﬁnancial data across space and time without
adjusting for the ﬁnancial responsibilities of overlapping jurisdictions may bias results, especially with respect to expenditures (Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky 2011). Diﬀerent
cities are ﬁnancially responsible for diﬀerent services. Education, for example, may be funded
primarily by the city or the city and county may make equal contributions. In addition, many
of the ﬁnancial variables exhibited problems of multicollinearity. These potential problems
6

The Gini-Simpson Index is calculated as GSI = 1 −

k
P
i=1

category i.

p2i , where pi represents the proportion of each
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Population change
1154
Log population change
1154
Socioeconomic disadvantage
1142
% Black
1154
% Poverty
1142
% Single mothers
1155
Unemployment
1154
Median income
1155
% Hispanic
1154
% Over 65
1142
Surrounding cnty pop chg
1155
Log surrounding cnty pop chg
1155
Economic diversity index
1155
Property tax per capitaa
1146
1146
Total debt per capitaa
a
Local housing & com dev per capita 1146
1154
CDBG per capitaa
Voter turnout
1151
1151
Voter turnout2
% Adherents
1133

15.889
0.251
0.000
17.760
15.824
3.587
7.166
51.023
14.094
11.090
18.369
0.023
75.028
398.262
2336.289
77.204
35.170
55.318
3138.510
50.043

a

Std Dev

Min

Max

45.890 −29.060
909.050
0.536
−3.403
3.442
1.000
−2.279
4.106
17.225
0.012
84.822
6.808
2.141
45.712
1.245
1.075
9.356
3.139
1.954
26.375
12.528
22.672
100.231
17.528
0.103
95.620
3.328
2.321
30.624
55.147 −627.375 1614.648
0.197
−6.443
1.273
7.065
36.615
85.316
378.415
9.857 3027.702
2023.422
0.000 27673.780
87.647
0.000
714.432
38.736
0.000
406.017
8.863
25.487
78.344
970.696
649.581 6137.766
12.775
22.745
96.610

City ﬁnancial variables are in 2010 inﬂation adjusted dollars per capita.

were considered during model speciﬁcation. Measures of decade averages for property tax
per capita and total debt per capita were retained in the ﬁnal models.7
City-level annual ﬁnance data are available for 1960–2006. All ﬁnance variables are
adjusted to 2010 inﬂation-adjusted dollars and normalized by population. Decennial ﬁnancial
measures are the average of the annual data for the preceding decade. Thus, the average
measure of property tax per capita for 1970 is the average of annual property tax per capita
for 1960–1969. The Census Bureau only collected annual data at the local level until 2006.
As a result, the decennial ﬁnancial measures for 2010 are based on the annual average of
data for 2000–2006.8
7

Average housing and community development expenditure per capita is also included in the ﬁnal models
as a measure of government performance.
8
The database documentation notes: “Beginning with data for ﬁscal year 2007, the Census Bureau decided
to end its long-running practice of issuing ﬁnance data for individual local governments.”
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Decennial average housing and community development expenditure per capita is included as a measure of government performance. Since general expenditure can vary so
widely because of overlapping jurisdictions I selected the most relevant, speciﬁc type of expenditure to gauge whether local oﬃcials are making thoughtful, targeted decisions that
work to stabilize or grow their populations.
Decennial measures of CDBG funding are based on annual data for 1975–2009. Annual
allocations were adjusted to 2010 constant dollars. Decennial measures are the average
annual CDBG funding for the previous decade. Thus, the measure of CDBG funding for
1990 is an average of annual funding from 1980 to 1989. Since the ﬁrst funding distribution
was in 1975, the average measure listed for 1980 includes only 1975 through 1979. Likewise,
CDBG funding for 1970 is $0. Decade averages are divided by total population to make
measures across cities more comparable.
To gauge the strength of civil society I look at each city’s capacity for voice and density of
associational life. Following previous scholarship (e.g., Aldrich 2012; Aldrich and Crook 2008;
Coﬀe and Geys 2005; Grimes and Esaiasson 2014; Go 2014; Hamilton 1993; Putnam 2000),
I use voter turnout to measure a city’s collective capacity. Higher levels of turnout represent
stronger citizen voice. Voting is one of the most basic forms of political participation and
at the same time the public’s primary means of holding elected representatives accountable.
A more engaged citizenry is more likely to voice concerns to government when they are
dissatisﬁed. Sharp (1984), for example, shows that neighborhood political participation has
a negative eﬀect on intentions to move. Research also shows that voters are more likely to be
active in their local community, “cooperate with their fellow citizens on community aﬀairs,”
and engage in “other forms of good citizenship” (Putnam 2000, 35). Higher rates of turnout
signal greater citizen participation and a larger collective of citizens willing to articulate
the public interest. Likewise, low levels of turnout represent a retreat from civic life and a
population that is less willing to use the voice option. Following Hirschman (1970), I argue
that citizens who are attached to their community will choose the voice option over exit.
I use membership in religious institutions to estimate the density of associational life.
Many forms of associational membership have been used to measure community ties (see
Putnam 2000 for examples), but city-level data on other types of membership organizations
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were not available dating back to 1970. Nevertheless, the share of religious adherents is an
appropriate measure of a community’s social capital, not just a measure of convenience. As
Putnam (2000) explains, “the overwhelming majority (93 percent) of older urban congregations provide community services”9 and an organizational hub for community activism
(68). Stable areas that demonstrate denser networks and a more engaged citizenry represent
stronger civil societies eﬀectively engaging voice.
Data on church memberships were collected for each decade and normalized by population. Decennial voter turnout measures are an average of turnout rates for the presidential
elections in the preceding decade. The measure of voter turnout in 1990, for example, is the
average across presidential elections in 1980, 1984 and 1988.

4.3.4

Level-1 Control Variables

The percentage of the total population over the age of 65 (percentage over 65), percentage Hispanic population, and a measure of population change for surrounding counties are
included as controls in the model. Notably, many studies fail to separate race and ethnicity
as two distinct variables. The U.S. Census Bureau treats race and Hispanic origin (ethnicity) as separate concepts in accordance with standards set by the Oﬃce of Management and
Budget. The Census Bureau advises researchers to heed this distinction. Moreover, with the
growing Hispanic population in the U.S., it is important to control for the possible eﬀects of
ethnicity. Ethnicity is calculated for each city-year as the percentage of the total population
that is Hispanic.
Conventional wisdom links central city population loss to processes of suburbanization
and white ﬂight—as a city’s core shrinks the surrounding area grows. Contrary to this
thinking, Beauregard (2001) argues that suburban populations actually grow or shrink concurrently with core city populations. I include population change in surrounding counties in
the model, but do not make deﬁnitive claims about the causal direction of the relationship.
9

In a footnote Putnam (2000) notes that he is referencing national data from a 1998 National Congregation
Survey, originally “reported in Mark Chaves, “Religions Congregations and Welfare Reform: Who Will
Take Advantage of ‘Charitable Choice’ ?” American Sociological Review 64 (1999):836-46, and Mark Chaves,
“Congregations’ Social Service Activities” (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, Center on Nonproﬁts
and Philanthropy, 1999)” (452).
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The variable measuring population change in surrounding counties was created by taking
an average of the population in counties bordering or intersecting the geographic bounds of
a city. This represents a rough approximation of a metropolitan area for all cities including
cities that do not have census deﬁned metro- or micro-politan areas. Furthermore, census
classiﬁcations for micro- and metro-politan areas have changed over time as have the boundaries deﬁning the speciﬁc geographic regions. County boundaries, in contrast, have remained
stable since 1970.

4.3.5

Level-2 Independent Variables

Three time-invariant (i.e., city level) covariates are included in the model. A large city
dummy variable identiﬁes cities with 200,000 or more residents for every decade in the period.
The 200,000 mark approximates the 75th percentile and thus distinguishes the top quartile of
observations. Cities are coded as Rustbelt cities using the geographic boundaries discussed in
Chapter 1. Finally, a categorical census region covariate is included in the model to account
for geographic eﬀects.

4.3.6

Decade Trends

Table 4.4 presents the grand means and decade means for all time-varying covariates, plus
average deviations from the grand means for each decade. The table illustrates aggregate
time trends. Many trends are unsurprising and align with popular perception. The average
share of Hispanics, for example, increased from 6% in 1970 to 23% in 2010. Decade averages
for voter turnout decline over time, mirroring the general decline in civic participation across
the country. Also, not surprisingly, average population change is positive for every decade,
reﬂecting the growing share of urban inhabitants in the U.S. Average population growth
is largest in 1970 (reﬂecting the change in population between 1960 and 1970) and slows
substantially in subsequent decades with a slight uptick in average population change in
1990 (reﬂecting the change in population between 1980 and 1990).
A few trends are especially noteworthy and hint at relationships that warrant further
scrutiny. At the aggregate, there is some evidence that population change in surrounding

21.149

20.796

a

1.141
0.003
−8.356
39.508
741.742

−3.008
−0.023
−4.126
15.832
261.965

−3.339
2.780

City ﬁnancial variables are in 2010 inﬂation adjusted dollars per capita.

−19.101
3.799
19.397
31.276
47.513
5.718
−5.448 −12.765
2.115
−1.915
−1.275
−1.893
240.388 −226.304 −163.553 −215.608
−1.944
4.924
0.005
0.671
231
231
231
231

−36.804
−35.170
2.997
368.600
−3.654
230

2.426

−8.890
−0.113
0.473
2.374
3.913
−0.110
2.868
−5.537
8.628
0.181

−5.238
−0.004
0.016
1.864
0.283
−0.104
0.049
0.287
4.133
0.418

−4.394
−0.015
0.052
0.673
0.221
0.081
0.090
−0.579
−0.835
0.940

2010

−5.770
−0.124
−0.145
−0.888
−1.838
−0.322
−0.509
−1.943
−4.266
−0.001

2000

1990

1980

40.400
58.103
81.003
96.601 108.480
0.000
82.683
40.888
29.722
22.405
58.315
57.433
53.403
54.043
53.424
3507.110 3378.898 2912.206 2974.957 2922.902
46.388
48.098
54.967
50.047
50.713
230
231
231
231
231

19.510

24.397
0.258
−0.399
−4.040
−2.610
0.455
−2.508
7.771
−7.693
−1.547

1970

0.009
0.010
0.001
4.356
4.437
3.689
−11.648
0.462 −44.608
−455.469 −432.157 −133.827

15.362

6.999
0.138
0.473
20.134
19.737
3.477
10.034
45.486
22.722
11.270

2010

Average Deviation from the Mean

0.032
0.033
0.023
0.000
0.025
79.384
79.465
78.717
70.901
66.671
386.614 398.724 353.654 414.094 437.770
1880.820 1904.132 2202.462 2598.254 3078.031

15.031

2000
10.651
0.247
0.016
19.624
16.106
3.483
7.215
51.310
18.227
11.508

10.119
0.126
−0.145
16.871
13.985
3.265
6.657
49.080
9.828
11.089

40.286
0.509
−0.399
13.720
13.214
4.042
4.658
58.794
6.401
9.543

Population change
15.889
Log population change
0.251
Socioeconomic disadvantage
0.000
% Black
17.760
% Poverty
15.824
% Single mothers
3.587
Unemployment
7.166
Median income
51.023
% Hispanic
14.094
% Over 65
11.090
Surrounding county
population change
18.369
Log surrounding county
population change
0.023
Economic diversity index
75.028
Property tax per capitaa
398.262
Total debt per capitaa
2336.289
Local housing & community
development per capitaa 77.204
CDBG per capitaa
35.170
Voter turnout
55.318
Voter turnout2
3138.510
% Adherents
50.043
N
1154

11.495
0.236
0.052
18.433
16.045
3.667
7.256
50.444
13.259
12.029

1990

1970

Mean

1980

Decade Means

Variables

Grand

Table 4.4. Decade Means and Deviations from the Grand Mean by Decade
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counties does rise and fall in contrast to city population shifts, consistent with popular
belief. Average economic diversity peaked in the 1980s and declined slightly in the next
decade before dropping sharply in 2000 and 2010. Average CDBG funding per capita has
declined precipitously since the 1980s. At the same time, average per capita spending on
housing and community development increased across the entire period as did average total
debt per capita. The fact that community development spending declines while total debt
is increasing highlights the ﬁscal stain cities have been facing over the last few decades.

4.3.7

Model Speciﬁcation

The following explanation draws heavily from the work of Singer and Willett (2003);
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012); and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). As a starting point
for the analysis, recall that a basic regression model takes the form:
Yit = β0 + ξit

(4.1)

where the residuals ξit are assumed to be normally and independently distributed. This assumption no longer holds with longitudinal data. Repeated measures on the same unit tend
to be more similar than measurements on diﬀerent units. Observations that are clustered
in this way are likely to be correlated within each unit. In the present case, measurement
occasions within a particular city will likely show some dependence. OLS regression also
assumes that the same intercept and slope characterize all 231 cities in the dataset. Multilevel models account for the hierarchical structure of the dataset while allowing multiple
observations on the same unit to violate the assumption of independence (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal 2012). Multilevel modeling can also separate within-city and between-city eﬀects
to capture eﬀects that vary over time within a city in addition to eﬀects that vary from city
to city.
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4.3.7.1 Step 1: Variance components model
The ﬁrst phase of model speciﬁcation examines the hierarchical structure of the data.
A variance components model (also referred to as an unconditional means model) helps
establish whether there is suﬃcient variance at the city level to warrant a multilevel approach.
Including a random intercept for city allows for the possibility that average population change
varies systematically by city and enables the decomposition of outcome variation into withinand between-city components. To do this, we use a simple two-level model where occasions
are the level-1 units and cities are the level-2 units:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + εit , where εit ∼ N (0, σε2 )

(4.2)

Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + ζ0i , where ζ0i ∼ N (0, σζ20 )
Substituting the level-2 model into the level-1 model produces a composite model:
Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + ζ0i + εit

(4.3)

The subscript i represents cities and the subscript t indicates time points (occasions). The
ﬁxed part of the model is the grand mean γ00 —the average population change across all cities
and time points. The variance components model splits the residual ξit into two uncorrelated
components: a level-1 residual εit for occasions within cities and a level-2 residual ζ0i for
cities. The level-1 residual εit represents the random deviation of occasion t from city i’s
mean π0i and has constant within-city (between-occasion) variance σε2 (standard deviation
σε ). The level-2 error term ζ0i is the random deviation of city i’s average change in population
π0i (across occasions) from the overall mean γ00 . The level-2 residual ζ0i has between-city
variance σζ20 (standard deviation σζ0 ). In sum, γ00 + ζ0i is the true mean for city i and εit is
the measurement error for city i at occasion t. (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, 78)
Observations (city-year) with missing data drop out of the analysis, leaving 1,154 observations belonging to 231 cities. A likelihood ratio test comparing the variance components
model to a linear regression model indicates that adding city-speciﬁc intercepts signiﬁcantly
improves the model (LR chi2(1) = 312.06; p < 0.001). The results from the variance compo-
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nents model are displayed in the ﬁrst column of Table 4.5 titled “RI Null.” The overall mean
γ00 for population change across all occasions and cities is 0.251. The standard deviation
σζ0 of the random intercept is 0.359, meaning 95% of the city-speciﬁc intercepts fall within
0.359 percentage points of 0.251. Thus, city means for logged population change range from
0.453 to 0.955 (γ00 ± 1.96σζ0 = 0.251 ± 1.96 × 0.359).
The variance components model provides information about the outcome variability at
each level. As mentioned, the level-2 residuals have a standard deviation σζ0 of 0.359 and the
level-1 residuals have a standard deviation σε of 0.398. The intraclass correlation coeﬃcient ρ
describes the proportion of the total outcome variance that is between cities and is estimated
as:
ρ=

2
σζ0
0.3592
=
= 0.448
2
+ σε2
0.3592 + 0.3982
σζ0

(4.4)

The intraclass correlation is 0.448, meaning an estimated 44.8% of the total variation
in population change is represented at the city level. The large proportion of variability in
population change measures explained by the city underscores the importance of accounting
for the hierarchical structure of the data.
In the unconditional means model, the intraclass correlation (ICC) also represents the
“error autocorrelation coeﬃcient”—the correlation of measurements within the same city
(Singer and Willett 2003, Ch 4). Recall from equation 4.3 that the total residual for an
observation is composed of two error components: a level-2 residual ζ0i for cities and a level1 residual εit for occasions within cities. City i may have a diﬀerent εit for each time point
but has only one ζ0i across every time point. The repeated presence of ζ0i links the residuals
for city i across occasions. ρ quantiﬁes the average correlation between any pair of occasions
for city i. This within-cluster correlation is zero when there is no between-cluster variance
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, 80). In the case where ρ = 0, no within-city eﬀects
are present and a single-level model would be acceptable. A correlation of 0.448 between
occasions within the same city is quite large and indicates a violation of the linear regression
assumption of uncorrelated residuals.
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Table 4.5. Base Model Speciﬁcation

RI Null
β/s.e.
Fixed eﬀects
TIME /Decade (1970=0)

RI + TIME RI + TIME FE
β/s.e.
β/s.e.
−0.062∗∗∗
(0.008)

0.251∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.376∗∗∗
(0.031)

−0.384∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.274∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.264∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.373∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.510∗∗∗
(0.034)

Random eﬀects (variance components)
0.359∗∗∗
Between-city SD [Intercept] σζ0
(0.021)
Within-city SD [Residual] σ
0.398∗∗∗
(0.009)

0.361∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.385∗∗∗
(0.009)

0.366∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.367∗∗∗
(0.009)

1980
1990
2000
2010
Constant

N
Log likelihood
AIC
BIC

1154
−761.242
1528.484
1543.637

1154
−732.031
1472.062
1492.266

1154
−685.727
1385.453
1420.810

Although geographic classiﬁcations (e.g., states, census regions) are used for descriptive
purposes throughout this dissertation, they do not ﬁnd their way into the multilevel structure of the [ﬁnal] model speciﬁcation. Previous chapters suggest some regional variation with
respect to historical trends, such as changes in the proportion of manufacturing employment.
For this reason, I tested various geographic classiﬁcations as potential level-3 variables in a
three-level model, where occasions are level-1 and cities are level-2. The geographic categorizations tested include states, census regions, census divisions, and Bureau of Economic
Analysis regions.
Adding random intercepts for states does improve the model; however, the number of
cities per state ranges from 1 to 46 with quite a few states having only 1 or 2 cities. The
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variation in the number of cases along with the number of states with so few observations
makes any results from a model including state for level-3 questionable. For this reason,
state is not included in subsequent models.
Including each of the other regional variables as a level-3 grouping did not add substantial
explanatory power to the models. For example, after adding a level-3 random eﬀect for census
region, measures of population change are only slightly correlated within the same region,
but are highly correlated within the same city and region. In the three-level model, the
census region ICC is 0.206, while the city ICC is 0.465. Thus, decade changes in population
are only slightly correlated within census region, but at the city level these changes have
a much higher correlation. Although a likelihood ratio test does indicate that the threelevel null model is a statistically signiﬁcant improvement over the two-level null model, this
signiﬁcance does not remain after covariates are added to the model. (This was tested in step
3 below.) The same pattern holds true for the remaining geographic classiﬁcations—census
division and Bureau of Economic Analysis region. In sum, the two-level model is preferred
over a three-level model because of a relatively low degree of within-cluster correlation at
aggregate geographic levels.

4.3.7.2 Step 2: Random Intercept model with TIME as a covariate
The variance components model in Step 1 lacks a slope parameter and thus assumes that
the rate at which population changes is constant over time. Panel a in Figure 4.1 displays
how this would look graphically. The thin grey lines in Figure 4.1a represent city-means
while the bold dashed line represents the grand mean. The lines for each city run parallel to
the overall average diﬀering only in their intercept. All of the lines are ﬂat because nothing in
the ﬁxed or random part of the model is a function of time. Including TIME as a covariate in
the model transforms the city-speciﬁc means into regression lines (see Panel b in Figure 4.1)
and allows the rate of population change to vary across time—a more reasonable assumption.
The ﬁxed part of the model now includes an intercept and a slope. TIME measures each
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decade in the dataset and takes on the values 0–4 with 0=1970. Adding TIME as a predictor
in the random intercept model yields the following framework:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + π1i T IM Eit + εit , where εit ∼ N (0, σε2 )

(4.5)

Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + ζ0i , where ζ0i ∼ N (0, σζ20 )
Substituting the level-2 model into the level-1 model produces the composite model:
Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + ζ0i + π1i T IM Eit + εit

(4.6)

Similar to the variance components model, γ00 is the grand mean across all cities and time
points. The level-2 error term ζ0i measures the distance between city i’s average change
in population π0i and the grand mean γ00 . The level-1 residual εit represents the random
deviation of occasion t from city i’s average level of population change π0i .
A linear random intercept model with covariates is essentially a regression model with a
city-speciﬁc intercept. Consequently, each city has its own distinct initial level of population
change π0i . City-speciﬁc lines diﬀer from the grand mean γ00 by a vertical shift equal to
ζ0i . The time eﬀect π1i is the average trajectory (path in time) for population change across
all cities. Since the eﬀect of TIME is ﬁxed, each city’s trajectory has the same slope as
the overall average, meaning the diﬀerence between each city’s trend and the overall trend is
constant over time. Panel b in Figure 4.1 represents this model graphically. The city-speciﬁc
regression lines and the grand mean line remain parallel because they share a common slope
parameter π1i .
The estimation results for the random intercept model with TIME as a covariate are
listed in the “RI + TIME ” column of Table 4.5. The coeﬃcient for the random intercept
indicates that, on average, logged population change was 0.376 in 1970, the starting point for
this dataset. The eﬀect of TIME is ﬁxed at −0.062, meaning that on average each additional
decade is associated with a little more than a half percentage point decline in the rate of
population change.
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(a) Unconditional Means (Null)

(b) RI w/TIME Covariate

(c) RI w/TIME Fixed Eﬀects

Fig. 4.1. Base Model Speciﬁcations

The level-1 and level-2 standard deviations for the random intercept model are similar
to their counterparts in the variance components model. Including TIME as a covariate
explains very little additional variance. Even so, a likelihood ratio test comparing the random
intercept model to the variance components model shows that adding TIME as a covariate
signiﬁcantly improves the model (LR chi2(1) = 58.42; p < 0.001).

4.3.7.3 Step 3: Alternative TIME speciﬁcations
The assumption that cities grow or decline at the same rate is unsubstantiated in the real
world; it is more likely that cities exhibit diﬀerent patterns of growth and decline. There are
two possible ways to account for this tendency: include a random coeﬃcient for TIME or
include TIME as a decade ﬁxed eﬀect. The former option allows the slope on TIME to vary
across cities, thereby relaxing the restriction of parallel regression lines. Adding a random
slope for TIME does not, however, improve the model (LR chi2(1) = 1.45; p = 0.228).10
10

The random coeﬃcient model with a city-speciﬁc random slope for TIME takes the form:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + π1i T IM Eit + εit , where εit ∼ N (0, σε2 )
Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + ζ0i , where ζ0i ∼ N (0, σζ20 )
π1i = γ10 + ζ1i , where ζ1i ∼ N (0, σζ21 )

Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + ζ0i + (γ10 + ζ1i )T IM Eit + εit
Yit = γ00 + γ10 T IM Eit + ζ0i + ζ1i T IM Eit + εit
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TIME may also be incorporated as a decade ﬁxed eﬀect. Recall from Table 4.4 that average
population growth is much higher in 1970 and smaller in subsequent decades with a slight
uptick in 1990. Unfortunately, there are not enough time points in the dataset to model
a cubic trajectory for time with any level of precision (Singer and Willett 2003). Instead,
independent decade eﬀects within a city can be captured using decade dummy variables:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + εit , where εit ∼ N (0, σε2 )

(4.7)

Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + ζ0i , where ζ0i ∼ N (0, σζ20 )
Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + ζ0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + εit

(4.8)

where logged population change at time t for city i is predicted by an intercept π0i and timeperiod eﬀects π1i , π2i , π3i , and π4i .11 As Table 4.5 indicates, within-city variance decreases
when TIME is accounted for as a decade eﬀect while between-city variance changes very little
(column “RI + TIME FE”). In other words, decade eﬀects help explain variation within
a given city. Furthermore, the model with decade eﬀects oﬀers an improvement over the
model with TIME measured as a continuous time trend (LR chi2(3) = 92.61; p < 0.001).12
The random intercept model with decade dummies is also more appropriate for models that
separate within- and between-eﬀects—models of this nature are considered below. Returning
to Figure 4.1, panel c illustrates this change. The city-speciﬁc lines remain parallel to the
grand mean but now incorporate the [nonlinear] inﬂuence of each decade.
Random intercept models can accommodate additional predictors at level-1 or level-2.
Time-varying covariates are included in the level-1 submodel while the level-2 submodel
11

1970 is the excluded time period (reference category).
A traditional Fixed Eﬀects model is inappropriate for the present analysis because “it eliminates the ability
to test between-cluster hypotheses” (Bartels 2008, 6).

12
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incorporates time-invariant terms. The full random intercept model takes the functional
form:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + π5i xit + εit
Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + γ01 wi + ζ0i

(4.9)
(4.10)

where i is the index for cities and t is the index for occasions. In the ﬁxed part of the model,
xit is a series of covariates measured at the occasion level with coeﬃcients π5i . Coeﬃcients
γ01 for time-invariant covariates wi are included in the level-2 submodel. The composite
model takes the form:
Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + γ01 wi + ζ0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + π5i xit + εit

(4.11)

Yit = γ00 + γ01 wi + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + π5i xit + ζ0i + εit
Model 4.1 in Table 4.6 is a fully speciﬁed random intercept model with all relevant timevarying and time-invariant explanatory variables. All level-1 (i.e., time-varying) covariates
are grand-mean centered.

4.3.7.4 Step 4: Within-Between model
Much of the existing research employing multilevel modeling stops at this point and
oﬀers interpretation of the ﬁndings. Following recent scholarship (e.g., Bell and Jones 2015;
Bartels 2008; Fairbrother 2013; Moller et al. 2009), I examine one more model formulation
before proceeding to a discussion of the results.
The models discussed thus far produce a single coeﬃcient to describe the eﬀect of a
level-1 covariate. These models assume that the between- and within-group eﬀects of the
covariate are equal (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Yet, a level-1 variable may vary
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between and within groups, especially when dealing with time-series, cross-sectional data.
If the within and between eﬀects are truly diﬀerent, a single coeﬃcient will not accurately
capture these eﬀects leading to cluster confounding (Bartels 2008; see also Bell and Jones
2015). Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) explain that cluster-level confounding is the correlation between a level-1 covariate and the random intercept, “which represents the eﬀects of
omitted level-2 covariates...This problem is often referred to as endogeneity in econometrics”
(150). According to the authors, including both within- and between-cluster transformations
of level-1 variables in the model will alleviate potential problems of cluster confounding. Estimates from a within-between formulation are also more precise (Bartels 2008; Bell and
Jones 2015). The following model speciﬁcation relaxes the assumption that the betweenand within-city eﬀects for time-varying covariates are the same and separates covariate effects on population change into longitudinal (over time) and cross-sectional (across cities)
components:
Level-1 Model: Yit = π0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + π5i (xit − x
¯i ) + εit

(4.12)

¯i + ζ0i
Level-2 Model: π0i = γ00 + γ01 wi + γ02 x
Composite Model: Yit = γ00 + γ01 wi + γ02 x̄i + ζ0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it
+ π3i 2000it + π4i 2010it + π5i (xit − x
¯i ) + εit

(4.13)

Yit = γ00 + ζ0i + π1i 1980it + π2i 1990it + π3i 2000it
+ π4i 2010it + π5i (xit − x
¯i ) + γ01 wi + γ02 x̄i + εit
Explanatory variables in the within-between speciﬁcation of the random intercept model
are measured with two indicators: the mean (over time) for each city and the deviations from
those means. For any level-1 variable x, the between-city (or cross-sectional) operationalization x̄i is the city-speciﬁc mean of xit . The within-cluster (or longitudinal) operationalization
is calculated as the deviation of each observation xit from the city’s mean x̄i . The level-1
equation includes city mean deviations (xit − x̄i ) and predicts cities’ population change over

time. The level-2 equation adds the city-level means x̄i as independent variables and predicts
city-level eﬀects on population change.

4.4

Results and Discussion

Fit statistics for the random intercept and within-between models are listed in the bottom row of Table 4.6. Both the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) indicate the within-between model is preferred over the random
intercept model. The covariates in Model 4.1 are grand-mean centered.13 For Model 4.2,
Table 4.6 includes columns for longitudinal eﬀects, cross-sectional eﬀects, and coeﬃcients
representing the diﬀerence between the within- and between-country eﬀects (which tests for
cluster confounding).
The within-between speciﬁcation does not produce consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients
for the level-2 covariates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). For this reason, the random
intercept model (Model 4.1) results are more appropriate for interpreting city level covariates.
Although, in the present case, level-2 coeﬃcients in Models 4.1 and 4.2 are very similar.
Results from the within-between model reveal signiﬁcant cluster confounding for several
variables, suggesting notable discrepancies between the within- and between-city eﬀects and
conﬁrming the need to distinguish between the two. Consequently, the discussion of timevarying covariates will focus primarily on Model 4.2.

4.4.1

Results

I begin with the city level covariates. The coeﬃcients for the large city and Rustbelt
identiﬁers are signiﬁcant and negative. The empirical results also conﬁrm that large, postindustrial cities of the Midwest were hit the hardest by deindustrialization. Put simply,
larger cities and Rustbelt cities are more likely to see decline, as are cities located in the
Midwest. Detroit, Michigan, the city of interest in the chapters to follow, ﬁts this proﬁle.
13

Surrounding county population change is not mean-centered in the model because it contains a meaningful
zero-point. Similarly, socioeconomic disadvantage is also not mean-centered because the regression-weighted
index is already calculated so that the mean is equal to zero.
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Detroit lies within the geographic boundaries deﬁning the Rustbelt and had well over 200,000
residents throughout the period under study.
The South is the reference group for census regions. Cities in the Midwest are signiﬁcantly
more likely to experience decline than are cities in the South. That the Midwest is more likely
to experience decline than the South is not surprising. What is surprising is the insigniﬁcant
diﬀerence between the South and the Northeast region. Measured at the state level, Southern
states have experienced signiﬁcantly more growth than their Northern counterparts (Judd
and Swanstrom 2008). The diﬀerence in state- and city-level trends suggests that suburban
and rural growth are contributing more than urban growth to state level trends in the South.
TIME has a signiﬁcant eﬀect across all models. Compared to the 1970 baseline, and
controlling for other variables in the model, logged population change is 0.369 points lower
in 1980. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the other decades and 1970. Contrasting
each decade with the preceding decade during post estimation revealed a signiﬁcant decrease
from 1970 to 1980 (chi2 = 61.70, p < 0.001) and a signiﬁcant increase from 1980 to 1990
(chi2 = 69.87, p < 0.001). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between 2000 and 1990 and
between 2010 and 2000.
Socioeconomic disadvantage has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on population change across
all models (p < 0.001). The test for cluster confounding suggests that the longitudinal and
cross-sectional eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent; even so, estimating both eﬀects provides
a more precise substantive interpretation (Bartels 2008). On average, cities with a larger
share of disadvantaged residents are more likely to experience decline. Over time, increasing
socioeconomic disadvantage within a city is associated with population decline. Both eﬀects
echo established explanations of decline. Aﬄuent, White citizens are more likely to move
out from the central city, leaving behind the least mobile citizens. As the proportion of
disadvantaged residents increases, the exodus of the middle class accelerates.
A model testing the component variables of socioeconomic disadvantage conﬁrms these
trends (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).14 Consistent with historical accounts, decline is
14

The component model includes percentage Black, percentage single mothers, percentage poverty, and
unemployment. Median household income is highly correlated with percentage poverty and unemployment
so it is excluded from the model. Percentage single mothers failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance in any of
the component models. This is not surprising since there is very little variation in the percentage of single
mothers either over time or across cities.

Constant
Socioeconomic characteristics
Socioeconomic Disadvantage
% Hispanic
% Over 65
Physical characteristics
Surrounding Cnty pop chg
Economic/ﬁnancial characteristics
Economic diversity
Property tax per capitaa
Total debt per capitaa
Government responsiveness
Local housing & com dev per capitaa
CDBG per capitaa
Strength of civil society
Voter turnout
Voter turnout2
% Adherents
Large city [dummy]
Rustbelt [dummy]
Census region b
Northeast
Midwest
West
0.007
(0.004)
0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.000†
(0.000)
−0.000†
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.050∗∗ (0.018)
−0.000∗∗ (0.000)
−0.006∗∗∗ (0.002)

(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.000)

−0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
(0.014)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.036)
(0.061)
(0.084)
(0.062)
(0.048)

0.029∗
−0.000∗
−0.007∗∗∗
−0.142∗∗∗
−0.206∗∗∗
−0.079
−0.155∗
−0.078

(0.063)

0.004
0.000
0.000∗∗

0.041

(0.052)

0.027

−0.113∗∗∗ (0.030)
(0.002)
−0.004†
−0.079∗∗∗ (0.006)

s.e.

−0.175∗∗∗ (0.017)
0.002
(0.001)
−0.055∗∗∗ (0.004)

β
2.100∗∗∗ (0.597)

s.e.

Longitudinal

0.520∗∗∗ (0.046)

β

Model 4.1 (RI)

Table 4.6. Mixed Eﬀects Models of Population Change

s.e.

0.072
−0.155∗
−0.054

−0.087∗∗
0.001∗∗
−0.001

−0.037†
0.000†
−0.007∗∗∗
−0.107∗∗
−0.148∗∗

(0.026)
(0.000)
(0.002)

(0.000)
(0.001)

continued on next page...

(0.086)
(0.063)
(0.054)

(0.019)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.034)
(0.057)

(0.230)
−0.006
(0.006)
−0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.015

−0.001∗
−0.005∗∗

(0.004)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(0.198)

s.e.

−0.055
(0.038)
0.007∗∗ (0.002)
0.050∗∗∗ (0.008)

β

Diﬀerence Test

−0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
−0.002†
(0.001)

0.001
−0.000
0.000∗∗

0.056

−0.168∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.003∗
(0.001)
−0.029∗∗∗ (0.005)

β

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2 (Mean/Dev)
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(0.047)
(0.039)
(0.047)
(0.057)

s.e.

1110
−374.249
796.498
916.789

0.167∗∗∗ (0.015)
0.310∗∗∗ (0.008)

−0.370∗∗∗
−0.043
−0.059
−0.078

β

Model 4.1 (RI)

(0.049)
(0.046)
(0.064)
(0.086)

s.e.

1110
−328.440
728.880
909.316

0.140∗∗∗ (0.013)
0.302∗∗∗ (0.007)

−0.369∗∗∗
−0.007
0.002
−0.020

β

Longitudinal
β

s.e.

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2 (Mean/Dev)
β

s.e.

Diﬀerence Test

Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log of true population change. Covariates for Model 4.1 are grand-mean centered.
Covariates for Model 4.2 are city-mean centered. Coeﬃcients are estimated via Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
Standard Errors are in parentheses. † p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
a
City ﬁnancial variables are in 2010 inﬂation adjusted dollars per capita.
b
South is the reference category for census region.
c
1970 is the reference category for year.

N
Log likelihood
AIC
BIC

Random eﬀects (variance components)
Between-city SD [Intercept] σζ0
Within-city SD [Residual] σ

Time/Decade (1970=0) c
1980
1990
2000
2010

Table 4.6. continued
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more likely to occur as the share of impoverished residents increases within a given city.
Comparing across cities, those that average a larger share of Black residents tend to experience more decline. Cities with a higher average unemployment rate are also more likely to
see population decline. These processes work to concentrate socioeconomic disadvantage in
central cities while the most mobile citizens move elsewhere.
For percentage Hispanic, the insigniﬁcant eﬀect in Model 4.1 is misleading. The diﬀerence
test for percentage Hispanic indicates signiﬁcant cluster confounding. The within-between
model reveals diﬀerent processes occurring over time and across cities. For a given city, as
the share of Hispanic residents increases over time, population signiﬁcantly decreases. This
longitudinal eﬀect, however, fails to meet the threshold for statistical signiﬁcance (p = 0.079).
Cross-sectionally, cities that, on average, have a larger share of Hispanic residents are more
likely to experience growth in the aggregate. Recall from Table 4.4, that the average share
of Hispanics has been growing each decade. This general trend in combination with the
cross-sectional results suggests that cities with generally larger shares of Hispanic residents
are positioned well for maintaining population stability or achieving growth as the Hispanic
population in the U.S. continues to increase over the next few decades.
In Model 4.2, the eﬀects for percentage over 65 show signiﬁcant cluster confounding even
though both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and negative. Cities with a larger average share
of residents over 65 are more likely to experience aggregate decline. Between cities, a 1%
increase in the proportion of elderly residents reduces population change by 2.858%.15 The
negative eﬀect of an aging population is more than twice as large over time within a given
city. A 1% increase in the proportion of elderly residents reduces population change by
7.596% within a given city.
Population change in surrounding counties and economic diversity are insigniﬁcant in
Models 4.1 and 4.2. This latter ﬁnding is especially interesting. The aggregate decennial
trend for economic diversity illustrated in Table 4.4 showed urban economies becoming less
diverse over time, but this general trend had no impact on population change. Even parti15

Since the dependent variable is the log of population change, a 1% change in X is interpreted as a
[(eβ−1 ) × 100] change in Y .
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tioning the eﬀects into within- and between-components uncovered no relationship between
economic diversity and population change.
Consistent with expectations, a larger tax base (measured as a decade average of property
tax per capita) is associated with population stability or growth, at least longitudinally. The
diﬀerence test for property tax per capita reveals signiﬁcant cluster confounding. Within-city
increases in per capita property tax are linked to greater population stability, but between
cities the size of the average per capita property tax base does not determine whether a
city’s population will grow or shrink. The model and data say nothing about the inﬂuences
of other tax revenues, leaving open another avenue for future research that may provide
additional insight about the inﬂuence of city ﬁnances on population change.
The results oﬀer mixed support for the hypothesized relationship between government
performance and population change. Contrary to expectations, more local spending on
housing and community development is associated with population decline, not growth.
Speciﬁcally, local housing and community development expenditure has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on population change across all models. The diﬀerence between the longitudinal and
cross-sectional eﬀects is signiﬁcant even though the coeﬃcients for the two eﬀects are very
similar. Cities with generally higher levels of housing and community development spending
are more likely to experience net depopulation than cities with relatively low spending on
housing and community development. Similarly, cities that increase spending over time
are more likely to see a larger share of citizens exiting, although this ﬁnding misses the
threshold for statistical signiﬁcance (p = 0.082). These results provide evidence against the
hypothesized relationship between local housing and community development spending and
population change. At the same time, the eﬀects illustrate a perpetual pattern of decline—
cities in decline spend more on housing and community development and cities that are, on
average, spending more on housing and community development tend to be those that are
worse oﬀ.
In contrast, the results for CDBG funding per capita provide partial conﬁrmation of
Hypothesis 4.4. Results from Model 4.2 show signiﬁcant cluster confounding for the measure
of CDBG funding. The cross-sectional eﬀect for average CDBG funding is not statistically
signiﬁcant but the longitudinal eﬀect is signiﬁcant. Consistent with expectations, increasing
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per person CDBG allocations longitudinally helps cities to stabilize or grow their populations.
This means that, for a given city, decades with larger CDBG allocations tend to experience
more growth. In other words, increasing per capita CDBG funding over time, increases the
city’s growth rate. The longitudinal results are especially interesting given the decline in
aggregate CDBG funding across decades shown in Table 4.4. If the general goal of CDBG
funding is growth, then individual cities appear to be using their resources wisely. Increased
funding makes a positive diﬀerence within cities.
This initial set of results provides evidence that federal grant money can make a diﬀerence.
Local leaders appear to be making ﬁnancial decisions that are in the interest of maintaining or
growing their populations; however, the empirical analysis thus far cannot tease out exactly
how CDBG funding is being used at the local level or if local targeting decisions are indeed
being made in response to citizens’ needs. I use the case study in the following chapters to
draw more deﬁnitive conclusions about government performance.
Turning next to the measures of civil society, all three of the relevant coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant in Model 4.1. The longitudinal results for Model 4.2 parallel the pattern found
in the random intercept model. Cross-sectionally, the percentage of religious adherents
is the only measure of civil society to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Cluster confounding is
signiﬁcant for voter turnout and its quadratic variant. For percentage of adherents, the test
of equal between and within eﬀects is not statistically signiﬁcant, meaning that associational
membership has the same eﬀect over time as it does across city.
Recall that the within-between model addresses the question: Does this eﬀect occur for a
given city across time (as civil society gets weaker or stronger) or between cities that generally
maintain a larger or smaller stock of social capital? Contrary to expectation, associational
membership has a negative eﬀect on population change. Over time, cities with a growing
share of religious adherents see less growth. And, cities with a generally larger share of
residents belonging to religious institutions average less growth than cities with a generally
smaller share of religious adherents. Analysis thus far shows an inverse relationship between
social capital in the form of voluntary associational membership and population change.
Religious organization membership, to the extent that it measures community connectedness
and provides an opportunity for collective action, does not prevent exit.
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Voter turnout measures the potential for collective inﬂuence through citizen voice. Decomposing turnout’s inﬂuence on population change into within- and between-city eﬀects
reveals that political participation signiﬁcantly aﬀects population change longitudinally, but
not cross-sectionally. The positive longitudinal coeﬃcient for turnout conﬁrms a relationship
between increasing collective capacity within a city and population growth. The negative
coeﬃcient for turnout squared, however, indicates that beyond a given level of civic participation population tends to decline with rising turnout.
Figure 4.2a displays estimates of population change as a function of voter turnout, holding
level-1 covariates at their means and TIME and the level-2 covariates at their observed
values.16 Moving across levels of turnout, the predicted rate of population change increases
as turnout increases. The estimated rate of population change is greatest for cities with
turnout rates around 54%. This location also corresponds to the point at which the slope of
the ﬁtted line is zero, as can be seen in the marginal eﬀects plot to the right. Figure 4.2b
shows that the positive eﬀect of voter turnout on population change decreases in magnitude
as turnout increases. More exactly, the eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant when turnout equals
20% and remains positive until roughly 54%; here, the eﬀect on population change is zero
and insigniﬁcant. Beyond 54% turnout, the average marginal eﬀect is negative. Thus, cities
with relatively weak civil society (operationalized as low levels of voter turnout) beneﬁt most
from strengthening civil society (increasing average voter turnout).
Notably, the expected rates of population change are almost exclusively positive in Figure
4.2a. Of the 1,110 observations modeled, population change is positive for 783 observations
and negative for only 327. Thus, the plots reﬂect the general tendency for population change
to be positive. Limiting the sample to the 130 cities with at least one year of population
decline provides a better illustration of how voter turnout can have a positive eﬀect on cities
experiencing population decline. Figure 4.3 displays predicted rates of population change
across levels of voter turnout alongside an illustration of the average marginal eﬀects of
turnout for cities with at least one year of decline (624 observations after accounting for
missing data). Results for the random intercept model with limited observations are given
16

Predicted means and marginal eﬀects are based on the random intercept model. Stata, the statistical
software used to analyze models and generate marginal eﬀects plots, could not properly plot eﬀects from the
within-between formulation because of the way interactions are speciﬁed.
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(a) Predicted Values

(b) Average Marginal Eﬀects

Fig. 4.2. Inﬂuence of Voter Turnout on Population Change

in the Appendix (see Table A.2). Restricting the model to include only cities that have
experienced at least one decade of decline shifts the predicted values curve down in Figure
4.3a. The average marginal eﬀects line is also steeper in Figure 4.3b. The general trends are
the same for the original and limited models, but more pronounced in the limited model.
Increases in political activity have the greatest positive eﬀect on population change in
cities with relatively low levels of political participation. Over time, increasing the collective
capacity in these cities works to halt the outmigration of residents, but only to a certain
point. As collective capacity increases, decline lessens until collective capacity hits above
average levels. There, the positive eﬀect plateaus before weakening. Although the eﬀect
remains positive, increasing the collective capacity when civil society is already quite strong
results in a diminishing return on investment. In other words, cities struggling with civic
participation have the most to gain by increasing turnout.

4.4.2

Conclusion

In a global society, cities are hubs of innovation and economic activity. Their decline has
consequences for the health of the country as a whole. The solution to decline promoted
by many economic determinists is to diversify the economic opportunities within the city.
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(a) Predicted Values

(b) Average Marginal Eﬀects

Fig. 4.3. Inﬂuence of Voter Turnout on Population Change for Cities with at Least One Year
of Decline

But the results presented here show that increasing economic diversity does not aﬀect the
outmigration of central city residents. Increased access to federal funding, however, appears
to matter a great deal for individual cities. Based on these ﬁndings, it seems as though local
leaders must be doing something right with their federal dollars if longitudinal increases in
CDBG funding predict population stability (or growth).
City-level results also conﬁrm that socioeconomic disadvantage is associated with population decline. Citizen voice, in contrast, is linked to population stability or growth. Aggregate measures, however, cannot account for variation among the communities within a
city. Fittingly, the city-level results from this chapter inform subsequent chapters looking at
neighborhood variation. Speciﬁcally, Chapters 5 and 6 explore how these processes work at
the neighborhood level in Detroit, Michigan. As Weaver and Holtkamp (2015) note, “analyzing urban change demands attention to multiple spatial scales and location-speciﬁc features,
particularly the distribution of social capital within a city” (2015). Although results from
a single case study on Detroit are not generalizable to all cities, they do contribute to our
understanding of local civil society.
Throughout the last few decades, disadvantage has become especially concentrated in
central cities like Detroit. This concentration has not been felt equally by all segments of
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the population. Unemployment and poverty have had, and continue to have, the harshest
eﬀects on Black Americans. Take, for example, the unemployment rate over the last few
decades: for Blacks, unemployment was 14.3% in 1980, 11.4% in 1990, 7.6% in 2000, and
16.0% in 2010 compared with the national averages of 7.1% in 1980, 5.6% in 1990, 4.0% in
2000, and 9.6% in 2010.17 Detroit’s population was 82% Black as of the 2010 census; its
unemployment rate was 26.4%. The share of residents in poverty was (and is) also especially
high in Detroit. The acute concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage in Detroit makes
the city’s economic recovery diﬃcult and restricts its residents’ upward mobility prospects.
Putnam (2000) stresses the importance of social capital for communities suﬀering from
socioeconomic disadvantage and argues that “precisely because poor people (by deﬁnition)
have little economic capital and face formidable obstacles in acquiring human capital (that
is, education), social capital is disproportionately important to their welfare” [emphasis in
original] (318). Who contributes to a community’s reservoir of social capital and who beneﬁts
from it is not clear from aggregate data alone. In a poor, unemployed, and racially isolated
city like Detroit, Putnam’s contentions are especially relevant.
The next two chapters explore how civil society and local government decision-making
aﬀect population change in Detroit. Chapter 5 looks at where leaders in Detroit are targeting
their federal CDBG dollars and tests whether decision-makers are responding to community
need, civil society, or both. Chapter 6 tests the extent to which civil society and local
government investment decisions can mitigate population decline. Together, the chapters
address a series of questions: Are local decision makers targeting communities most in need?
Can the strength of local civil society help communities secure needed resources? Are local
investment strategies working? In other words, does ﬁnancial investment prevent exit? Does
strong local civil society mitigate decline? And ﬁnally, to what extent do the strength of
civil society and government investment reinforce each other in preventing the exodus of city
residents?

17

Unemployment statistics by race are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics “Unemployment rates by race
and ethnicity, 2010” table at: https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20111005_data.htm
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CHAPTER 5. NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS

5.1

Introduction

In previous chapters I have argued that greater levels of social capital will decrease
exit and strengthen voice but acknowledge that policy decisions aﬀect this relationship.
The results from Chapter 4 support this argument and oﬀer insight on the dynamics at
work inside large U.S. cities. Cross-sectionally, larger local government expenditures on
housing and community development predict population decline. In contrast, for a given
city, increases in federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) allocations over
time successfully mitigate decline. Indeed, Chapter 4 explicitly shows that as a particular
city’s CDBG allocations increase across decades, population stability and growth become
signiﬁcantly more likely.
The ability to draw from a larger resource base in the form of CDBG funding is an asset
for cities hoping to arrest (or at least reduce) the outmigration of their residents. But as it
turns out, having more resources available and needing to use more resources are two very
diﬀerent things. When local leaders are forced to expend more resources on housing and
community development it is usually in response to decline. Once the process of decline
begins, local decision-makers work to stop it by funneling money into projects and programs
designed to better their communities. But such eﬀorts are often ineﬀective in big cities
because once population decline begins it activates a number of self-reinforcing mechanisms
that sustain it (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982). In the aggregate, it seems averaging
larger local housing and community development expenditures is little more than a signal
that city oﬃcials are ﬂoundering in the face of decline.
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The analysis in Chapter 4 also conﬁrms a link between growing socioeconomic disadvantage and dwindling population. Once again, a number of forces are at play. Many
mobile citizens exit because of growing socioeconomic disadvantage and at the same time
the exodus of mobile citizens further concentrates socioeconomic disadvantage in the city. As
Downs (1997) has noted the departure of more aﬄuent households “creates a self-aggravating
downward spiral in ﬁscal, economic, and social strength” (386). Chapter 4 also shows that
increasing the strength of civil society within a city can counter these eﬀects and curtail the
exodus of its inhabitants. Rather than leave, residents living in areas with a strong civil
society choose to voice their concerns.
This chapter and the next move from the city level to the neighborhood level and further
explore how civil society and local government decision-making aﬀect population change. In
this chapter, I argue that areas with strong civil society are better at gaining resources from
local government. In the following chapter I argue that strong civil society can mitigate
population decline. These two arguments are not separate processes; rather, they work in
tandem. Stronger civil societies, characterized by more local political activism and a denser
organizational resource base, are better at articulating their preferences and pressuring local
oﬃcials for goods and services. The same underlying social mechanisms that activate voice
and encourage neighborhood co-ordination also hold exit at bay (Hirschman 1970).
Turning ﬁrst to civil society’s ability to gain resources, this chapter speciﬁcally looks
at where local decision makers in Detroit, Michigan are targeting CDBG funding. The
analysis asks: Are local decision makers targeting communities most in need? Can the
strength of local civil society help communities secure needed resources? Logistic regression
models evaluate neighborhood characteristics hypothesized to inﬂuence CDBG allocations
paying special attention to community need and the strength of civil society. Because the
CDBG program is intended to beneﬁt citizens and areas most in need of resources, local
level allocation decisions indicate the extent to which decision makers pay attention to their
residents. Moreover, research on urban policy often uses local service provisions or ﬁnancial
policy outputs to measure government performance and responsiveness (see Clark and Krebs
2012 for a review). This chapter follows this convention and uses local CDBG funding
allocations to gauge government responsiveness.
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5.2
5.2.1

Explanations and Hypotheses

Percentage Low- and Moderate- Income

The CDBG program was designed speciﬁcally to address community needs with a focus
on housing, neighborhood rehabilitation, and economic development. The program “works
to ensure decent aﬀordable housing, to provide services to the most vulnerable in our communities, and to create jobs through the expansion and retention of businesses” (HUD).1
Program requirements stipulate that “not less than 70 percent of CDBG funds must be used
for activities that beneﬁt low- and moderate-income persons” (HUD Exchange).2 Based on
program requirements, neighborhoods with larger proportions of low- and moderate-income
residents should be more likely to receive CDBG funding.

5.2.2

Concentrated Disadvantage

Communities in need, meaning those composed of “the most vulnerable in our communities,” should receive more resources given the mandate of the CDBG program. Existing
knowledge shows this is not always the case for a variety of reasons. Politically self-interested
politicians, for example, allocate resources to maximize their chance of reelection (Downs
1957). Local decision makers are expected to reward their core constituency above all else
(Banﬁeld 1961). In their study of local CDBG distribution in Milwaukee and Baltimore, for
example, Wong and Peterson (1986) found that local leadership allocated CDBG resources
so as to “serve both the communities’ economic interest and their own electoral ambitions,”
paying little attention to the needs of their poorest residents (307). Consistent with this
thinking, local decision-makers are not expected to prioritize the most disadvantaged communities. The apparent contradiction between expecting local oﬃcials to target low- and
moderate- income areas but not their most disadvantaged residents can be rectiﬁed with a
brief explanation about how disadvantage is characterized in this paper.
1

HUD program description from the website https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_
offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs.
2
HUD Exchange, CDBG Entitlement Program Eligibility Requirements: https://www.hudexchange.info/
programs/cdbg-entitlement/cdbg-entitlement-program-eligibility-requirements/
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A variety of disciplines investigate the causes and consequences of disadvantage. Conceptualizations of socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g., Morenoﬀ and Sampson 1997), social vulnerability (e.g., Aldrich and Crook 2013; Flanagen et al. 2011), multidimensional poverty (e.g.,
Reeves, Kneebone, and Rodrigue 2016), and concentrated disadvantage (e.g., Langworthy et
al. 2009; Morenoﬀ, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush
2008) abound. Deﬁnitions and naming conventions may vary from discipline to discipline
and author to author, but there is a general consensus as to what factors tend to characterize disadvantage and an understanding about what is deﬁnitively not disadvantage. Income,
race, family structure, public assistance, education, and place are all determinants of disadvantage. Thus, identifying “the most vulnerable in our communities,” requires looking
beyond simple income levels.
Urban sociologists, among others, have long recognized that poverty does not exist in
a vacuum. Neighborhood poverty, especially in deeply segregated areas, tends to isolate
the poor from the more aﬄuent who, in turn, are apt to have better education along with
more upward mobility and employment opportunities (Curley 2010; Wilson 1987). Sampson
(2012) explains that “disadvantage is not encompassed in a single characteristic but rather
is a synergistic composite of social factors that mark the qualitative aspects of growing up in
severely disadvantaged neighborhoods” (100). Concentrated disadvantage has been linked to
higher rates of homicide, neighborhood-level variations in rates of violence (Morenoﬀ, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), and decreased access to social networks capable of providing
upward social or economic mobility (Wilson 1987; Tigges et al. 1998).
Neighborhoods with greater levels of concentrated disadvantage are more in need of ﬁnancial assistance and should be the logical recipients of CDBG funding. We know, however,
that local oﬃcials often ignore their most disadvantaged citizens and prioritize economic interests and better-oﬀ citizens. In line with existing arguments, I expect neighborhoods with
more concentrated disadvantage to be less likely to receive CDBG funding. It is important to recognize, however, that “the state’s capacity to intervene depends in part on the
neighborhood’s capacity to express its needs through formal or informal political interactions” (Kleiman and Teles 2006, 635). Communities characterized by severe concentrated
disadvantage often lack the means and access necessary to extract resources (Putnam 2000).
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Thus, it is quite possible that disadvantaged neighborhoods fail to acquire needed resources
because they are unable to “voice” their needs to local oﬃcials. This important consideration
is discussed in more detail shortly.

5.2.3

Strength of Civil Society

Collective pursuits of housing and community development funds are especially diﬃcult in
declining cities. Where large groups of individuals suﬀer the same conditions—as in declining
urban neighborhoods—rational individuals have little incentive to expend their own resources
when they will beneﬁt regardless of their participation (Olson 1965). A number of studies
have demonstrated that stronger civil societies, endowed with an abundance of social capital
deﬁned as “resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized
in purposive actions” (Lin 2001, 29), more eﬀectively articulate their preferences and, as a
result, are more successful in securing resources. Putnam (1993), for instance, shows that
governments of municipalities rich in social capital more eﬀectively produce public goods.
As another example, studies of community resilience argue that neighborhoods with higher
levels of social capital are better able to gain needed resources after devastating natural
disasters (Aldrich 2011a, Go 2014).
Denser social networks and organizational resources provide residents with more opportunities for social interactions which help build social ties and attachment to the community.
The ties that comprise one’s social network are an intangible resource that can be harvested
by neighborhoods facing signs of disinvestment (Weaver and Holtkamp 2015). The trust and
norms of reciprocity that arise from these ties reduce the individual costs of coordinated
action (Putnam 2000). Thus, residents who feel deep connections to their community are
more likely to mobilize voluntarily when confronted with an issue.
Neighborhoods where more individuals partake in voluntary civic activity are better
able to voice their preferences and have a greater probability of overcoming the collective
action problem. Aldrich (2012), citing Mancur Olson’s (1965) inﬂuential work on collective
action, explains that politically active and connected communities are better prepared to
“mobilize and overcome barriers to collective action” and “present their demands to and
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extract resources from authorities” (401). Governments are more inclined to be responsive to
informed and politically engaged communities (Besley and Burgess 2002). In fact, Go (2014)
provides empirical evidence that local political participation positively aﬀects the delivery of
urban services. In accordance with the EVL-Framework presented in this dissertation and
the preceding argument, neighborhoods rich in social capital should be better at obtaining
resources.

5.2.4

Interaction

Overcoming collective action problems in disadvantaged areas, however, is especially
diﬃcult. Existing scholarship tells us, rather pessimistically, that poorer communities “suﬀer
doubly,” meaning “they lack the material resources to get ahead, and they lack the social
resources that might enable them to amass these material resources” (Putnam 2000, 322).
Where socioeconomic ills concentrate, there is less information and fewer means available to
reduce the costs of mobilizing a large number of citizens in collective pursuit of community
development funding. Scholars recognize that social capital is weakest among minority and
low-income groups (Putnam 2000) and even when strong social ties do exist in a community
plagued by disadvantage they are often ineﬀective (Langworthy et al. 2009). In sum, how
eﬀective civil society is in obtaining resources depends on social and economic context.
Thus, the relationship between the strength of civil society and the probability of receiving
funding is anticipated to vary depending on the level of disadvantage in the neighborhood.
Speciﬁcally, I expect the strength of civil society to positively inﬂuence the targeting of
CDBG funding; however, high levels of concentrated disadvantage will dampen this eﬀect.
At the same time, and by nature of “the inherent symmetry of interactions,” this means
that civil society also conditions the eﬀect of concentrated disadvantage on CDBG funding
decisions (Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012, 3). Even though disadvantaged neighborhoods
are more likely to have weaker civil society, those that defy conventional wisdom with their
strong social ties and active, engaged citizenry may be able to use their social capital to
gain needed resources. As Putnam (2000) notes, “social capital can help to mitigate the
insidious eﬀect of socioeconomic disadvantage” (319). Thus, when the collective voice of a
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disadvantaged community is loud, the likelihood of receiving funding is expected to increase.
Put diﬀerently, neighborhoods characterized by high levels of concentrated disadvantage
should be more likely to receive CDBG funding when civil society is strong compared to
weak. In sum, I expect strong civil society to weaken the negative eﬀect of concentrated
disadvantage on a block group’s chances of receiving funding.

5.2.5

Residential Stability

In the next chapter, I argue that residential stability—measured by owner occupancy
and length of residence—promotes social interaction and fosters strong neighborhood ties,
thereby preventing exit. Neighborhood attachment may also act as a catalyst for coordinated
eﬀorts to solicit funding. Existing research demonstrates that residential stability is a strong
source of local social ties (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974) and collective eﬃcacy (Sampson
2012), both of which contribute to stronger civil society. In Dekker’s (2007) view, “it is their
positive attachment...to the neighborhood that will encourage people to take action towards
improving the situation there” (362). Residents have more opportunities for interaction the
longer they live in one place. Repeated interaction is key in motivating citizens to cooperate
for mutual beneﬁt and “may build public familiarity, a basic component to trust” (Curley
2010, 94). According to Putnam (1995), residential stability is “clearly associated with
greater civic engagement” (74-75). To the extent that residential stability contributes to
a stronger civil society, it makes sense to expect residentially stable areas to be better at
extracting resources.
It is, however, also possible for residential stability to exhibit a positive eﬀect on local
allocation decisions for another reason. Local oﬃcials may see more stable neighborhoods
as good investments. Over the last few decades, Detroit’s Master Plans and various city
initiatives have proposed strategically targeting city resources in an eﬀort to preserve transitional neighborhoods. Market Value Analysis has been used to identify “Steady,” “Transitional,” and “Distressed” neighborhoods and to inform investment decisions in Detroit.
City departments “have started using the data to guide decision making about how best
to target services and make investments,” a September 2011 press release reports (Detroit
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Works Project 2011). Previous empirical investigations draw similar conclusions. Wong
and Peterson (1986), for example, describe how local politicians in Milwaukee and Baltimore selected policies to “maximize their economic prosperity” over redistributive activities
that would have beneﬁted low-income individuals (295). Milwaukee decision makers, in particular, actively prioritized “the preservation of transition neighborhoods” (299). Both of
the arguments advanced provide a strong rationale in favor of controlling for the eﬀect of
residential stability.
The following analysis examines the extent to which Detroit decision makers meet minimum program requirements along with the inﬂuence of local civil society and government
investment strategies. Speciﬁcally, the analysis tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 : Neighborhoods with larger proportions of low- and moderate-income residents
are more likely to receive CDBG funding.
Hypothesis 2 : Neighborhoods where civil society is stronger are more likely to receive CDBG
funding. This positive eﬀect is strongest when concentrated disadvantage is low compared
to high.

5.3
5.3.1

Data and Research Design

Unit of Analysis and Data Sources

Census block group is the unit of analysis for this chapter. The choice of block group is
based on two related considerations: the appropriate level at which to conceptualize neighborhoods and data availability. Standardized data are rarely collected based on socially and
culturally deﬁned boundaries—two aspects that greatly aﬀect how residents identify their
neighborhood. Instead, available data are usually based on geographically deﬁned census
units—tracts, block groups, or blocks. In fact, multiple studies have used census tracts
to approximate neighborhoods (Galster et al. 2004; Lovell 1983; Rosenfeld 1979; Urban
Institute 1994). In addition to ignoring the social and cultural aspects that deﬁne a neighborhood, the choice of census tract is problematic because tracts vary tremendously in size
and population density, even within a city’s limits. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
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census tracts have a population size between 1,200 and 8,000 people. It is unlikely that
tracts with larger populations represent only one single neighborhood.
Prior to 1990, data were not widely available for geographic units smaller than the census
tract (i.e., census block groups or census blocks). Thus, early studies looking at neighborhoods were quite limited. The availability of demographic and socioeconomic data at lower
levels of aggregation has improved tremendously since 1990. Consequently, the analysis
presented in this chapter uses more recent data from 2000 and 2010.
Although much of the socioeconomic and demographic data for 2000 and 2010 are available at the block level, some data are only available at the tract level. Utilizing geographic
information systems (GIS) provides a unique advantage as I can modify traditional census
data at the block, block group, or tract level so that the data are accurately mapped to
the same level. Working at the block group level serves as a compromise between using a
less realistic, larger geographic classiﬁcation (e.g., census tract) with better data availability
and using a more accurate, smaller geographic classiﬁcation (e.g., census block) with less
data available and bigger challenges for allocating data to a single level of aggregation (this
process is explained in detail below).
As of the 2000 census, there were 1,066 block groups within the city limits of Detroit.3
In 2010, there were 879 block groups. To account for changes in block group boundaries
between 2000 and 2010, data for 2010 were collected at a lower level of analysis: block level.
Geographic information systems software was used to assign 2010 blocks to the corresponding
2000 block groups, as displayed in Figure 5.1. The 2010 block level data were then summarized
to the 2000 block group level. Shapeﬁles for 2000 block group and 2010 block boundaries
were obtained through the Census Bureau’s MAF/TIGER database.
The City of Detroit, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development serve as the primary data sources in this analysis. Socioeconomic and demographic data for 2000 are drawn from Summary File 1 of the U.S. Census Bureau. Data
for 2010 are American Community Survey data for 2006-2010. Tabular census data were
3

There are actually 1,067 block groups in Detroit, one of which is Belle Isle Park. Since the entire island is
a park, it is uninhabited and not included in the dataset.

2000 Census Block Groups

2000 Census Block Groups
based on 2010 Blocks

Fig. 5.1. Census Geographies: Blocks by Block Groups

The ﬁrst panel displays a hypothetical set of census blocks. The second panel
shows three census block groups, each represented by a diﬀerent color. Census
block groups align with census block boundaries, as is depicted in the third panel.

Each color represents a diﬀerent 2000 Census Block Group.

Small squares represent 2010 Census blocks

2010 Census Blocks
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acquired through the National Historical Geographic System database from the University
of Minnesota.

5.3.2

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable measures whether a block group was selected by the City of
Detroit to receive CDBG funding or not. Community Development Block Grant data were
extracted from the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) data portal.
The dataset include the geographic coordinates and address for each activity along with the
dollar amount, completion date, and type of project. Because CDBG activities were reported
by geographic location, geographic information systems software was used to assign each
geographic point (representing a CDBG activity) to the block group where the activity was
located. Data representing the geographic coordinates associated with each activity were
spatially joined to a 2000 census block group layer using ArcGIS Desktop. Block groups
that received funding at any point between 2001 and 2010 are coded 1 and block groups that
did not receive funding are coded 0. The start year is 2001 rather than 2000 because projects
are listed by completion date. Projects ending in 2000, for example, may have begun in 1999
or 1998. As such, CDBG data are lagged by one year in an attempt to account for projects
that likely started more than a year before their completion date.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development identiﬁes six types of CDBG activities and classiﬁes each project as: acquisition, economic development, housing, public
improvement, public service, or other. An earlier study by Miranda and Tunyavong (1994)
used the same data source to examine local allocation decisions in Chicago from 1976 to 1990.
The authors examined per capita allocations for four categories—housing, public works and
facilities, economic development, and public services—in addition to total per capita CDBG
allocations. The way in which HUD classiﬁes activities has evolved some since the time of
Miranda and Tunyavong’s study. Acquisitions, for example, were added as a classiﬁcation
while public works projects were reallocated into the public improvement or public service
categories.
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For this examination, activities were initially reclassiﬁed into four groups: public improvement, public service, economic development, or other projects. Because there are so
few acquisition and housing activities during the time period under investigation it made
sense to combine these activities with activities in the next closest category. Thus, projects
labeled as acquisition or housing-type activities are included in the public improvements
category. Public improvement activities include, for example, centers for the disabled, youth
centers, street improvements, parks, and public facilities and improvements. Examples of
public service projects include senior and youth services, childcare services, and employment
training. Economic development activities and other-type projects are ultimately excluded
from the analysis because there were only a limited number of data points and the projects
were not similar enough to any of the other existing categories to justify combining them.
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics about the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables described below.
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs.

Mean

CDBG funding 2001-2010
Lagged CDBG funding
Public improvements 2001-2010
Public services 2001-2010
Economic development 2001-2010
% Low- and moderate-income
Residential stability
% Built < 1940
Concentrated disadvantage
Collective capacity
Organizational density
Kilpatrick vote share

1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056
1056

0.240
0.051
0.086
0.201
0.017
66.619
0.003
29.523
0.028
0.001
−0.001
54.483

Std. Dev.
0.427
0.220
0.281
0.401
0.130
17.798
0.995
20.646
0.959
1.000
1.000
12.379

Min.

Max.

0
0
0
0
0
0.000
−3.607
0.000
−3.053
−2.833
−1.028
7.067

1
1
1
1
1
102.000
2.541
93.814
3.198
3.010
7.494
78.378

Notes: Descriptive statistics are for the observations included in the logit models.

97
5.3.3

Explanatory Variables

5.3.3.1 Community need
Funding allocations are hypothesized to be a function of community conditions and the
strength of social capital. Two measures of community need are included in the analysis. The
ﬁrst measure of community need, percentage low- and moderate-income residents, is included
to assess the extent to which CDBG program objectives are being met. Program guidelines
stipulate that “grantees must give maximum feasible priority to activities which beneﬁt lowand moderate-income persons” (HUD Exchange). Percentage low- and moderate-income
residents is measured as the share of “families and individuals whose incomes do not exceed 80
percent of the median income of the area involved” (42 U.S.C. §5302 (a)(20)(A) (2010)). Data
on income levels were obtained from the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
data portal.
The second measure of community need, concentrated disadvantage, captures the multidimensional characteristics of poverty (Rodrigue, Kneebone, and Reeves 2016; Reeves,
Kneebone, and Rodrigue 2016; Kneebone and Reeves, 2016). In urban sociology, the conceptualization of concentrated disadvantage reﬂects “economic disadvantage in racially segregated urban neighborhoods” (Morenoﬀ, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001, 7) and “captures
the kinds of compounded disadvantages that can isolate a community from resources, limit
the usefulness of local network ties, and expose neighborhood residents to negative social
conditions” (Langworthy et al. 2009, 15). Thus, for the purpose of assessing community
need I also construct a measure of concentrated disadvantage.
I used principal-component factor analysis4 to generate an index of concentrated disadvantage. Following Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush (2008) I test the extent to which
percentage Black, percentage poverty, unemployment, share of single mothers, percentage
children under ﬁve, and the percentage of households receiving public assistance load on a
single factor of concentrated disadvantage. In departure from previous measures of concentrated disadvantage, I also include a measure for educational attainment (percentage of the
4

“Principal-component factor analysis” is the terminology used in Stata. Other statistical packages use the
term “principal component analysis” to refer to the same procedure.
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population with a high school degree or less). Notably, percentage Black was not a strong
indicator of concentrated disadvantage. All other variables load on a single factor with an
eigenvalue of 3.37. Each item has a high loading well over the 0.4 threshold (Acock 2008,
302). The component loadings for each item are displayed in Table 5.2. These loadings were
used to calculate a regression-weighted index of concentrated disadvantage with a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1. Data for the components of concentrated disadvantage come
from the U.S. Census Bureau.
A simple correlation shows that the variables representing concentrated disadvantage
and percentage low- and moderate income are correlated. This is not surprising given the
economic dimensions of the two measures. Each variable represents an important theoretical
consideration. The percentage low- and moderate-income residents measures the extent to
which federal requirements guide local targeting while concentrated disadvantage captures
the multidimensional nature of poverty that can be especially proliﬁc in urban neighborhoods. For these reasons, both variables are retained in the ﬁnal models. Likelihood ratio
tests conﬁrm that the addition of each variable improves the model. Additionally, a Variance
Inﬂation Factor test for multicollinearity produces a mean VIF score of 1.89, which is well
below accepted thresholds (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2007; Chatterjee and Hadi 2006; Hair
et al. 2010).

5.3.3.2 Civil society – collective capacity
To measure the strength of civil society, I assess civic engagement and the potential
for collective action along with the organizational dimensions of community life. Principalcomponent factor analysis was used to generate two proxies for civil society measuring a
neighborhood’s collective capacity and organizational resource base. Factor loadings for
the two measures are given in Table 5.2. The ﬁrst factor, collective capacity, is positively
associated with voter turnout and census response rates. The second factor, organizational
density, is characterized by high positive loadings for places of worship and childcare centers.
Whereas in previous scholarship voter turnout and organizational density have loaded on a
single dimension (e.g., Coﬀee and Geys 2005), the two variables do not load on a single
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Table 5.2. Principal Component Analyses
Variable

Factor Loadings

Concentrated Disadvantage
% Households on public assistance
% Poverty
Unemployment
% Single mothers
% High school or less
% Under 5 years old

0.772
0.811
0.664
0.739
0.800
0.697

Eigenvalue

3.367

Residential Stability
% Same household in 1995
% Owner occupied

0.869
0.869

Eigenvalue

1.512

Civil Society Indices
Turnout
Census response rate
Childcare centers
Places of worship
Eigenvalue

Collective Organizational
Capacity
Density
0.930
0.052
0.935
0.009
0.148
0.768
−0.239
0.716
1.816

1.105

factor in the present study. When census response rate, another proxy for social capital, is
examined alongside voter turnout and the measures of neighborhood institutions, principalcomponent factor analysis produces two clear dimensions of civil society. Thus, for Detroit
neighborhoods, manifestations of civil society take two distinct forms: collective capacity and
organizational resources.
Collective capacity, as a proxy for strength of civil society reﬂects a neighborhood’s
ability to express voice (Hirschman 1970) and captures the potential its citizens will mobilize
collectively (see Aldrich 2012 and Go 2014 for a similar rationale; also see Olson 1965).
Following previous scholarship (e.g., Aldrich 2012; Aldrich and Crook 2008; Coﬀe and Geys
2005; Grimes and Esaiasson 2014; Go 2014; Hamilton 1993; Putnam 2000), I include voter
turnout as an indicator of community political engagement and potential for collective action.
Citizens use voting to voice their preferences and hold elected representatives responsible for
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their actions. Higher levels of turnout in local elections indicate a more engaged citizenry
and signal to local oﬃcials that a community is actively paying attention. Knack (1992)
has linked “trust in people” and “knowing one’s neighbor” to voting and found that turnout
is correlated with participation in civic groups and neighborhood associations. Hamilton
(1993) points out that individuals who are more likely to vote are also “more likely to
become involved in community political action” (107). High turnout shows that a suﬃcient
number of citizens are motivated by a sense of civic duty and measures the potential residents
will engage in collective action.
Voter turnout data for the 2005 mayoral election are from the City of Detroit’s Elections
Department. The original dataset lists votes cast and registered voters by district and
precinct number—the classiﬁcation method used by Detroit. Spatial voting district5 layers
are available for 2000 and 2010 from the U.S. Census Bureau but are not consistent with the
number of precincts listed in Detroit’s voting data, a problem noted by other scholars (e.g.,
McDonald and Altman n.d.). Upon request, the City of Detroit’s GIS department supplied
a digital precinct map with an unknown coordinate system.
As Figure 5.2 illustrates, voting districts are drawn based on census block boundaries and
do not necessarily follow block group boundaries. Consequently, the precinct level voting
data had to be assigned to blocks ﬁrst and then summarized at the block group level. First,
the Detroit precinct map was georectiﬁed6 to a 2000 census block boundary layer. Next, a
precinct code was assigned to each block using the digital precinct layer as a reference. Voting
data were apportioned among census blocks based on the share of voting-age population each
block represents within its corresponding voting district.
To accomplish this, total voting-age population for each voting district is calculated
by summing the voting-age population for all blocks within a given voting district. The
proportion of voting-age population represented by each block is calculated next. Voting data
are then assigned to each block based on this proportion. To move from block to block group,
5

The Census Bureau uses the term “voting district” to “refer to the generic name for geographic entities, such
as precincts, wards, and election districts, established by state governments for the purpose of conducting
elections.” From the Census Bureau’s “Geographic Terms and Concepts - Voting Districts” page: https:
//www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_vtd.html
6
Georectiﬁcation is the process of aligning a non-spatial digital image with an existing spatial layer in GIS
using a series of control points.

Census Block Groups over
Voting Districts by Blocks

Fig. 5.2. Census Geographies: Voting Districts by Blocks and Block Groups

The far left panel displays a hypothetical set of census blocks. The center left panel shows three census voting districts, each represented by a diﬀerent color. Census voting districts align with census block boundaries, as is depicted in the center right panel. The far right panel adds census block group boundaries and illustrates the inconsistencies between voting district and block group boundaries.

Colors represent voting districts

Census Voting Districts
based on Blocks

Bold lines represent block groups

Census Voting Districts (VTDs)

Small squares represent blocks

Census Blocks
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the voting totals are averaged across blocks within their corresponding block group. This
method of data manipulation is modeled after methods used by Stephen Ansolabehere and
Jonathan Rodden of The Harvard Election Data Archive and by Dr. Michael P. McDonald
and Dr. Micah Altman of the Public Mapping Project. Voting-age population data are from
the 2000 decennial census.
The second component of the collective capacity index is census response rate. Knack
(2002) argues that census response rates are “a reasonable proxy for socially cooperative
attitudes” (776). He explains that returning a census form “reﬂects a sense of civic responsibility” (Knack 2002, 776; see also Couper, Singer, and Kulka 1998). Census response rate is
“a particularly powerful proxy measure of community norms of social trust and reciprocity,
as well as engagement in community social and organizational life,” according to Martin and
Newman (2014, 2). By this logic, the census is a public good that all citizens beneﬁt from
whether they contribute or not. Citizens who complete and return their census form have
demonstrated a willingness to contribute to the public good (Knack 2002). Census response
rate data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data for 2000 are only available at the census
tract level. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes were used to allocate
data from census tracts to corresponding block groups.

5.3.3.3 Civil society – organizational density
A growing body of scholarship emphasizes the “organizational dimensions of community civic life” to gauge the strength of civil society (Sampson 2012, 193). According to
Small (2006), “neighborhood institutions, such as churches, recreation centers, and childcare
centers” serve as resource brokers, deﬁned as “organizations possessing ties to businesses,
nonproﬁts, and government agencies rich in resources, which then provide the neighborhood
institutions’ patrons with access to these resources” (274; see also Chaskin et al. 2001).
Neighborhood organizations provide information and services and are a place for informal
social interaction, especially in poorer communities (Curley 2010; Small 2006).
Previous empirical work has operationalized the organizational dimension of civil society
using the total number or density of community-based organizations and neighborhood social
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institutions. Curley (2010), for example, uses a 15-item index to measure “the availability of
neighborhood institutions, facilities, and public spaces,” including, among others, churches,
parks, child care centers, and after-school programs (86). He argues that the number of
neighborhood institutions is associated with “higher levels of neighborhood trust, norms,
and reciprocity” (Curley 2010, 91). Similarly, Go (2014) uses the frequency of “churches,
social service organizations, and neighborhood associations” “to estimate the strength of
community organizing” (46). Aldrich (2011b), uses nonproﬁt organizations per capita to
measure community level social capital. In other work, Sampson (2012) shows that a community’s organizational service base, measured as the density of nonproﬁts and churches,
is a strong predictor of the propensity for collective action. In accordance with this trend,
the second measure of civil society, organizational density, captures the organizational dimensions of community civic life and is characterized by high positive loadings for places of
worship and childcare centers.
Data for places of worship and childcare centers are based on physical and cultural
point features from the U.S. Geological Survey’s Geographic Names Information System.
Institution counts were matched to census block groups using FIPS codes for each type of
institution. The index for organizational density was derived from the two resulting variables
using principal-component factor analysis. Factor loadings are displayed in Table 5.2.

5.3.3.4 Interaction
Strong neighborhood civil societies are expected to garner more CDBG funding. But
because communities with more concentrated disadvantage are less likely to receive funding,
I expect that increasing concentrated disadvantage will weaken civil society’s positive eﬀect
on the probability of receiving funding. Given the conditional nature of the hypothesized relationship, the measure of concentrated disadvantage is interacted with each measure of civil
society to assess the eﬀect of strong civil society on CDBG funding allocations conditioned
by disadvantage.
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5.3.4

Control Variables

An index of residential stability, based on owner occupancy and length of residence, is
also included in the following models. Principle component analysis was used to generate the
index. As in previous operationalizations of residential stability (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush,
and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012), percentage of owner occupied housing and percentage of
residents residing in the same house for the last ﬁve years loaded highly on a single dimension.
Factor loadings are displayed in Table 5.2. Data for the components of residential stability
come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census.
The analysis controls for three additional variables: lagged CDBG funding, the percentage of housing built before 1940, and incumbent vote share. I include a lagged measure of
CDBG funding (lagged CDBG funding) to account for the inﬂuence of long-term investment
plans. Master Plans for the City of Detroit indicate ongoing investment strategies that can
span years. It would not be surprising to see local governments targeting the same areas for
development projects over a longer period of time.
In previous work on local CDBG distribution in Chicago, Miranda and Tunyavong (1994)
include age of housing stock as a proxy for service need. This analysis controls for the
potential inﬂuence of service need by including a measure of older housing, which is the
percentage of housing built before 1940. Share of older housing stock is also an indicator of
physical decline and a component of the CDBG formula for allocations.
To capture the extent to which local utility-maximizing politicians reward their electoral
constituency I include a measure of incumbent vote share. Data for incumbent vote share
are for the 2005 mayoral election. Kwame Kilpatrick was the incumbent mayor of Detroit
at that time and the winner of the 2005 runoﬀ election. Voting data are from the City of
Detroit’s Elections Department.
Variables measuring race and ethnicity were examined during model speciﬁcation but
were excluded from the ﬁnal model because of multicollinearity. Measures of race and ethnicity are strongly correlated with incumbent vote share. In related work on local CDBG
allocations, Miranda and Tunyavong (1994) describe an electoral-coalition model of urban
service delivery where greater “support for political leadership by a particular sector (e.g.,

105
blacks)” equates to favorable “patterns of service distribution...to that sector” (517). The
authors also found collinearity between race and the percentage voting for the mayor in the
democratic primary. For their analysis, dropping percentage Black strengthened the eﬀect
of electoral support. Like Miranda and Tunyavong, I also exclude race in favor of retaining
incumbent vote share. Notably, neither incumbent vote share nor race are signiﬁcant in the
model when included.

5.4

Results

The logistic regression models in Table 5.3 test to what extent minimum federal requirements, concentrated disadvantage, collective capacity, and organizational ties aﬀect local
CDBG allocation decisions, controlling for prior CDBG investment, residential stability, incumbent vote share, and percentage of housing units built before 1940. Model 5.1 in Table
5.3 predicts the likelihood of a block group receiving any form of CDBG funding between
2001 and 2010. Models 5.2 and 5.3 examine allocations for the CDBG activity types—public
improvement and public service activities, respectively.
The coeﬃcients in Table 5.3 are odds ratios. Coeﬃcients in the odds ratio metric can
be diﬃcult to interpret, especially when interactions are present (e.g., Williams 2012). Predicted probabilities provide a more tangible representation of the relationships being modeled. Thus, to aid interpretation, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 covert the logit coeﬃcients from Model
5.1 into outcome probabilities at speciﬁed values of the independent variables. Meaningful
changes in the expected probability of a positive outcome—receiving CDBG funding—are
also given. Changes in expected probabilities are calculated by increasing one explanatory
variable at a time from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean if continuous and from 0 to 1 if dichotomous, holding all other variables at
their mean (continuous) or median (discrete).7
As reported in Table 5.3, Model 5.1 shows that previous funding allocations and percentage low- and moderate-income residents increase the probability a block group will receive
funding. Predicted probabilities displayed in Table 5.4 conﬁrm that block groups that re7

Davis and Bali (2008) describe a similar procedure in their table notes on page 1,187.
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Table 5.3. Logit Models of Local CDBG Funding Allocations

Lagged CDBG funding
% Low- and moderate-income
Residential stability
% Built < 1940
Incumbent vote share
Collective capacity
Organization density
Concentrated disadvantage
Collective capacity ×
Concentrated disadvantage
Organizational density ×
Concentrated disadvantage
Intercept
N
Log likelihood
AIC
BIC

All CDBG
(5.1)

Pub. Imp.
(5.2)

Pub. Serv.
(5.3)

2.301∗∗∗
(0.370)
0.022∗∗
(0.007)
−0.435∗∗∗
(0.113)
0.006
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.278†
(0.157)
0.400∗∗∗
(0.081)
−0.706∗∗∗
(0.153)

1.350∗∗∗
(0.345)
0.029∗
(0.012)
−0.234
(0.156)
0.014∗
(0.006)
−0.006
(0.009)
−0.549∗
(0.227)
0.391∗∗∗
(0.103)
−0.623∗∗
(0.205)

2.139∗∗∗
(0.336)
0.018∗
(0.008)
−0.359∗∗
(0.119)
0.004
(0.004)
−0.010
(0.006)
−0.225
(0.168)
0.356∗∗∗
(0.080)
−0.558∗∗∗
(0.165)

−0.203∗
(0.080)

−0.375∗∗∗
(0.104)

−0.201∗
(0.083)

0.006
(0.088)
−2.724∗∗∗
(0.595)

−0.069
(0.116)
−5.151∗∗∗
(0.943)

0.036
(0.088)
−2.566∗∗∗
(0.615)

1056
−491.656
1005.313
1059.897

1056
−255.365
532.730
587.315

1056
−459.080
940.161
994.746

Notes: Table displays Logit estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests.

ceived funding in the previous period are more than three times as likely to receive funding
in the current period when compared to block groups that did not receive funding in the
previous period (0.679 compared to 0.175). The lagged CDBG funding measure also has a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in Models 5.2 and 5.3.
Consistent with expectations, percentage low- and moderate-income residents has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on CDBG funding allocations. This is true for public improvement
and public service activities as well as total CDBG funding. Neighborhoods with a larger
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share of low- and moderate-income residents are more likely to receive local allocations than
neighborhoods with fewer economically challenged people. Not surprisingly, decision makers
in Detroit appear to be meeting basic requirements of the CDBG program.
As in previous studies (Miranda and Tunyavong 1994), older housing, measured as the
percentage of housing built before 1940, does not inﬂuence overall CDBG targeting decisions.
It does, however, positively predict public improvement activities. This ﬁnding is somewhat
in line with Miranda and Tunyavong (1994) who show that areas comprised of fewer new
houses are more likely to receive public works projects. Public improvement projects tend to
involve physical improvements, so it makes sense that areas with older, often deteriorating,
homes would receive CDBG activities of this type.
Miranda and Tunyavong (1994) also ﬁnd that Chicago wards containing a larger percentage of owner occupied housing are less likely to receive CDBG funds in general and
speciﬁcally within the public service category. The measure of residential stability used in
this analysis includes the percentage of owner occupied housing units and length of residence
as index components. Similar to Miranda and Tunyavong’s ﬁndings on owner occupancy,
the probability of receiving CDBG funding declines as residential stability increases. Moving
from low to high values of residential stability, as shown in Table 5.4, the probability of
receiving funding declines 12.5 percentage points from 24.6% in less stable areas to 12.1%
in more stable areas (ΔP r(Y ) = −0.125; p < 0.001). For public service activities, the difference between probabilities associated with high and low values of residential stability is
also signiﬁcant but slightly less substantial (ΔP r(Y ) = −0.089; p < 0.01; probabilities not
shown).
These ﬁndings suggest that local decision makers in Detroit are targeting areas characterized by residential in-stability rather than making strategic investment decisions that
target residentially stable neighborhoods. This pattern of targeting is especially relevant
when it comes to public service activities including, among others, educational programs
in literacy and job training or programs that provide transportation or health services to
seniors. It might make sense for local decision-makers to strategically target areas where
owner occupancy is low and residents tend to move in and out frequently for these types of
services. Oﬃcials may see residents of less stable neighborhoods as more in need of public
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Table 5.4. Predicted Probabilities and Meaningful Changes in Probabilities
P r(Y )

ΔP r(Y )

Conf. Inter.

Lagged CDBG funding = 0
Lagged CDBG funding = 1

0.175
0.679

0.504∗∗∗

(0.347, 0.661)

% Low- and moderate-income
Low (µ − σ) = 47.313
Mean (µ) = 66.056
High (µ + σ) = 84.800

0.121
0.173
0.241

0.119∗∗

(0.043, 0.196)

Residential stability
Low (µ − σ) = −.991
Mean (µ) = .003
High (µ + σ) = 0.998

0.246
0.175
0.121

% Built < 1940
Low (µ − σ) = 8.538
Mean (µ) = 29.266
High (µ + σ) = 49.993

0.157
0.175
0.194

0.037

(−0.014, 0.088)

Incumbent vote share
Low (µ − σ) = 42.115
Mean (µ) = 54.489
High (µ + σ) = 66.864

0.191
0.175
0.160

−0.030

(−0.074, 0.013)

Collective capacity
Low (µ − σ) = −1
Mean (µ) = 0
High (µ + σ) = 1

0.220
0.175
0.138

−0.082†

(−0.17, 0.006)

Organizational density
Low (µ − σ) = −1
Mean (µ) = 0
High (µ + σ) = 1

0.124
0.175
0.240

Concentrated disadvantage
Low (µ − σ) = −1
Mean (µ) = 0
High (µ + σ) = 1

0.304
0.178
0.097

−0.125∗∗∗ (−0.189, −0.061)

0.116∗∗∗

(0.069, 0.163)

−0.207∗∗∗ (−0.293, −0.122)

Notes: † p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests

services or they may be strategically investing in services in an eﬀort to entice residents to
stay—a possibility worthy of future inquiry.
The interactions between measures of civil society and concentrated disadvantage were
included in the models to investigate the extent to which disadvantaged communities uti-
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lize social capital to gain much needed resources. The coeﬃcients and standard errors for
the interaction terms in Table 5.3 are unsuitable for testing the hypothesized conditional
relationship. Instead, I follow the advice of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and “calculate substantively meaningful marginal eﬀects and standard errors” to test the relationship
between civil society and CDBG funding allocations at meaningful levels of concentrated
disadvantage (77). The appropriate marginal eﬀects are calculated as:
M E(X|Z) =

dY
= βX + βXZ Z
dX

(5.1)

where X represents the strength of civil society and Z is concentrated disadvantage. Acknowledging the “inherent symmetry of interactions” and in accordance with recommendations from Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012), I also treat civil society as the conditioning
variable and examine the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and CDBG funding allocations at various levels of civil society (3). The marginal eﬀect of concentrated
disadvantage, Z, is given by:
M E(Z|X) =

dY
= βZ + βXZ X
dZ

(5.2)

Table 5.5 lists predicted probabilities and associated standard errors for low, average,
and high values of concentrated disadvantage and civil society. Low and high values represent one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively. Changes in expected
probabilities are also given. The changes in probability listed in the bottom row of each
section of the table represent the diﬀerence between high and low values of civil society
for a given level of disadvantage. These diﬀerences are calculated by increasing the corresponding civil society variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard
deviation above the mean, holding concentrated disadvantage at speciﬁed values (see table),
lagged CDBG funding at 0, and all other variables at their mean. The changes in probability listed in the far-right column are calculated as the diﬀerence between high and low
concentrated disadvantage, holding the associated civil society variable at speciﬁed values,
lagged CDBG funding at 0, and all other variables at their mean. Note that concentrated
disadvantaged is displayed from high to low disadvantage reading from left to right; and as a

110
result, the changes in probabilities in the last column are changes associated with decreasing
concentrated disadvantage.8
Looking down the columns in Table 5.5, the predicted probabilities show that the likelihood of receiving funding is greatest when collective capacity is relatively weak for each
level of concentrated disadvantage. For communities with low concentrated disadvantage,
the probabilities associated with low and high collective capacity are statistically indistinguishable (0.321 compared to 0.289). Increasing collective capacity in these relatively well-oﬀ
neighborhoods does not change their likelihood of funding (ΔP r(Y ) = −0.032, not signiﬁcant). In communities where disadvantage is more pronounced, the probability of receiving
funding is 0.147 when civil society is weak and 0.062 when it is strong. Increasing the collective voice of a community characterized by high concentrated disadvantage has a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on a community’s ability to obtain funds (ΔP r(Y ) = −0.085, p < 0.01).
Without exploring further, the results thus far suggest that the hypothesized relationship
between civil society and CDBG targeting, at least with respect to collective capacity, is
wrong.
Reading across rows in Table 5.5, the predicted probabilities reveal another perspective.
Areas characterized by less disadvantage are signiﬁcantly more likely to receive a CDBG
activity than areas with more disadvantage at every level of civil society. Moving from
left to right across the table, the likelihood of receiving funding increases as concentrated
disadvantage decreases. The rate of increase is greatest in neighborhoods with more collective capacity. Compare, for instance, the 17.4 percentage point diﬀerence in the likelihood
that a neighborhood with low collective capacity will receive CDBG funding to the 22.7
percentage point diﬀerence in likelihood for a neighborhood with high collective capacity.
This means that, in neighborhoods with greater collective capacity, alleviating concentrated
disadvantage—moving from high to low levels of disadvantage—has the largest positive impact on the likelihood of receiving CDBG funding.
8

The author would like to note that while changing the order for the categories of concentrated disadvantage
may initially seem confusing to the reader, it does serve a useful purpose in interpretation—namely, that it
makes more sense to talk about attempts to decrease concentrated disadvantage than it does to talk about
attempts to increase it.
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Recall from the preceding discussion that, when concentrated disadvantage is low, weaker
and stronger civil societies are indistinguishable—a likelihood of 0.321 compared to 0.289.
This means that, despite having the largest positive impact, alleviating concentrated disadvantage in areas with stronger civil society simply equates to “leveling the playing ﬁeld,”
not necessarily making those neighborhoods any more competitive when compared to other
neighborhoods with less disadvantage and less social capital. Perhaps the more important
conclusion then is that neighborhoods with a greater potential for collective action have
the most to lose from growing concentrated disadvantage—a 22.7 percentage point drop in
likelihood from this perspective.
The predicted probability patterns for public improvement and public service activities
are similar to those for all CDBG activities. With respect to public improvement activities,
low and high levels of concentrated disadvantage are indistinguishable when collective capacity is low, according to Table 5.6. Alleviating disadvantage in neighborhoods with average
or high levels of collective capacity has a positive eﬀect on obtaining public improvement
projects though, in general, the predicted probabilities for every combination of concentrated
disadvantage and collective capacity are quite a bit lower in the public improvements model
compared to the model for all CDBG allocations. As in the total CDBG model, alleviating
disadvantage in areas where collective capacity is strong has the largest positive impact on
attracting public service projects according to Table 5.7. Reducing disadvantage puts politically active communities in a better position to gain public improvement or public service
projects. At the same time, these neighborhoods also have the most to lose from growing
concentrated disadvantage.
The generally low probabilities associated with every combination of concentrated disadvantage and collective capacity suggest that, in general, local decision makers in Detroit
are not prioritizing areas with severe concentrated disadvantage, whether they organize or
not. While alleviating disadvantage appears to make communities more eﬀective in securing
public goods; it does so regardless of whether civil society is strong or weak. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, increasing a community’s potential for collective action may actually
worsen a disadvantaged neighborhood’s already dismal chance of receiving funding. This
negative eﬀect, however, is quite small.

0.222
0.178
0.141

(0.022, 0.121)

0.072∗∗

ΔP r(Y )b

(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.022)

0.117∗∗∗ (0.070, 0.165)

0.127
0.178
0.244

0.321
0.305
0.289

(0.070, 0.262)

(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.048)

(-0.155, 0.091)

(0.053)
(0.033)
(0.037)

Low
(µ − σ)

0.166∗∗

0.228
0.305
0.394

(-0.170, 0.007) −0.032

(0.029)
(0.014)
(0.024)

Mean
(µ)

0.162∗∗∗ (0.085, 0.239)
0.208∗∗∗ (0.122, 0.294)
0.256∗∗∗ (0.130, 0.383)

0.174∗∗ (0.069, 0.278)
0.208∗∗∗ (0.122, 0.294)
0.227∗∗∗ (0.143, 0.311)

ΔP r(Y )a

a

Notes: † p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests.
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when concentrated disadvantage is reduced from one
standard deviation above the mean (high) to one standard deviation below (low), holding social capital at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding
at zero, and all other variables at their mean.
b
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when social capital is increased from one standard
deviation below the mean (low) to one standard deviation above (high), holding concentrated disadvantage at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding
at zero, and all other variables at their mean.

(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.028)

(-0.146, -0.025) −0.082†

(0.023)
(0.018)
(0.021)

0.066
0.096
0.138

−0.085∗∗

0.147
0.096
0.062

Organizational density
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

ΔP r(Y )b

Collective Capacity
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

High
(µ + σ)

Concentrated Disadvantage

Table 5.5. Predicted Probabilities for Total CDBG Activities
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0.071
0.043
0.025

(0.000, 0.030)

0.015∗

ΔP r(Y )b

(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.010)

0.032∗∗∗ (0.015, 0.050)

0.029
0.043
0.062

0.090
0.077
0.065

0.066∗

0.050
0.077
0.116

(-0.088, -0.005) −0.025

(0.0183)
(0.007)
(0.007)

Mean
(µ)

(0.014, 0.118)

(0.015)
(0.017)
(0.028)

(-0.094, 0.045)

(0.030)
(0.017)
(0.019)

Low
(µ − σ)

0.033∗
0.053∗∗
0.084∗∗

0.033
0.053∗∗
0.056∗∗

(0.000, 0.065)
(0.015, 0.092)
(0.022, 0.147)

(-0.021, 0.087)
(0.015, 0.092)
(0.018, 0.093)

ΔP r(Y )a

a

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests.
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when concentrated disadvantage is reduced from one
standard deviation above the mean (high) to one standard deviation below (low), holding social capital at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding at
zero, and all other variables at their mean.
b
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when social capital is increased from one standard
deviation below the mean (low) to one standard deviation above (high), holding concentrated disadvantage at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding
at zero, and all other variables at their mean.

(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.010)

(-0.076, -0.018) −0.046∗

(0.015)
(0.007)
(0.004)

0.017
0.023
0.032

−0.047∗∗

0.057
0.023
0.009

Organizational density
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

ΔP r(Y )b

Collective Capacity
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

High
(µ + σ)

Concentrated Disadvantage

Table 5.6. Predicted Probabilities for Public Improvement Activities
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0.177
0.147
0.121

(0.019, 0.111)

0.065∗∗

ΔP r(Y )b

(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.020)

0.090∗∗∗ (0.049, 0.130)

0.107
0.147
0.197

0.235
0.231
0.227

(0.030, 0.197)

(0.030)
(0.030)
(0.043)

(-0.118, 0.101)

(0.047)
(0.030)
(0.034)

Low
(µ − σ)

0.113∗∗

0.179
0.231
0.292

(-0.138, 0.025) −0.008

(0.026)
(0.013)
(0.023)

Mean
(µ)

0.117∗∗
0.141∗∗
0.165∗∗

(0.045, 0.188)
(0.061, 0.222)
(0.048, 0.283)

(0.008, 0.200)
0.104∗
0.141∗∗ (0.061, 0.222)
0.166∗∗∗ (0.088, 0.244)

ΔP r(Y )a

a

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests.
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when concentrated disadvantage is reduced from one
standard deviation above the mean (high) to one standard deviation below (low), holding social capital at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding
at zero, and all other variables at their mean.
b
ΔP r(Y ) represents the percentage change in the predicted probability of receiving funding when social capital is increased from one standard
deviation below the mean (low) to one standard deviation above (high), holding concentrated disadvantage at speciﬁed values, lagged CDBG funding
at zero, and all other variables at their mean.

(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.027)

(-0.131, -0.010) −0.056

(0.022)
(0.018)
(0.022)

0.062
0.090
0.127

−0.071∗

0.131
0.090
0.060

Organizational density
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

ΔP r(Y )b

Collective Capacity
Low (µ − σ)
Mean (µ)
High (µ + σ)

High
(µ + σ)

Concentrated Disadvantage

Table 5.7. Predicted Probabilities for Public Service Activities
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Given the city’s focus on targeting “transitional” neighborhoods, it is possible that local
decision makers in Detroit see disadvantaged communities as too far gone and not worth
investing in. In other work, Wong and Peterson (1986) explain how decision makers in
Milwaukee believed there were “inner-city slums too deteriorated to be worth preservation
eﬀorts” (299). The ﬁndings in this chapter seem to support this view.
Unlike collective capacity, the interaction between organizational density and concentrated disadvantage has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of funding—a ﬁnding that is
consistent with Hypothesis 5.2.9 The presence of brokering institutions increases the likelihood a block group will receive funding. Looking ﬁrst at the columns in the lower half of
Table 5.5, the predicted probabilities show that more organizational resources increase the
likelihood that communities suﬀering from concentrated disadvantage will receive funding,
but only by 7.2 percentage points (0.138 compared to 0.066). In areas characterized by low
concentrated disadvantage, neighborhoods with a larger organizational resource base have
a 16.6 percentage point advantage over communities with fewer neighborhood institutions
(0.394 compared to 0.228). Greater organizational density makes the biggest diﬀerence in
neighborhoods that are relatively better oﬀ; yet, it is worth noting that in every scenario
shown a larger organizational resource base is associated with a greater chance of receiving
a CDBG allocation. Better-oﬀ and worse-oﬀ neighborhoods alike beneﬁt from a larger pool
of brokering institutions from which to draw.
Moving from left to right across the lower half of Table 5.5, the probability of receiving
funding increases as concentrated disadvantage decreases, much like the observed behavior
for collective capacity. This increase is greatest in neighborhoods with a larger organizational resource base. The likelihood of receiving CDBG funding increases 16.2 percentage
points moving from high to low concentrated disadvantage in areas with fewer neighborhood
institutions (0.066 compared to 0.228). Whereas, areas with a larger organizational resource
base experience a 25.6 percentage point increase when concentrated disadvantage moves from
high to low (0.138 compared to 0.394).
9

I also tested a model with a three-way interaction for concentrated disadvantage, collective capacity, and
organizational density (with all constituent combinations). The three-way interaction was not signiﬁcant
and did not improve the model (LR chi2(2) = 0.19; p = 0.910).
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Consistent with Hypothesis 5.2, strong civil society, when measured by its organizational
density, positively predicts CDBG funding. Examining the average marginal eﬀects for organizational density across the range of possible disadvantage scores in Figure 5.3 accentuates
this relationship. When concentrated disadvantage is most severe the marginal eﬀect for organizational density is not signiﬁcant, but as disadvantage lessens the positive eﬀect of civil
society becomes signiﬁcant and increases in magnitude. This eﬀect increases to its strongest
point at roughly 2 standard deviations above the average value of concentrated disadvantage.
Beyond this point the conﬁdence intervals are very wide and the lower bound crosses zero
indicating the eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant. In sum, neighborhoods with a large organizational resource base are better at attracting CDBG projects, especially when concentrated
disadvantage is less proliﬁc. From a diﬀerent perspective, greater incidents of disadvantage
weaken civil society’s ability to attract CDBG activities.
Organizational density also positively predicts public improvement and public service activities. In general, the likelihood of receiving a public improvement project is quite low for
every combination of organizational density and concentrated disadvantage as shown in Table
5.6. Neighborhoods with more organizational resources and less concentrated disadvantage
are the most likely to receive a public improvement project (P r(Y ) = 0.116). The probabilities associated with public service activities are much higher and more closely resemble
the results for all CDBG projects (see Table 5.7). Greater organizational density positively
predicts public service activities. The eﬀect is strongest when concentrated disadvantage is
low and lessens as disadvantage increases.

5.5

Summary

Overall, the results suggest a rather complicated relationship between the strength of
civil society and concentrated disadvantage. In communities that are better oﬀ (have little disadvantage), greater organizational density means a better chance of receiving funds
while increasing collective capacity has no eﬀect. A larger supply of brokering institutions
also increases the likelihood of funding in areas where concentrated disadvantage is more
pronounced. In contrast, increasing collective capacity in more disadvantaged areas actually
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Fig. 5.3. Marginal Eﬀects of Organizational Density Across Levels of Concentrated Disadvantage

decreases the probability that a CDBG activity will occur in the neighborhood. This second
ﬁnding is inconsistent with expectations and past research.
Utilizing neighborhood institutions is a more eﬀective way to secure CDBG resources.
This ﬁnding aligns well with previous work. Sampson (2012), for example, gives extensive
empirical evidence that the density of community-based institutions is an excellent predictor
of collective action. Neighborhood institutions are also associated with the delivery of urban services (Go 2014). These institutions eﬀectively broker information and connections to
neighborhood residents (Small 2006). Social organizations like churches provide connections
to resources and formal and informal ties to other individuals or organizations (Aldrich and
Meyer 2015). In the present study, organizational density positively predicts a neighborhood’s ability to gain resources even in the presence of above average levels of concentrated
disadvantage.
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In Detroit, the mere presence of institutions capable of brokering connections to people
and resources is enough to increase a neighborhood’s chance of receiving funding. Churches,
according to Putnam (2000), “are one of the few vital institutions left in which low-income,
minority, and disadvantaged citizens of all races can learn politically relevant skills and be
recruited into political action” (339). Faith-based organizations have played an important
role in community development for African Americans residing in urban areas (Manning,
Thomas, and Blake 1996). Indeed, Black churches in Detroit are well known for organizing
civic action (Kaiser 2010; Rusch 2012). Given the important historical role of Black churches
in Detroit, it is not surprising that the index of organization density comprised of churches
and child care centers is a strong predictor of CDBG activity.
In the next chapter I examine neighborhood level population change. The analysis tests
civil society’s capacity to prevent exit and whether Detroit’s investment strategies are working. Building on the ﬁndings presented here, I also look at how the strength of civil society
and government investment can reinforce each other in preventing the exodus of city residents. Thus far, there is evidence that neighborhood institutions eﬀectively broker resources.
The next question is: When combined, can greater organizational density and local investment stem the tide of population decline? In answering this question, I also look at how
these processes vary across neighborhoods.
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CHAPTER 6. NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF POPULATION CHANGE

6.1

Introduction

The results from Chapter 5 suggest a complicated relationship between civil society
and local Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) targeting. The brokering power
of neighborhood organizations can help a community gain urban goods and services; yet,
active civic engagement by the neighborhood’s residents is an ineﬀective means of securing
resources. Thus, the argument that strong civil society is better at procuring resources is
only partially supported.
This chapter tests how the relationship between local CDBG targeting and civil society
inﬂuences population change. I argue that stronger civil societies, characterized by more
local political activism and a denser organizational resource base, are better at preventing
exit. As the theoretical argument advanced in Chapter 3 explains, civil society fosters strong
social ties among community members. Durable social networks and ties to one’s community
deepen attachment to the community and repress temptations to exit. I also argue that
the combination of strong civil society and smart government investment in housing and
community development best predicts stability. Individually, these forces mitigate decline
but together they have the largest impact.
The examination to follow tests this theoretical framework while accounting for social,
economic, and spatial context. Much of the work on urban decline is at the city level, ignoring potential variation within city. Importantly, neighborhoods in cities with declining
populations, like Detroit, do not necessarily change in the same ways or at the same rate
(Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst 2012; Hartley 2013). Weaver and Holtkamp (2015) explain
that “even so-called ‘shrinking cities’ exhibit patterns of growth and/or stasis alongside their
characteristic spaces of decline” (289). Causal mechanisms may also vary spatially, meaning
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factors that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence population change in one neighborhood may have a different eﬀect elsewhere. Consequently, techniques that account for spatial context produce
more accurate results and better capture idiosyncratic local forces. To truly understand
urban change, attention must be given to neighborhood level eﬀects and variation.
The following analysis is completed in three steps. First, linear regression models are
used to assess neighborhood characteristics likely to inﬂuence population change. Based on
ﬁndings from the previous chapter, special attention is given to the relationships between
various CDBG activity types and measures of civil society in predicating population change.
In the second step, spatial analysis techniques, including geographically weighted regression,
are employed to identify and model underlying spatial processes in the data. Last, three
regions of the city (where the geographically weighted regression performed well) are explored
in more detail to highlight how eﬀects vary spatially across Detroit.

6.2

Explanations and Hypotheses

Research has identiﬁed several mechanisms that prompt urban residents to leave central
city neighborhoods. Growing concentrations of poverty, poor economic opportunities, declining physical and social conditions, and poor government decision-making have all been
linked to population decline. In this chapter, I ask: To what extent can strong local civil
society counter these forces?

6.2.1

Existing Theory

When neighborhood conditions begin to decline, the most mobile groups—typically the
wealthy and middle-class—are the ﬁrst to exit the community. Consequently, multiple dimensions of disadvantage concentrate geographically, isolating poorer, resource deprived
neighborhoods from productive social networks and pathways for upward mobility (Langworthy et al. 2009). Existing research shows that such severely disadvantaged neighborhoods
struggle to maintain their residents or attract new ones. Using a composite measure of disadvantages, Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997), for example, ﬁnd that concentrated disadvantage is
a strong predictor of neighborhood depopulation. Indeed, the city-level results from Chapter
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4 conﬁrm that, over time, growing socioeconomic disadvantage is associated with population
decline.
Many of the factors that lead to population decline are also worsened by decline. Consider
one component of concentrated disadvantage—unemployment. As unemployment grows
within a city, citizens exit in pursuit of employment opportunities thereby reducing available
labor. With fewer people, aggregate consumption drops and businesses are forced to adjust
to new circumstances, relocate, or close their doors, all of which directly impact available
employment opportunities. As Downs (1997) has noted, “the departure of many viable ﬁrms
and nonpoor households from the core area creates a self-aggravating downward spiral in
ﬁscal, economic, and social strength” (386). Even accounting for temporal ordering, the
causal direction of relationships among factors associated with population change remains
fuzzy.
Furthermore, the declining tax base that comes with population loss leads to a drop
in local government revenue. The demand for government activities and services, however,
rarely declines at the same rate as the revenue stream. This “ﬁscal squeeze” forces local
governments “to reduce services, raise taxes, or seek additional aid from state or federal
governments” (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982, 26). Regarding the latter, recall that
Chapter 4 explored the relationship between CDBG funding and population decline at the
city level and found that, over time, increases in CDBG funds have a positive eﬀect on
population. According to the results from Chapter 4, local leaders seem to be eﬀectively
using their federal grant money to maintain or grow their populations.
Detroit, Michigan has received some of the largest per person allocations of CDBG funding. Of the 231 cities examined in Chapter 4, Detroit was one of the top 10 recipients in
1990, 2000, and 2010.1 Local per capita expenditure on housing and community development
is also above average in Detroit. At ﬁrst glance, the stampede of people leaving the Motor
City seems to suggest that Detroit’s eﬀorts at recovery have failed. There are, however, some
neighborhoods coming back. This chapter examines the variation in neighborhood popula1

Detroit does not stand out in this regard. Several other Rustbelt cities (e.g., St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buﬀalo, Youngstown) also were consistent top 10 recipients.
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tion ebbs and ﬂows across the city of Detroit and shows how the strength of civil society
helps explain divergent patterns of population change.

6.2.2

The Role of Civil Society

Citizens with strong social ties who feel a deep attachment to their community are less
likely to exit when faced with signs of neighborhood deterioration. Previous work identiﬁes
residential stability as a strong source of local social ties (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974)
and collective eﬃcacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012), both of
which contribute to stronger civil society. Residents have more opportunities for interaction
the longer they live in one place. Social capital, explains Fukuyama (2001), is a “product
of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games...if individuals interact with each other repeatedly
over time, they develop a stake in a reputation for honesty and reliability” (16). Repeated
interaction is key in motivating citizens to cooperate for mutual beneﬁt. Norms of reciprocity
develop and are sustained through reoccurring contact (Ostrom 1999). To the extent that
residential stability promotes social interaction, it makes sense to expect residentially stable
areas to foster stronger neighborhood ties thereby reducing residents’ propensity to move.
Dekker (2007) notes that strong feelings of attachment do not guarantee that residents of
a neighborhood will be “actively involved in its management” (357). According to Sampson
(2012), it is the density of local organizations that best predicts if a neighborhood will engage
in collective action. Neighborhood institutions broker connections to other organizations,
businesses, and government agencies beyond the immediate neighborhood (Small 2006).
Neighborhood organizations play an important role in coordinating eﬀorts to secure goods
and services. They also facilitate the interactions needed to build and maintain social ties
and community attachment.
Civic engagement, like adequate organizational infrastructure, is a necessary prerequisite
for strong civil society. According to Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Framework, residents choose to exit or voice when neighborhood quality declines. Politically active,
well-connected communities exercise voice to express their dissatisfaction to elected oﬃcials
and in doing so compel decision makers to be responsive to their needs, thus gaining more
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resources and generating signs of stability. Successfully gaining resources increases the likelihood that neighborhood conditions will improve and causes residents to feel more invested
in and connected to their communities. In turn, local governments that are responsive to
civil society are in a better position to retain their populations. In sum, combining strong
civil society with smart, targeted investment is the best strategy for combating decline. The
following hypotheses summarize the arguments advanced:
Hypothesis 6.1 : Where concentrated disadvantage is especially severe, population decline
will be greater.
Hypothesis 6.2 : Neighborhoods that exhibit more residential stability will show greater signs
of population stability.
Hypothesis 6.3 : Areas where civil society is stronger will show greater signs of population
stability; government investments will increase the magnitude of this eﬀect.

6.3
6.3.1

Data and Methods

Unit of Analysis

To assess the aforementioned hypotheses, I employ the same dataset as Chapter 5. Accordingly, census block group is the unit of analysis. Such a low level of analysis provides
for a more granular and accurate examination of local spatial processes. Block groups are
not, however, easily recognized visually or the most intuitive reference points for explaining
analyses and ﬁndings. For these reasons, Map 6.1 is included as a reference map for readers
less familiar with the Detroit area. The map displays a conﬁguration of large neighborhoods that have been deﬁned by the City of Detroit. City departments and various other
sources have produced a number of diﬀerent neighborhood mappings;2 all are disputed to
some extent. Most of the neighborhoods depicted in Map 6.1 can actually be subdivided
into multiple distinct neighborhoods, many of which are more recognizable to area residents
2

The City of Detroit’s Department of Neighborhoods (Garlin Gilchrist II) created another neighborhood mapping on May 21, 2015. It can be accessed through the City of Detroit’s Data Portal: https:
//data.detroitmi.gov/Government/Detroit-Neighborhoods/5mn6-ihjv, accessed on August 15, 2017.
Loveland Technologies created this map: http://www.livedetroit.org/detroit-neighborhood-map/, accessed August, 15, 2017. Another neighborhood map is available from the Southeast Michigan Council of
Governments: http://maps-semcog.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/detroit-neighborhoods, accessed
on January 20, 2018.
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than are the large neighborhood boundaries referenced here. Nevertheless, the large neighborhoods depicted in Map 6.1 provide a useful reference without visually overwhelming the
reader. The block groups underlying these neighborhoods are also depicted. Neighboring
municipalities and major thoroughfares provide additional reference points. Finally, note
that two independent municipalities lie within the boundaries of Detroit—Hamtramck and
Highland Park.

6.3.2

Dependent Variable

This research follows Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982) and uses population change as a
proxy for urban decline. Population change is measured as the logarithm of the true change:
((populationt−1 − populationt )/populationt−1 ). Since most of the block groups in Detroit
experienced decline between 2000 and 2010, population change had to be converted into
positive scores before taking the logarithm. Thus, logged population change was calculated
as: log(Y + 1 − min(Y )). Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2000 and 2010
decennial censuses.
Out of the 1,066 block groups, full data are available for 1,056 cases. All 1,056 cases are
included in the models to follow. Notably, 1,000 out of the 1,056 cases experienced population
decline between 2000 and 2010. Map 6.2 displays spatial distributions for population in
2000 and 2010 along with the spatial distribution of population change. For this section,
true population change is mapped rather than the logged version of the variable to simplify
interpretation. In addition, population data for 2000 and 2010 are classiﬁed manually so
that the categories are comparable over time. Population change data are classiﬁed into
5 quantiles (i.e., quintiles). Note, that the classiﬁcation metric itself inﬂuences the visual
interpretation of the data. Population change ranges from 100% decline to 1,633.33% growth.
The 80th percentile falls at −12.26%, meaning the top 20% of observations includes block
groups with very small rates of decline as well as block groups that exhibit stability or
growth. If the data were to be categorized into equal sized intervals, all but a handful of
observations would end up in the same category. Classifying the data by quantiles provides
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greater variation visually while still highlighting the severe decline happening throughout
the city.
Like many cities, the pattern of population growth and decline ﬂuctuates across the city
of Detroit. As Map 6.2 shows, the outer regions of the city are the most stable. A number
of stable or growing block groups cluster along the upper eastern border of the city near the
wealthier Grosse Pointe-Harper Woods area. Population is also relatively stable northwest
of the central business district and along parts of the river front.
In the northern portion of the city, there is a large pocket of stability covering the area
around the John C. Lodge Freeway and east to Woodward Avenue. The heart of this stability
lies in the Pembroke and Bagley neighborhoods which are ﬂanked on either side by partially
stable neighborhoods (namely, Greenﬁeld and Palmer Park). Interestingly, the Pembroke
area is home to the Eight Mile–Wyoming neighborhood discussed in Chapter 2. The Eight
Mile Wall, once erected to separate White and Black neighborhoods, sits squarely in the
middle of the Pembroke neighborhood surrounded on both sides by almost exclusively Black
neighborhoods (a point I return to below).
Starting from the central business district heading northeast on Gratiot Avenue, population decline is rampant on both sides of the thoroughfare all the way to the outskirts of the
city. Another pocket of decline sits east of Woodward Avenue just south of the Eight Mile
border.

6.3.3

Independent Variables

Population change is hypothesized to be a function of neighborhood socioeconomic conditions, local government investment activities, and the strength of neighborhood civil society.
The following sections describe how concepts are operationalized, the associated data sources,
and the spatial distribution of each variable. Operationalizations for residential stability, concentrated disadvantage, collective capacity, and organizational density are explained in detail
in Chapter 5. Thus, only a brief recap of the component variables is provided below. Unless
otherwise noted, all covariate data are for 2000 so as to account for temporal ordering among
aspects of decline that often reinforce one another. Summary statistics for all variables are
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Map 6.2. 2000 and 2010 Population with Population Change
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given in Table 6.1. Additionally, neighborhood characteristics are mapped in order to assess
variation across the study region (see Maps 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5). Mapped data are classiﬁed
into 5 quantiles (i.e., quintiles).

6.3.3.1 Concentrated disadvantage
Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997) show that an index of linked disadvantages based on the
share of the population receiving public assistance, unemployment, poverty, percentage of
families headed by females, and racial composition is a strong predictor of neighborhood
depopulation. Recall from the previous chapter that the concentrated disadvantage measure
used in this research is a 6-item regression-weighted index including the percentage of households on public assistance, the percentage of the population in poverty, the unemployment
rate, the percentage of single mothers, the percentage of people over the age of 25 with a
high school degree or less, and the percentage of the population under the age of ﬁve. Factor
loadings for the index are displayed in Table 6.2. Data for the components of concentrated
disadvantage come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Map 6.3 displays the spatial distribution of the concentrated disadvantage index along
with the spatial distributions of each component variable. The largest clusters of disadvantage (shaded red) are on the eastern side of the city. Less disadvantaged areas (shaded
blue) are found along the periphery of the city. Not surprisingly, the spatial distributions
for the component variables tend to be quite similar to the distribution of concentrated disadvantage. West of Woodward Avenue in the northern part of the city, for example, block
groups have smaller shares of impoverished and less educated residents. This region also
scores quite low on the concentrated disadvantage index. One notable discrepancy between
the disadvantage index and its components appears in the southern part of the city where a
large cluster of block groups house a substantial proportion of residents with little education.
Concentrated disadvantage is not proliﬁc in this region; rather, it varies substantially with
only a small number of block groups exhibiting severe disadvantage.
Mapping alone provides preliminary evidence that concentrated disadvantage and population decline are related. Note the large number of block groups with very low disadvantage
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0.302
Collective capacity
0
Organizational density
0
Public improvement
spending per capita
0.391
Public service
spending per capita
0.955
Economic development spending per capita
0.095
Economic diversity
0.820

Min

S.D.

Mean

Table 6.1. Summary Statistics

0
0
0.817

0

−40.583
−19.838
−0.514
−0.219
0.065
−0.812
−0.765
0.125
−0.939
−0.885

p20

0
0
0.839

0

−29.354
−9.813
−0.343
−0.102
0.100
−0.170
−0.145
0.150
−0.338
−0.476

p40

0
0
0.847

0

−24.179
−6.981
−0.274
−0.072
0.127
0.054
0.068
0.164
−0.067
−0.376

p50

0
0
0.854

0

−20.296
−4.260
−0.224
−0.043
0.170
0.307
0.280
0.182
0.238
0.034

p60

0
0
0.869

0

−12.266
3.279
−0.129
0.032
0.389
0.764
0.822
0.230
0.902
0.681

p80

9.861
9.700
0.899

10.113

1633.333
1350.000
2.843
2.665
0.853
3.198
2.541
46.000
3.010
7.494

Max
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Table 6.2. Principal Component Analyses
Variable

Factor Loadings

Concentrated Disadvantage
% Households on public assistance
% Poverty
Unemployment
% Single mothers
% High school or less
% Under 5 years old

0.772
0.811
0.664
0.739
0.800
0.697

Eigenvalue

3.367

Residential Stability
% Same household in 1995
% Owner occupied

0.869
0.869

Eigenvalue
Civil Society Indices
Turnout
Census response rate
Childcare centers
Places of worship
Eigenvalue

1.512
Collective Organizational
Density
Capacity
0.052
0.930
0.009
0.935
0.768
0.148
0.716
−0.239
1.816

1.105

scores located between the John C. Lodge Freeway and Woodward Avenue—one of the most
stable regions in the city. Pockets of greater concentrated disadvantage also correspond to
regions of the city that lost a substantial share of their residents. Take, for instance, a look at
the neighborhoods surrounding Gratiot Avenue. With the exception of the central business
district, the regions on each side of Gratiot exhibit severe disadvantage and also experienced
considerable population decline.

6.3.3.2 Residential stability
Civil society is more likely to ﬂourish in areas that are residentially stable. Residentially stable areas are those with more homeowners and a greater proportion of long term
residents (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012). Existing research links
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homeownership and neighborhood tenure to loyalty and neighborhood attachment. Using
survey data, Donnelly and Majka (1996) present empirical evidence that homeownership is
associated with stronger ties and commitment to the neighborhood. The act of buying a
home, according to McCabe (2013) “is an expression of long-term stability” and “increases
the transaction costs associated with switching residences” (933). For most people, choosing
to buy a home means making an important economic investment. Being economically invested in a neighborhood increases the cost of exit. In sum, residents who have lived in the
same place for a long time and are socially and economically invested in their community
are less likely to move out.
A measure of residential stability is included in the model as an estimate of how embedded
people are in their community. Residential stability is represented as an index based on the
population living in the same household for the past ﬁve years and the share of owner
occupied households, both of which have been linked to place attachment (Brown, Perkins,
and Brown 2003; Mesch and Manor 1998). Factor loadings are displayed in Table 6.2. Data
on owner occupancy and length of residence come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
As Map 6.4 illustrates, the least residentially stable areas are along the riverfront and
extending out from the central business district through the Lower and Middle Woodward
neighborhoods. The most residentially stable areas in the city lie in the northwest quarter. A
majority of the block groups in this region correspond to block groups with stable population.

6.3.3.3 Civil society proxies
Principal-component analysis was used to generate two proxies for civil society measuring
a neighborhood’s potential for collective action and its organizational resource base (see
Table 6.2). Recall from Chapter 5 that the ﬁrst factor, collective capacity, is positively
associated with voter turnout and census response rates. The second factor, organizational
density, is characterized by high positive loadings for places of worship and childcare centers.
Voter turnout data for the 2005 mayoral election are from the City of Detroit’s Elections
Department. Census Response Rate data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data for places
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of worship and childcare centers are based on physical and cultural point features from the
U.S. Geological Survey’s Geographic Names Information System.
Spatial distributions for each proxy are displayed in Map 6.4. Collective capacity exhibits
a clear spatial pattern, whereas the spatial distribution of organizational density appears to
be more random. There are, however, some small clusters of block groups with very low or
very high organizational density scores scattered throughout the city. Low collective capacity,
in comparison, encompasses most of the southern portion of the city extending all the way to
the Highland Park and Hamtramck border. Referring back to Map 6.2, population change
in the corresponding region is mixed with pockets of severe decline and stability alike. Block
groups in the northwestern quarter of the city and along the western and eastern borders
have a greater capacity for collective action. Large shares of these regions correspond to
areas that also show population stability. Here the overlap between strong civil society,
measured with respect to its collective capacity, and population stability is most apparent,
providing preliminary evidence of a relationship between the two.

6.3.3.4 CDBG investments by category
Community Development Block Grant data were extracted from the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s data portal. The Department of Housing and Urban Development classiﬁes CDBG projects into 6 types: acquisition, economic development, housing,
public improvement, public service, or other. Three project types have a limited number of data points: acquisition, housing, and other. For this project, acquisition, housing,
and public improvement projects are collapsed into a single public improvements category.
Other-type projects are excluded from the analysis. Thus, activities are classiﬁed as: public
improvement, public service, or economic development projects. The total amount spent for
each category is summarized to the block group level and then normalized by population.
Per capita project spending varies immensely resulting in heavily skewed distributions with
extreme positive outliers. For this reason, measures of CDBG spending were adjusted using a log transformation with an oﬀset of one. Summary statistics for the CDBG spending
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variables are displayed in Table 6.1 and the spatial distributions associated with each are
depicted in Map 6.5.
There are relatively large portions of the city that do not receive any type of CDBG
funding. As Map 6.5 illustrates, there are more CDBG projects in and around the central
business district and along the Detroit River than there are elsewhere in the city. Also of
note, the frequency of economic development spending is much lower than the other two
spending types. A large majority of the block groups in the city receive $0 in economic
development spending. A lack of variation in values is sometimes problematic for spatial
models because of issues with local multicollinearity. For this reason, statistical models with
and without the economic development spending variable were compared. Including the
economic development spending indicator improves model performance and does not cause
issues of local multicollinearity. Consequently, it is retained in the analysis to follow despite
its lack of variation.

6.3.3.5 Interactions
As explained in the previous chapter, two dimensions of civil society—a neighborhood’s
collective capacity and organizational density—are expected to increase the likelihood of
a neighborhood receiving CDBG funding. Chapter 5 results indicate that a block group’s
chance of receiving a public improvement or public service project is greater where there is
a denser organizational resource base. In contrast, increases in citizen voice decrease a block
group’s CDBG funding prospects.
This chapter extends the theoretical argument, and postulates that population stability
should be greater in areas where organizational networks are denser and residents are more
civically engaged. The inﬂux of money for housing and community development should
strengthen this relationship. In consideration of the ﬁndings from Chapter 5, however, it is
likely that interactions for collective capacity will have weaker eﬀects on population change
than those for organizational density. Be that as it may, I argue that the combination of
strong civil society and smart government investment in housing and community development
best predicts population stability. As such, interactions between the measures of civil society
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Map 6.3. Concentrated Disadvantage and Component Variables
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Map 6.4. Spatial Distributions of Explanatory Variables

Map 6.5. Spatial Distributions of CDBG Activity
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and public improvement and public service spending per capita are included to assess the
conditional nature of the hypothesized relationship.

6.3.4

Control Variables

In testing the impact of strong civil society, the analysis controls for other potential
determinants of neighborhood population change, including a neighborhood’s racial and
ethnic diversity, economic diversity, crime rate per capita, and change in population for
the previous decade. An index measure of housing conditions was also considered during
model speciﬁcation, but ultimately rejected because of strong correlation with concentrated
disadvantage.

6.3.4.1 Racial and ethnic diversity
Race and ethnicity are especially important considerations in studies of urban politics
and policy. Research has linked the changing racial composition of a neighborhood to urban
decline via a multitude of diﬀerent causal mechanisms, including racially motivated suburbanization (Sadler and Lafreniere 2017), race-based neighborhood stereotyping (Ellen 2000),
and racial “tipping points” (Schelling 1978) among others. Also of note, is research showing
that civil society preforms best in more homogenous areas (e.g., Donnelly and Majka 1996;
Sampson 2012).
The analysis accounts for a neighborhood’s racial and ethnic heterogeneity using a measure of racial and ethnic diversity based on the Gini-Simpson Index:3

GSI = 1 −

k
X

p2i

(6.1)

i=1
3

The Gini-Simpson Index is also called the Simpson’s Diversity Index in ecology and is equivalent to a variant
of the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index commonly used in economics.
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where pi represents the proportion of each category i. Race and ethnicity are incorporated
as follows:
GSI = 1 −

k
X

ri2

i=1

k
X

e2i

(6.2)

i=1

where ri represents the proportion of people of a race category and ei represents the proportion of people in an ethnic category.
" 
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(6.3)

The formula does not include a proportion for persons with multiple races. They are, however, included in the total population.4 An index score of 0 represents no diversity while a
score of 1 equals complete diversity.
The summary statistics in Table 6.1 and quantile breaks in Map 6.4 make it clear that
racial and ethnic diversity is sparse in Detroit. Only around 20% of the block groups have
a diversity score greater than 0.40. This is hardly surprising given that the population for
the city as a whole is over 80% Black American. More than half of Detroit’s block groups
contain less than 1% Hispanic American residents (578 out of 1,066) and only 7% have
Hispanic populations that exceed 10% of their total population (75 out of 1,066). Block
groups where more than half of their residents are white, non-Hispanic make up only 3.5% of
the 1,066 block groups (38 out of 1,066). Not a single block group in the city is over 50% Asian
American, Native American or Paciﬁc Islander, or any other racial minority. Consequently,
the deep red area in the southern part of the city scores higher on the diversity index because
of its larger share of Hispanic residents.
Block groups with greater racial and ethnic diversity correspond to regions of population
stability along the western and eastern boarders of the city (compare Map 6.4 to Map 6.2).
There is also a positive relationship between the two in some of the block groups in the
4

Excluding the proportion of mixed-race persons from the formula maximizes diversity because mixed-race
people are classed as “diverse” by default.
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southwest. A striking diﬀerence from this trend appears in the northern part of the city near
the John C. Lodge Freeway where very low diversity scores overlap a relatively large pocket of
stability. Here lies the Pembroke neighborhood and within its bounds what was once known
as the Eight Mile–Wyoming neighborhood. The Eight Mile wall no longer separates Whites
from Blacks; instead, it is ﬂanked on both sides by exclusively Black neighborhoods5 that
also happen to be some of the most residentially stable in the city (as mentioned previously).

6.3.4.2 Economic diversity
Like the index for racial and ethnic diversity, a neighborhood’s economic diversity is
measured using the Gini-Simpson Index, which accounts for both richness (the number of
industries) and evenness (the relative abundance of the diﬀerent industries making up the
richness of the neighborhood). Neighborhoods have a higher diversity score when their
residents are employed in a wider array of industries with more abundant employment in
many of the industries.
The summary statistics reported in Table 6.1 show that economic diversity values range
from 0 to 0.899. The 20th percentile break, however, falls at 0.817, meaning that the bottom
20% of the distribution spans nearly the entire range of possible values. This also means
that diversity scores for 80% of Detroit’s block groups are tightly concentrated within the
interval of 0.817 and 0.899. Thus, for a large majority of the cases, there is very little
variation in possible values.6 As previously mentioned, the lack of variation in values for a
large number of cases can be a source of trouble for spatial models, leading to problems with
local multicollinearity, especially when there is a signiﬁcant amount of spatial clustering of
identical values. The left-side panel of Map 6.6 illustrates the spatial distribution of economic
diversity. The clustering of identical values is tested in the next section.
5

Population is 96% Black or more in the relevant block groups.
A log transformation with an oﬀset of 1 did not signiﬁcantly change the shape of the distribution. Other
transformations performed equally poor.
6

Map 6.6. Economic Diversity: Spatial Distributions and Hot Spot Analysis
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6.3.4.3 Lagged population change
Population change in the previous period is a logged measure of true population change
calculated in the same way as the dependent variable. Population data are derived from
the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial censuses. The spatial distribution of
population change between 1990 and 2000 is similar to the population change distribution
between 2000 and 2010. In both periods, the largest clusters of stability can be found in
the southern and northeastern sections of the city (see Map 6.4). Population decline is
most prevalent in the interior regions of the city, especially in neighborhoods along Gratiot
Avenue.

6.3.4.4 Crimes per capita
The crime data used in this analysis were extracted from the Detroit Open Data Portal.
The original source of the data on criminal oﬀenses is the Detroit Police Department’s
CrisNet/NetRMS records management system. The data describe all oﬀenses associated with
all reported incidents, excluding sexual assaults. The Detroit Police Department launched
a new system to collect crime data in 2016 and has been working to archive historical data.
At the time of this project, 2009 was the oldest year of crime data available. Thus, the data
reﬂect the per capita crime rate for all reported oﬀenses, excluding sexual assaults, that
occurred within Detroit’s city limits in 2009. The per capita crime rate is highest near the
central business district and along the Woodward corridor (see Map 6.4).

6.3.5

Methods

This chapter tests the extent to which civil society’s strength inﬂuences population change
while accounting for social, economic, and spatial context. First, an Ordinary Least Squares
regression model is used to gain an understanding of the average relationships between the
covariates and population change. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is considered a
global model in the sense that each OLS regression coeﬃcient provides a single estimate to
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summarize the eﬀect of a covariate for the entire study area. The standard linear regression
model may be written as:
yi = β0 +

X

βk Xik + εi

(6.4)

k

where y is a vector of observations on the response variable and X represents a matrix
containing a set of predictor variables. β is a vector of regression coeﬃcients and ε is a
random vector whose distribution is N (0, σ 2 ). Subscripts represent individual elements of
vectors or matrices.
Traditional regression models assume that residuals are independent and identically distributed or, in other words, that observed characteristics at one location are independent of
characteristics in other locations (Charlton and Fotheringham 2009a). Spatial data violate
this assumption. In the present case, many of the explanatory variables illustrated in the
previous section exhibit clear spatial patterns. Block groups with more racial and ethnic
diversity, for instance, tend to be located near one another. When variables in the model
exhibit this kind of spatial dependence, the residuals for neighboring observations will likely
be similar in magnitude and sign. As Charlton and Fotheringham (2009b) explain “spatial
structure in the data means that the value of the dependent variable in one spatial unit is
aﬀected by the independent variables in nearby units. This leads to parameter estimates
which are both biased and ineﬃcient” [emphasis in original] (3).
Fortunately, individual variables and regression residuals can be tested for spatial autocorrelation (e.g., Fischer and Getis 2010). Global measures of spatial autocorrelation like
Moran’s I use a single statistic to describe the overall spatial relationship of all observations
(Lee and Wong 2001). The statistic measures spatial association using an index based on
1) the proximity of locations and 2) the similarity of the attributes associated with these
locations (Lee and Wong 2001; see also: Fischer and Getis 2010; Getis and Ord 1992; Ord
and Getis 1995). Consider the present case, Detroit is subdivided into n block groups,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The proximity of locations refers to the distance between points i and j.
For a random variable X, each location i has an associated value of xi . The similarity of
attribute values (xi and xj ) between two locations i and j is assessed by ﬁrst calculating each
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value’s deviation from the mean of that variable and then taking the product of their deviations (Lee and Wong 2001). Accordingly, the Moran’s I statistic for spatial autocorrelation
is expressed as:
n P
n
P

n
I= P
n P
n

wij (xi − x̄)(xj − x̄)

i=1 j=1

wij

i=1 i=1

n
P

i 6= j
(xi −

(6.5)

¯2
x)

i=1

where wij is the spatial weight between locations i and j and the (xi − x̄)(xj − x̄) component
represents the similarity in attribute values. The denominator of the Moran’s I statistic
includes “the sum of the squared deviations scaled by the total weight of the matrix” (Lee
and Wong 2001, 158). The statistic tests the null hypothesis that the overall conﬁguration
of the data is the result of random chance.
Various global spatial eﬀects models, including the spatial lag and spatial error models,
have been developed to deal with spatial dependencies in the data (Câmara and Sá Carvalho
n.d.). In such models, spatial autocorrelation is captured by adding a single parameter to
the standard regression model. Like traditional OLS models, these regression models assume
a stationary spatial process, meaning the same stimulus provokes the same response in all
parts of the study region. In addition, the extent of spatial dependence in these models
is considered ﬁxed across the study area (Cho and Gimpel 2012). If, however, the eﬀect
of a covariate diﬀers across the geographic region then these models fail to capture important local variation (Anselin 1999, 2002; Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton 1996, 1998;
Charlton and Fotheringham 2009b; Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002; Fotheringham, Charlton, and Brunsdon 1998). In the current context, the eﬀect of socioeconomic
status, residential stability, or another established predictor of population change may not be
uniformly distributed across the urban landscape. Concentrated disadvantage, for instance,
may be a strong predictor of population decline for one neighborhood but have little eﬀect
in another neighborhood.
To illustrate this point, consider the traditional OLS regression model once again. Residuals can be mapped and tested for spatial autocorrelation to help identify spatial nonstationarity in the model. With a normal distribution, regression residuals will be randomly
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distributed throughout the extent of the geographic region in question. Clustering of the
over and under predictions is the ﬁrst indication of an underlying spatial structure in the
data. A statistically signiﬁcant Moran’s I identiﬁes global spatial autocorrelation, but gives
no information about how each observation is related to its neighbors and ignores potential instability over space (Anselin 1995). Notably, spatial autocorrelation does not always
manifest the same in every location; rather, spatial dependencies may ﬂuctuate from place
to place. When the magnitude of spatial autocorrelation varies according to location there
is spatial heterogeneity (i.e., the spatial process is nonstationary). In the presence of spatial
heterogeneity, there will be structure in the residuals. Local indicators of spatial association
are used to capture the heterogeneity of spatial autocorrelation when the OLS residuals are
nonrandom.
The Getis-Ord G∗i statistic (pronounced: G-I-star) indicates where observations with
either high or low values cluster spatially (Getis and Ord 1992; Ord and Getis 1995). A
spatial autocorrelation value is derived for each location using the following formula:
n
P

wij (d)xj − Wi∗ x̄
j=1
s
G∗i (d) =
n

s

n
P

j=1

for all j

(6.6)

2 −W ∗2
wij
i

n−1

where n is equal to the total number of observations, wij is the spatial proximity for all
locations j within distance d of point i, and xj is the attribute value for location j. Because
a cluster usually contains its origin as a member of the cluster, the matrix Wi∗ represents
the spatial relationships between i and j including the case where j is equal to i (thus,
Wi∗ = Wi + wii ). This ensures that “any concentration of the x values includes the x at i”
(Getis and Ord 1992, 192). The associated mean and standard deviation are deﬁned as:
n
P

x̄ =

s

xj

j=1

n

and

s=

n
P
j=1

n

x2j

− (x̄)2

for all j.

(6.7)

By subtracting the expected value and dividing the diﬀerence by the standard error, the G∗i
statistic is scaled to be “equivalent to standard deviations of the normal distribution” (Getis
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2010, 269). Thus, a positive G∗i value identiﬁes a cluster of high values while a negative G∗i
value denotes a clustering of low values (Aldstadt 2010).
Statistically signiﬁcant hot spots (clusters of similar high attribute values) and cold spots
(clusters of similar low attribute values) are an indication of spatial nonstationarity (Lee
and Wong 2001). The clusters of high and low values identiﬁed by these statistics show
that there is something about certain places that makes them diﬀerent. In other words,
the same stimulus evokes a diﬀerent response in diﬀerent parts of the study area. Local
statistical models can be used to account for spatial variation when a local indicator of
spatial association reveals that the underlying spatial process is nonstationary.
Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton (2002) developed a local regression technique,
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR), as a means for analyzing relationships under the condition of nonstationarity (see also Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton 1996,
1998; Charlton and Fotheringham 2009b; Fotheringham, Charlton, and Brunsdon 1998).
Geographically weighted regression addresses issues of spatial nonstationarity directly by
allowing the relationships between predictor and outcome variables to vary over space (e.g.,
Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton 1996). Instead of estimating one global regression
model, GWR essentially creates a regression equation for each observation; as a result, a separate parameter estimate is calculated for each location (Mennis 2006, 172). The regression
model may be rewritten as:
yi = βi0 +

X

βik Xik + εi

(6.8)

k

where yi is the estimated value of the outcome variable at location i (Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton 1996; Fotheringham, Charlton, and Brunsdon 1998; Fotheringham,
Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002). βi0 is the intercept and βik is the estimated eﬀect of parameter k for location i. In GWR, observations are weighted based on their proximity to location
i. The GWR estimator is written as:
β̂(i) = [X T W (i)X]−1 X T W (i)y

(6.9)
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where W (i) is an n × n matrix of spatial weights that vary according to the spatial location
of i. Observations closer to i are weighted more than observations that are farther away.
The weight assigned to each observation is determined via a spatially adaptive weighting
function

wij =

⎧
2
⎪
⎨
1 − (dij /hi )2

if dij < hi

⎪
⎩0

otherwise

,

(6.10)

where dij is once again the distance between locations i and j and hi is the bandwidth (the
N th nearest neighbor distance from i). The bandwidth is selected by minimizing the Akaike
Information Criteria score,
AICc = 2n loge (σ̂) + n loge (2π) + n



n+tr(S)
n−2−tr(S)



,

(6.11)

where n is the number of observations, σ̂ is the estimate of the standard error of the residuals,
and tr(S) is the trace of the hat matrix.
Finally, the results from running a GWR model can be used to generate coeﬃcient
surfaces that illustrate how the relationships between the dependent variable and each explanatory variable ﬂuctuate over the study area (ESRI 2016b).

6.4
6.4.1

Results

Ordinary Least Squares Regression

Model 6.1 regresses population change on racial and ethnic diversity, concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, collective capacity, organizational density, and public improvement, public service, and economic development investments, controlling for economic
diversity, lagged population change and crimes per capita. Results for Model 6.1 are displayed
in Table 6.3. The overall model is statistically signiﬁcant (F (11, 1, 044) = 30.53; p < 0.001)
with an R-squared value of 0.343 and Adjusted R-squared of 0.336. A Variance Inﬂation
Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity produces a mean VIF score of 1.67 which is well below
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accepted thresholds (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2007; Chatterjee and Hadi 2006; Hair et al.
2010).
Map 6.7 displays the spatial distribution of the standardized residuals for Model 6.1.
Residuals are classiﬁed by standard deviation breaks. Block groups are shaded blue in areas
where the model over predicts the actual observed values. Red block groups indicate the
model has under predicted population change. Deeper hues reﬂect intensity; thus, predicted
population change is much lower than observed population change in darker red block groups.
As explained above, over and under predictions should be distributed randomly across the
study area if the regression model is properly speciﬁed. Any systematic pattern suggests
the presence of spatial autocorrelation. In this speciﬁc instance, over predictions appear to
cluster in the northcentral portion of the city south of the Eight Mile border, while under
predictions appear to congregate in the southcentral portion of the city near the Woodward
corridor.
The Moran’s I statistic formally tests for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. The
statistic ranges from −1 to +1, where high positive values indicate the clustering of similar
attribute values, and tests the null hypothesis that the overall conﬁguration of the data is
the result of random chance (Lee and Wong 2001). The calculated value of Moran’s I is
0.044 and the associated z -score is 3.678. According to the Moran’s I test results, given the
z -score of 3.678, there is a less than 1% likelihood that the clustered pattern displayed in
Map 6.7 is the result of random chance.
The Moran’s I statistic provides a global assessment of spatial autocorrelation, but does
not indicate the location or whether the autocorrelation is positive or negative. The GetisOrd G∗i statistic is needed to identify statistically signiﬁcant hot spots and cold spots. The
right panel of Map 6.7 displays statistically signiﬁcant spatial clusters. The cluster of over
predictions in the northcentral portion of the city is, in fact, statistically signiﬁcant as are
clusters of over predictions on both sides of the airport. There are also two small clusters
closer to the central business district. The cluster of under predictions in the southcentral
portion of the city near the Woodward corridor is also statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus far, there is suﬃcient evidence to suggest nonstationary relationships between the
independent variables and population change. Employing a GWR model to account for these
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Table 6.3. OLS Regression and Geographically Weighted Regression Results
OLS Regression

Constant
Population change lag
Racial and ethnic diversity
Concentrated disadvantage
Residential stability
Crimes per capita
Collective Capacity
Public improvements spending
per capita
Public services spending

(6.1)
β/s.e.

(6.2)
β/s.e.

(6.3)
β/s.e.

−1.153∗∗
(0.377)
−0.260
(0.183)
0.302∗∗∗
(0.071)
−0.119∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.024
(0.022)
0.063∗
(0.025)
0.039
(0.027)

−0.449∗∗∗
(0.040)
−0.266
(0.200)
0.361∗∗∗
(0.093)
−0.089∗∗
(0.031)
0.049†
(0.029)
0.046∗
(0.023)
0.060†
(0.032)

−0.447∗∗∗
(0.040)
−0.266
(0.201)
0.355∗∗∗
(0.093)
−0.088∗∗
(0.032)
0.049†
(0.028)
0.046∗
(0.023)
0.067∗
(0.034)

−0.005
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)

−0.002
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)

Collective capacity × Public
improvements spending per capita
Collective capacity × Public services
spending per capita
Organizational density

0.001
(0.007)

0.011
(0.008)

Organizational density × Public
improvements spending per capita
Organizational density × Public
services spending per capita
Economic development spending
per capita
Economic diversity

Geographically Weighted Regression

0.059†
(0.033)
0.862∗
(0.427)

0.034
(0.024)

Min

(6.4)
Mean Median

Max

−0.627 −0.363 −0.351

−0.126

−1.073 −0.044 −0.042

0.689

−0.694 −0.011 −0.083

0.948

−0.263 −0.116 −0.113

0.003

−0.150 −0.001 −0.004

0.112

−0.632

0.077

0.085

0.339

−0.142

0.057

0.052

0.181

0.006
(0.009)
0.003
(0.007)

−0.087

0.001

0.002

0.080

−0.035

0.000

0.000

0.040

0.011
(0.007)

−0.037 −0.001 −0.002

0.055

−0.011∗
(0.005)
0.014
(0.009)

−0.046

0.009

0.007

0.087

−0.058

0.006

0.003

0.040

−0.008†
(0.004)

−0.054 −0.006 −0.005

0.026

0.003
(0.006)

−0.027

0.001

0.002

0.032

0.034
(0.023)

−0.060

0.019

0.015

0.147

N
1056
1056
1056
1056
R-Square
0.343
0.304
0.309
0.587
Adj. R-Square
0.336
0.297
0.300
0.525
AIC Stata
381.770 441.001 441.021
AIC
383.770 443.001 443.334
AICc
384.119 443.300 443.857
111.338
Moran’s I Index
0.044
0.071
0.066
0.009
Z-score
3.687
5.817
5.415
0.807
P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.420
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log of true population change. Robust Standard Errors are
in parentheses. † p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests.

Map 6.7. Residuals for OLS Model 6.1 with Hot Spot Analysis
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underlying spatial processes is the next step; however, the GWR model fails because of severe
model design errors. Global or local multicollinearity are common causes of model design
errors (ESRI 2016a; Wheeler 2007). As mentioned, the mean VIF for Model 6.1 is quite low
(1.67) as is the VIF value for individual OLS coeﬃcients, meaning local multicollinearity
is more likely the problem since global multicollinearity is not an issue. Causes of local
multicollinearity include a lack of variation among values of an explanatory variable and the
spatial clustering of identical or very similar values (ESRI 2016a). Based on the univariate
distribution, economic diversity is the likely problem. And in fact, the GWR model runs
successfully after repeating these steps without economic diversity. Before turning to the
new series of models without economic diversity, Hot Spot Analysis is used to provide a more
comprehensive look at economic diversity.
Recall that for a large majority of the cases, there is very little variation in possible values
of economic diversity (80% of Detroit’s block groups have a diversity score over 0.817). The
right-side panel of Map 6.6 displays results from the Hot Spot Analysis. Cold spots representing statistically signiﬁcant clusters of very low values of economic diversity appear along
the Detroit River and up the Woodward corridor. There are no signiﬁcant clusters of higher
values likely due to the lack of variation in values among the top 80% of cases. The regression
results from Model 6.1 imply that greater economic diversity leads to population stability
or growth. While this ﬁnding may be true in the aggregate, the results do not necessarily
translate to the local level. Sophisticated techniques beyond the scope of this project would
be needed to say anything deﬁnitive about the local eﬀects of economic diversity. Since
one of the primary goals of this exercise is to explain variation among neighborhood eﬀects,
economic diversity is excluded from the remainder of the analysis.
Model 6.2 drops the economic diversity variable and regresses population change on racial
and ethnic diversity, concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, collective capacity, organizational density, and public improvement, public service, and economic development
investments, controlling for lagged population change and crimes per capita.7 There are
no issues with implementing a GWR version of Model 6.2 and post-estimation diagnostics
7

Model 6.2 is statistically signiﬁcant (F (10, 1, 045) = 32.33; p < 0.001) with an R-squared value of 0.304 and
Adjusted R-squared of 0.297. A VIF test for multicollinearity produces an acceptable mean VIF score of
1.60. The AICc for Model 6.2 is 443.300.
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conﬁrm that local multicollinearity is no longer an issue. Model 6.2 is the foundation for
subsequent models, so its results are displayed in Table 6.3 for reference, but space is not
devoted to a thorough discussion of the model’s output. Because the analysis is interested in
how civil society and government investment strategies work to mitigate population decline,
Model 6.3 adds the interactions between the measures of civil society and types of CDBG
funding. Accordingly, the discussion to follow will focus primarily on this fully speciﬁed OLS
model and its GWR equivalent (Model 6.4).
Results for Model 6.3 are displayed in Table 6.3. The overall model is statistically signiﬁcant (F (14, 1, 041) = 24.79; p < 0.001) with an R-squared value of 0.309 and Adjusted
R-squared of 0.300. A VIF test for multicollinearity produces an acceptable mean VIF score
of 1.89. The AICc for Model 6.3 is 443.857, whereas the AICc for Model 6.1 is 384.119.
Despite a larger AICc score, Model 6.3 is preferred over Model 6.1 because local multicollinearity is no longer an issue. However, similar to Model 6.1, the residuals for Model 6.3
exhibit spatial autocorrelation. The spatial distribution of the residuals along with results
from a Hot Spot analysis are displayed in Map 6.8. Note that statistically signiﬁcant clusters
of high and low residuals remain even after dropping economic diversity and accounting for
interactions between civil society and government investments.

6.4.2

Geographically Weighted Regression

Model 6.4 is a GWR model composed of the same variables as Model 6.3. Recall that, unlike global regression models, GWR “generates spatial data that express the spatial variation
in the relationships among the variables” (Mennis 2006, 171). When nonstationarity is suspected, OLS results are misleading at best. In contrast, GWR estimates parameters at every
location while taking into consideration the values of covariates in neighboring locations.
Fit statistics displayed in Table 6.3 indicate that Model 6.4 performs reasonable well.
Increased R-squared and Adjusted R-squared values (0.587 and 0.525, respectively) reﬂect
the greater explanatory power of the model after accounting for spatial processes in the data.
In addition, the AICc has declined considerably—compare 111.338 for Model 6.4 to 443.857
for Model 6.3. Testing the residuals for Model 6.4, reveals that spatial autocorrelation is no
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longer an issue (see Map 6.9). In fact, the Moran’s I for the GWR residuals is very close
to zero at 0.009 and no longer signiﬁcant (z -score = 0.807; p = 0.420). The insigniﬁcant
Moran’s I indicates that geographic weighting has successfully accounted for the spatial
dependencies that were present in the OLS model.
The right-side panel of Map 6.9 illustrates the model’s performance across the study
region using local R-squared statistics. Local R-squared values range from 0.277 to 0.796,
whereas the R-squared for the equivalent global model is 0.309. Only 40 of the 1,056 cases
included in the local model have lower R-squared values than the global model. In other
words, the GWR model performs better 96% of the time (1,016 out of 1,056). The GWR
model performs best in the western third of the city and does especially well in the southwest
and in the central northern portion of the city.
It is worth noting that the model performs least well along the Detroit River and in the
central business district and surrounding neighborhoods—areas of the city that are receiving the most CDBG investment. Interestingly, this collective of downtown neighborhoods,
referred to as the 7.2 (read: seven point two), is experiencing a resurgence.8 The sheer
number of CDBG investments alone make it clear that Detroit leaders are prioritizing this
region. Even so, population change remains uneven. Some block groups are stable while
others experience some of the worst rates of decline in the city.
What makes the 7.2 so much diﬀerent than the rest of the city is the recent changes
in racial and ethnic composition. For better or worse, the 7.2 is gentrifying. Already, the
share of young white professionals in the area is growing. According to a 2015 report put
together by a team of local foundations and data analytic organizations the share of White
residents in the 7.2 increased from 18% in 2000 to 21% in 2010 while the share of Black
residents dropped from 73% to 68% during the same period.9 The average block group in
Detroit is 10% White and 82% Black. Only around 15% of the block groups in Detroit are
21% or more White. The report also indicates that the share of college educated residents
8

The 7.2 is “shorthand for the 7.2 square miles of greater downtown Detroit, and encompasses freshly
scrubbed neighborhoods in downtown, Corktown, Midtown, New Center, Woodbridge, Eastern Market,
Lafayette Park and Rivertown” (Derringer 2014).
9
The report (called the 7.2 SQ MI) was prepared by the Hudson-Webber Foundation, the Detroit Economic
Growth Corporation, the Downtown Detroit Partnership, Midtown Detroit, Inc., Invest Detroit, and Data
Driven Detroit and is available here: http://detroitsevenpointtwo.com (Accessed: April 13, 2017).

Map 6.8. Residuals for OLS Model 6.3 with Hot Spot Analysis
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Map 6.9. Residuals for GWR Model 6.4 with Local R-squared Values
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has increased as has median income (see also Derringer 2014; Florida 2013). Thus, it is very
likely that the changing dynamics of the 7.2 are the reason the model does poorly in this
area.10
Table 6.3 displays global coeﬃcients and robust standard errors for Model 6.3 and descriptive statistics for the local GWR coeﬃcients from Model 6.4. These summary statistics
furnish information on underlying spatial processes that may be masked by global coeﬃcients. Maps 6.10 and 6.11 display local coeﬃcient surfaces based on Model 6.4.11 Local
coeﬃcient values are classiﬁed by standard deviation breaks for each map using a diverging
color scheme.
In order to glean the most useful information from the results the following section
brieﬂy describes the global and local coeﬃcients for Models 6.3 and 6.4 and then provides
a more detailed examination using three regions of the city where the model performs well:
the southwest, northcentral, and northeast regions.12 Each region is discussed individually
starting with an overview of the region’s characteristics and then moving into the associated GWR results. The section concludes with a summary of common trends and notable
diﬀerences among the three regions.

6.4.2.1 Racial and ethnic diversity
Turning ﬁrst to racial and ethnic diversity, the global coeﬃcient for Model 6.3 in Table 6.3
is signiﬁcant and positive at 0.355. Greater racial and ethnic diversity is associated with population stability and less diversity is associated with decline, according to the global model.
The GWR model, however, shows that this eﬀect is nonstationary with local coeﬃcients
ranging from negative 0.694 to positive 0.948. The local coeﬃcients for racial and ethnic
10

Gentriﬁcation in Detroit will be especially contentious given the city’s history of segregation, displacement,
and neglect. As rents and property values go up, poorer residents will continue to be forced out. These
people will go somewhere—likely concentrating poverty even more and further isolating these communities.
11
I do not display the t-values associated with the local coeﬃcient estimates because of issues with multiple
signiﬁcance testing. Multiple testing problems associated with GWR are well documented (e.g., Charlton
and Fotheringham 2009a; Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002; Byrne, Charlton, and Fotheringham
2009). The best method of addressing the multiplicity problem is still up for debate (see Byrne, Charlton,
and Fotheringham 2009 and Silva and Fotheringham 2016 for recent advancements and critiques on this
topic).
12
These regions are selected based solely on model performance, not the performance of any particular
covariate.
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Map 6.10. Spatial Distributions of GWR Coeﬃcients

Map 6.11. Spatial Distributions of GWR Coeﬃcients for Civil Society and their Interactions
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diversity in Map 6.10 illustrate how this eﬀect changes across the study region. Greater
racial and ethnic diversity positively predicts population stability in the southern portion of
the city. Looking back to Map 6.4, this is one of the most diverse areas in the city, although,
notably, the city is generally not very diverse. Racial and ethnic diversity has the opposite
eﬀect on population change in the northcentral portion of the city. Here, greater diversity
is associated with population decline, not stability. For this part of the city, the global OLS
model results are misleading, highlighting the importance of looking at local level variation.

6.4.2.2 Lagged population change
Results from Model 6.3 indicate a negative relationship between population change in
the previous period and population change in the current period. According to the global
results, neighborhoods that showed growth or stability between 1990 and 2000 are more likely
to face decline between 2000 and 2010. The negative relationship in the global model is a
spatial average and, as such, masks underlying diﬀerences in the eﬀect across space. Locally,
lagged population change actually varies in its eﬀects. As Map 6.10 illustrates, there is a
negative relationship in the south and a positive relationship in the northcentral part of the
city. Since there are positive relationships in some areas and negative relationships in others,
the global result is misleading.

6.4.2.3 Crimes per capita
Crimes per capita has a signiﬁcant positive relationship with population change in the
global model. According to this aggregate result, a higher crime rate is linked to population
growth, not decline. The local results, however, indicate that the relationship is much more
nuanced. The relationship between crimes per capita and population change varies substantially in the GWR model. Local coeﬃcients are negative in the southern and northcentral
regions of the city and positive on the western side of the city.
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6.4.2.4 Concentrated disadvantage
Model 6.3 indicates that concentrated disadvantage has a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on
population change. Looking at the GWR results, it is clear that most of the local regression
coeﬃcients are negative. The few coeﬃcients that are positive have large enough standard
errors to question their reliability.13 Thus, in the case of concentrated disadvantage, results
from the global model are a fairly accurate summary of local eﬀects.
The local coeﬃcients displayed in Map 6.10 show that concentrated disadvantage has
the strongest negative eﬀects in the northeastern quarter of the city and in the area south
of Highland Park and Hamtramck. Coeﬃcient estimates in the northeast, in particular, are
interesting as they conﬁrm earlier speculation about the relationship between severe disadvantage and population decline in these areas. In addition, it was previously noted that
neighborhoods surrounding Gratiot Avenue (with the exception of the central business district) exhibit severe disadvantage and also show considerable population decline. Coeﬃcients
from the local model conﬁrm this relationship as well.

6.4.2.5 Residential stability
In the global model, residential stability is insigniﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level (p =
0.082). This insigniﬁcant ﬁnding is likely the result of local variation in the relationship
between residential stability and population change across the study region (see Map 6.10).
In the northcentral and southwest portions of the city, residential stability has a strong
positive eﬀect on population change, meaning neighborhoods with more owner occupied
housing and long-term residents are better at retaining their inhabitants. Block groups
near the Airport neighborhood and south of Highland Park and Hamtramck have large
negative coeﬃcients for residential stability. In these areas, greater residential stability in
2000 predicts population loss between 2000 and 2010. To the extent that homeownership and
13

Standard errors are estimated for every local coeﬃcient and are available upon request from the author;
but, as mentioned in the previous footnote, the best method of testing statistical signiﬁcance for local
coeﬃcients is still up for debate. Standard errors are used in this chapter as rough approximations only.
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tenure accurately capture economic and social attachment to the neighborhood, the results
for this area of the city imply that place attachment is not enough to mitigate decline.

6.4.2.6 Civil society × CDBG spending
The interactions between the measures of civil society and CDBG spending per capita
were included in the models to investigate the extent to which civil society and government
investment can work together to mitigate decline. The coeﬃcients and standard errors for
the interaction terms in Table 6.3 are unsuitable for testing the hypothesized conditional
relationships. Accordingly, I follow the advice of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and
“calculate substantively meaningful marginal eﬀects and standard errors” to test the relationship between civil society and population change at various levels of CDBG spending
(77).14 Note that the discussion of marginal eﬀects pertains speciﬁcally to the global results
from the OLS regression (Model 6.3).
Looking ﬁrst at collective capacity, the global results partially support the theoretical
argument. Collective capacity does, in fact, limit decline, but its eﬀectiveness in doing so is
inﬂuenced by the type and amount of CDBG investment. Panel a in Figure 6.1 graphically
depicts the relationship between collective capacity and population change at diﬀerent levels
of public improvement spending per capita. The average marginal eﬀect for collective capacity
is positive and increases in magnitude as public improvement spending per capita increases.
In neighborhoods where collective capacity is stronger, local investments in public improvement projects, such as youth centers, street improvements, or public facility improvements,
can bolster the neighborhood’s power to halt the exodus of its inhabitants.
Public service spending per capita, in contrast, has a dampening eﬀect on the positive
relationship between collective capacity and population change. As Figure 6.1 shows, the
average marginal eﬀect for collective capacity is positive at very low levels of public service
spending but declines in magnitude, eventually becoming insigniﬁcant, as public service
spending per capita increases. Instead of strengthening or facilitating citizen voice, public
14

The appropriate marginal eﬀects are calculated as: M E(X|Z) =
the strength of civil society and Z is CDBG spending per capita.

dY
dX

= βX + βXZ Z where X represents
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service programs, like childcare, employment training, or services for seniors, seem to weaken
it. The local GWR results discussed below shed additional light on this ﬁnding.

(a) Public Improvement Spending

(b) Public Service Spending

Fig. 6.1. Average Marginal Eﬀects of Collective Capacity

The conditional relationship between organizational density and population change is not
signiﬁcant for either type of CDBG spending with one exception. As Figure 6.2 illustrates,
organizational density has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on population change when public
improvement spending per capita is held at zero. Otherwise, the average marginal eﬀect
for organizational density is insigniﬁcant at every level of public improvement spending.
Similarly, public service spending per capita has no discernible eﬀect on the relationship
between organizational density and population change at any level (zero or otherwise). Based
on results from the global model, there is very limited evidence of a positive relationship
between organizational density and population change, speciﬁcally, when public improvement
spending is held at zero.
Accounting for spatial context complicates matters further. According to the summary
statistics for Model 6.4 (see Table 6.3), local coeﬃcients for both civil society proxies range
from negative to positive values, indicating clear nonstationarity in their relationships with
population change. Both dimensions of civil society work to lessen population decline in the
northeastern quarter and southwest tip of the city, as can be seen in Map 6.11. Elsewhere
in the city, strong civil society is associated with population decline rather than stability.

The locations of these negative relationships diﬀer between the two measures of civil society.
South of Highland Park and Hamtramck, for example, greater collective capacity intensiﬁes
decline. Along the Woodward corridor, greater organizational density is associated with
increased decline.

(a) Public Improvement Spending

(b) Public Service Spending

Fig. 6.2. Average Marginal Eﬀects of Organizational Density

In the same way that the eﬀects of civil society vary from place to place, so too do the
conditioning eﬀects of diﬀering types of CDBG spending. Instead of attempting to explain
all of the various combinations of positive and negative eﬀects associated with the measures
of civil society and their interactions, I look at three smaller geographic regions within
the city where the GWR model performs especially well. Using Local R-squared values, I
selected neighborhood clusters where the GWR model explains at least 50% of the variation
in the dependent variable (recall that Local R-squared values are displayed in Map 6.9).
Map 6.12 identiﬁes the three regions and the neighborhoods that lie within each regional
classiﬁcation. For each region, I begin with a description of the region’s characteristics using
the raw data. Map 6.4 provides a useful reference for these descriptions. Next, I explain the
local coeﬃcient patterns for each region (refer to Map 6.10 or 6.11 for these explanations).
Last, I explore common trends and notable diﬀerences among the three regions. Table 6.4
summarizes neighborhood characteristics and lists the general direction of local relationships.
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The classiﬁcations in Table 6.4 are rough approximations and should only be used for general
reference.

6.4.3

Discussion

6.4.3.1 Northeast region
The northeast region includes the neighborhoods of Mt. Olivet, Burbank, Denby, and
Finney. The block groups nearest the city border are the most stable in these neighborhoods.
The less peripheral block groups in the region, in contrast, experienced substantial decline
between 2000 and 2010. There are mixed levels of residential stability in the region with a
few stable block groups as well as a cluster of block groups falling into the bottom quintile for
residential stability. Many of the block groups in these neighborhoods are also quite racially
and ethnically diverse in comparison to other neighborhoods in the city. Collective capacity
is strong and there is relatively little disadvantage with the exception of a large cluster of
block groups in the southwest corner of the Burbank neighborhood where disadvantage is
more pronounced and collective capacity is rather weak. Organizational density scores range
from very low to very high.
In the northeast, local coeﬃcients for residential stability and racial and ethnic diversity
are very close to zero with extremely large standard errors, which means these estimates
cannot be trusted. Concentrated disadvantage has large, negative local coeﬃcients while
collective capacity and organizational density have large, positive coeﬃcients. These three
variables in particular seem to be driving the predictive power of the local model in this
region. When it comes to preventing exit, areas with less concentrated disadvantage fare
much better than those with higher levels of disadvantage. Consistent with expectations, in
areas where concentrated disadvantage is more proliﬁc, decline is greater.
For neighborhoods in the northeast, greater collective capacity and a denser organizational resource base are important resources residents can leverage to mitigate decline. Contrary to expectation, however, both types of CDBG spending weaken, rather than strengthen,
the positive eﬀects of civil society in this region (see Map 6.11).
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High/Mixed
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Levels of explanatory variables are rough approximations based on visual examination and comparisons between
the regional means (and standard deviations) and the grand mean for the entire city.
b
Positive or Negative classiﬁcation is a rough approximation based on a summary of regional local coeﬃcients.
c
Eﬀect is very small.
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Levels of explanatory variables (raw data)a

Table 6.4. Summary of Local Characteristics and Results
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Map 6.12. Detroit Focus Regions with 2000-2010 Population Change
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6.4.3.2 Southwest region
The southwest region includes the neighborhoods of Chadsey, Springwells, Vernor/Junction,
West Riverfront, and Boynton. Population change varies a great deal here with some block
groups suﬀering from extensive decline and others maintaining their population levels. Despite pockets of population stability, most of the block groups in this region have low levels
of residential stability with the exception of the Boynton neighborhood where nearly all of
the block groups have high residential stability scores. For the most part, concentrated disadvantage in the region ranges from average to above average throughout, meaning a larger
proportion of residents in these neighborhoods are in poverty, unemployed, or on public
assistance. Once again, the Boynton neighborhood diﬀers from other neighborhoods in the
region. The block groups in the Boynton neighborhood exhibit a broader mix of disadvantage levels. The southwest region of the city is also home to the largest grouping of racially
and ethnically diverse neighborhoods.
Unlike the northeast region previously discussed and the northcentral region discussed
next, all of the block groups in the southwest region have very low collective capacity scores.
The region is home to one of the few clusters of low organizational density in the city but, in
general, organizational density in the area varies substantially. Civil society is relatively weak
in these areas; yet, like the neighborhoods in the northeastern region, the GWR coeﬃcients
for collective capacity and organizational density are large and positive in the southwest
region. Residential stability also has a positive eﬀect on population change in the region.
Despite suﬀering from severe concentrated disadvantage and having limited collective capacity and a smaller organizational resources base from which to draw, civil society in these
neighborhoods eﬀectively mitigates decline.
Public improvement and public service investments have diﬀering eﬀects on the relationships between the measures of civil society and population change. For collective capacity,
public improvement spending strengthens the positive relationship with population change
while public service spending weakens it. The conditional eﬀects of public improvement
and public service spending are reversed when it comes to organizational density. In this
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case, public improvement spending weakens the positive eﬀect of organizational density while
public service spending strengthens it.

6.4.3.3 Northcentral region
The northcentral region includes the neighborhoods of Pembroke, Bagley, Palmer Park,
and State Fair. Population is relatively stable for slightly fewer than half of the block groups
in the Pembroke and Bagley neighborhoods. The rest of the block groups in the region are
experiencing varying levels of decline with some falling into the bottom quintile of population
change. Most of the block groups in the State Fair neighborhood, in particular, experienced
very large declines in their populations between 2000 and 2010.
Block groups in the Pembroke and Bagley neighborhoods score very low on the racial
and ethnic diversity index. The Palmer Park and State Fair neighborhoods, on the other
hand, are more diverse with block groups in the upper quintiles for diversity. Concentrated
disadvantage is very low everywhere in the region except for the State Fair neighborhood.
The same pattern holds for collective capacity and residential stability; the block groups in
Pembroke, Bagley, and Palmer Park are residentially stable with greater collective capacity.
In contrast, many of the block groups in the State Fair neighborhood fall into the bottom
quintiles for collective capacity and residential stability. Block groups vary in their organizational density as well with a few resource rich clusters distributed across the region. Of
the three regions discussed, the northcentral has the densest concentration of neighborhood
organizations, albeit none of the regions are especially well endowed with organizational
resources.
Local coeﬃcients for concentrated disadvantage are positive, but with extremely large
standard errors, meaning disadvantage has no real inﬂuence on population change. When
compared to the other two regions, the remaining coeﬃcient patterns for the northcentral
region are quite distinct. Unlike the relationships in the northeastern and southwestern sections of the city, organizational density has a small negative eﬀect in the northcentral region.
Despite the pockets of greater organizational density scattered throughout the region, local
coeﬃcients for this dimension of civil society are negative. A larger organizational resource
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base is associated with population decline, not stability. Public improvement spending,
however, can reduce the negative eﬀect of organizational density in these neighborhoods.
Local coeﬃcients for collective capacity are similar in sign (positive) to the other regions
but are quite small. The associated standard errors tend to be large and, at times, even
exceed the values of the coeﬃcients themselves. Thus, the eﬀect of collective capacity is
negligible in this region. Recall that three of the four neighborhoods in the northcentral
region score very high on this dimension of civil society; yet, the neighborhoods are not able
to leverage this resource to eﬀectively grow their population. Contrary to expectation, there
is no demonstrable evidence of a relationship between collective capacity and population
change in the northcentral region.
The lack of eﬀective organizing in the northcentral is particularly surprising given the
regions historical roots. At the heart of the Pembroke neighborhood is the old Eight Mile–
Wyoming neighborhood—an area that was once home to a strong collective of Black activists
who spoke out against discrimination and successfully organized to defend their property
(Sugrue 1996). Population remains relatively stable in the area but not because of residents’
civic capacity for coordinated action. Residential stability and racial and ethnic homogeneity
better predict population stability in the northcentral region. Given the region’s history,
there are likely other aspects of neighborhood organizing and civic activism inﬂuencing
population changes in the region. Additional research is needed to determine just what
those inﬂuences are.

6.4.3.4 Summary
Even though the GWR model performs well in all three regions, the nature of the relationships captured diﬀer signiﬁcantly from one region to the next (summarized in Table
6.4). Accordingly, support for the three primary hypotheses is mixed and varies by location.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, increased concentrated disadvantage escalates rates of decline
in the northeast region. For the other two regions, concentrated disadvantage has no eﬀect
on population change. Greater residential stability is associated with population stability
in the southwest and northcentral, providing partial support for Hypothesis 2. Strong civil
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society—whether it is measured by its collective capacity or organizational density—is positively associated with population stability in the northeast and southwest but has no impact
on population change in the northcentral region, aﬀording partial support for Hypothesis 3.
Combined, the results for the latter two hypothesis tests show that neighborhood attachment, as measured by its residential stability, only appears to be a catalyst for civil society
in the southwest.
What explains these variations? Are there characteristics common to both the northeast
and southwest that make these regions better incubators of social capital than the northcentral region? Is there something about the character of neighborhood attachment in the
southwest that helps the region foster eﬀective civil society?
The argument advanced throughout this study states that socially connected, civically
engaged communities are better at keeping their residents and more capable of gaining the
resources they need to better their community. Putnam argues, however, that social capital
is often absent where it is needed most. People in disadvantaged areas “lack the material
resources to get ahead” and the “social resources that might enable them to amass these
material resources” (Putnam 2000, 322). He stresses the importance of social capital for
communities suﬀering from socioeconomic disadvantage and argues that social resources are
“disproportionately important to their welfare” (Putnam 2000, 318).
In the northeast and southwest, levels of disadvantage are notably higher, incidents of
residential instability are more common, and neighborhoods exhibit greater racial and ethnic
diversity than do neighborhoods in the northcentral region. Given these characteristics, one
would expect the northeast and southwest to have weaker civil society. When compared with
the northcentral region, this expectation is in fact true; collective capacity and organizational
density are generally lower in the northeast and southwest.
When it comes to mitigating decline, the initial stock of social capital matters very little;
instead, how eﬀectively a neighborhood uses what it has matters more. Of the three regions
examined, the southwest region exhibits the most disadvantage and has the weakest civil
society. Even so, civil society matters here. For neighborhoods in the southwest, strengthening civil society is an eﬀective way to mitigate decline. The same is true for the northeast
region. Thus, social resources are, as Putnam suggests, vital assets for disadvantaged com-
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munities. The northcentral region, by comparison, has the greatest collective capacity and
the largest organizational resource base from which to draw; yet, neither eﬀectively prevent
exit. Limiting concentrated disadvantage and maintaining or increasing residential stability
are better paths to growth for the northcentral.
The local models show that the conditional eﬀects of CDBG spending also vary substantially across the city. In some areas, civil society’s eﬀectiveness is strengthened by local
investments but in other areas it is weakened. There are few commonalities among the
conditioning eﬀects and the common trends that do exist involve weakening eﬀects. Increased spending on public service projects, for instance, weakens rather than strengthens
citizen voice. Likewise, adding additional public facilities or improving existing ones does
not strengthen the brokering power of local institutions; rather, it weakens their power.
Contrary to expectation, CDBG spending, regardless of type, does not strengthen the relationship between civil society and population change in the northeast.
The only instances of CDBG investments strengthening the relationship between civil
society and population change are in the southwest, where investing in public improvements
strengthens the eﬀectiveness of citizen voice and public service spending enhances the brokering power of neighborhood organizations. Regarding the latter, community organizing
through local churches has been an eﬀective strategy for change in the southwest since at least
the 1980s (Rusch 2010). In her extensive work on congregation-based community organizing
in Detroit, Lara Rusch (2008, 2009, 2010, 2012) explains how church leaders in the southwest
organized against crime, abandoned housing, and gang violence in the 1990s. A collective
of 17 congregations formed the Jeremiah Project in 1993, “which linked Latino parishes and
other diverse congregations in Southwest Detroit” (Rusch 2012, 54). The Jeremiah Project
witnessed a number of policy successes in the 1990s and eventually joined forces with the
West Detroit Interfaith Community Organization (WDICO) and the Northeast Organization
Allied for Hope (NOAH) to form the Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength
(MOSES). Rusch (2010), explains that “community organizers and participants in MOSES
behave as democratic ‘bridging mechanisms;’ they help build new networks by establishing interpersonal trust in the absence of generalized trust” (484). Early engagement with
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congregation-based community organizing may be why neighborhoods in the southwest are
better at leveraging government investments.
The eﬀectiveness of neighborhood organizations, according to Temkin and Rohe (1998),
also relies on the “ability of these groups to act on behalf of residents” (69). Churches with
large Latino memberships were some of the ﬁrst to organize into the larger collective of
congregations. Consequently, Hispanic interests have been a part of the political discourse
in the southwest through the Jeremiah Project and MOSES for decades. This representation
of Hispanic interests has been especially important for understanding residents’ needs in the
largest Hispanic community in Detroit. By accounting for all local interests, neighborhood
organizations in the southwest do a better job brokering resources and thereby preventing
exit.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

A recurrent theme in this dissertation is that population decline is a direct threat to the
survival of large U.S. cities, especially those in the Rustbelt. Local budgets and businesses
depend on residents to sustain them. As citizens exit, cities are often left with a host
of social and economic problems. Finding solutions, as this research has demonstrated,
will require taking into consideration important historical and institutional contexts and
also neighborhood level dynamics. What works in one community does not automatically
translate elsewhere. Within Detroit, there are quite a few places where local government
is responsive to citizens, but there are very few places where government is responsive to
need. What would happen if local government actually targeted the most disadvantaged
neighborhoods? Would it make a diﬀerence?
The ﬁndings from Detroit and the city-level analysis show that when local decision makers
are responsive to civil society they can indeed prevent exit. There is also some evidence that
targeting the most disadvantaged communities for CDBG projects would be beneﬁcial in
keeping residents. As history has made clear, though, policy change requires considerable
eﬀort and political will. Local decision makers will likely need more evidence. Thus, the
logical next step for this research project is a comparison of successes and failures across a
selection of cities.

7.1

Summary of Findings

The most consistent ﬁnding throughout this research is that social and economic disadvantages are not good for communities. Increased levels of disadvantage consistently predict
population decline at every level of analysis. According to the ﬁndings from Chapter 4, cities
that average a larger share of disadvantaged residents are more likely to experience decline.
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At the same time, increasing socioeconomic disadvantage within a city (over time) leads to
population decline. Likewise, the global and local models for Detroit neighborhoods (Chapter 6) show that increased disadvantage is linked to population decline. Locally, there is
some variation in the eﬀect of concentrated disadvantage, but for most of the neighborhoods
in the city, increased concentrated disadvantage is a reliable indicator of population decline.
The core hypothesis throughout this dissertation has been that stronger civil societies
can slow the exodus of central city residents. The results from Chapters 4 and 6 oﬀer partial
support for this hypothesis. Looking ﬁrst at the organizational dimensions of civil society,
the results from the analytical chapters are not consistent (across models or scale). The
city level analysis in Chapter 4 shows that associational membership consistently predicts
population decline, not stability. At ﬁrst, the neighborhood level results from Chapter 6
appear to conﬁrm that the organizational dimension of civil society does not predict stability.
Indeed, organizational density has no eﬀect on population change in the global model. The
local geographically weighted regression model, however, detects local inconsistencies in the
relationship between organizational density and population change that were masked by the
spatial average, meaning the single global coeﬃcient.
Regarding the second measure of civil society, within-city collective capacity is linked
to population stability in Chapter 4. Over time, increased collective capacity works to
halt the outmigration of residents, especially in cities with an initially weak capacity for
collective action. The global model in Chapter 6 conﬁrms this ﬁnding. Considered as a
spatial average, collective capacity has a positive eﬀect on population change. Coeﬃcients
from the geographically weighted regression in Chapter 6, however, once again reveal a more
nuanced relationship. Once space is accounted for, collective capacity no longer has an eﬀect
in the Northcentral region, but the positive eﬀect remains in the other two regions (Northeast
and Southwest).
Local regression results for Detroit neighborhoods reveal important spatial processes
that underlie the data. The nature of the relationships captured diﬀer signiﬁcantly from one
region to the next. Although it had a negative eﬀect at the city level, locally, organizational
density does matter. In fact, it is one of the best predictors of population stability in two
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of the three regions examined at the end of Chapter 6. Collective capacity also positively
predicts population stability for a large share of Detroit neighborhoods.
Chapter 6 also looks at how the relationship between local CDBG targeting and civil
society aﬀects population change. Rather than strengthen the positive eﬀects of civil society
as hypothesized, the analysis shows that local CDBG investments tend to weaken them.
There are three notable exceptions to this general tendency that will be discussed shortly;
but ﬁrst, there is another apparent inconsistency that needs to be addressed: the negative
conditioning eﬀect of local CDBG targeting.
Returning brieﬂy to the city-level ﬁndings, recall that Chapter 4 explored the relationship between CDBG funding and population decline and found that longitudinal increases
in CDBG funding positively inﬂuence population change. According to the city-level ﬁndings, local leaders are eﬀectively using their federal grant money to maintain or grow their
populations. Thus, the city level-results seem to contradict the neighborhood level ﬁnding
that CDBG funding has a negative conditioning eﬀect on mitigating decline. Note, however,
that even the within-city results in Chapter 4 are aggregates. The multilevel structure of
modeling used in Chapter 4 sheds light on some of the processes that are happening within
cities but cannot provide insight on how these processes vary within a given city or indicate
which cities most consistently match the general time trend. The fact that CDBG funding
is almost always associated with decline at the neighborhood level (Chapter 6) suggests that
temporal processes in Detroit are not like the average time trends observed at the city-level
in Chapter 4.
Results from Chapter 5 help explain why the longitudinal trend for CDBG funding in
Chapter 4 may not be mirrored in Detroit. The analysis presented in Chapter 5 questions
whether local decision makers in Detroit are strategically investing their CDBG funding in areas showing the greatest need, meaning those neighborhoods where numerous disadvantages
have concentrated. The prevailing sentiment among urban scholars is that neighborhoods
characterized by high rates of unemployment, single mothers, and residents who are dependent on public assistance lack not only the resources needed to get ahead, but also access
to those resources, putting these communities at the greatest disadvantage (Putnam 2000).
Even though it is clear that such areas are in dire need of assistance, they are often overlooked
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by local decision makers. And in fact, Chapter 5’s results show that government oﬃcials in
Detroit are not prioritizing their most disadvantaged communities, conﬁrming conventional
wisdom.
Chapter 5 also assesses whether Detroit oﬃcials are targeting CDBG funds toward neighborhoods where civil society is most vibrant. Speciﬁcally, the analysis tests whether the
likelihood of securing a CDBG activity increases with increases in collective capacity or organizational density conditional on the neighborhood’s level of concentrated disadvantage.
I argue that localities with strong civil society are better at gaining resources from local
government. Support for this argument is mixed. Contrary to expectation, greater collective capacity does not increase the likelihood of receiving a CDBG project. In better-oﬀ
neighborhoods, where concentrated disadvantage is low, collective capacity has no eﬀect. In
areas with severe concentrated disadvantage, increasing the community’s collective capacity
may actually worsen the neighborhood’s chance of receiving funding. This latter ﬁnding
suggests that local leaders are not prioritizing need or being responsive to active and engaged citizens. Put simply, local decision makers in Detroit are ignoring need and voice.
Consequently, Detroit’s “targeting strategy” is having little impact on population retention.
The organizational capacity of civic life has a very diﬀerent impact on the targeting of
CDBG funding. The results from Chapter 5 show that a neighborhood’s organizational
capacity can indeed increase its likelihood of gaining CDBG funding. The organizational
dimension of civil society is most eﬀective when concentrated disadvantage is relatively low.
Although the eﬀect is quite small, organizational density also produces a positive eﬀect on
the likelihood of securing CDBG funds in communities with severe disadvantage.
When it comes to predicting population change, results from Chapter 6 show that local
CDBG investments tend to weaken civil society’s ability to mitigate decline. Even though
higher levels of organizational density increase the probability of obtaining CDBG resources,
the two forces combined are not always successful in mitigating decline. In general, civil
society, whether it is measured by its collective capacity or organizational density, does have
a positive eﬀect on population change in many of the neighborhoods across the city. The
fact that poor government decisions (CDBG targeting that ignores need and voice) weaken
civil society’s positive eﬀect should be cause for alarm in Detroit. The theoretical framework
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depicted in Figure 3.1 illustrates why this is the case. According to Cycle B, continued
unresponsiveness by local government weakens civil society, eventually leading to residents
exiting. Given Detroit’s generally higher levels of turnout and CDBG funding (see Table 1.1
in Chapter 1), there is strong evidence that this process is already well underway. Citizens
are exercising voice; yet, local decision makers are not targeting need or responding to more
vocal civil society. Consequently, population decline continues to be a problem for Detroit.
As previously mentioned, there are three notable exceptions to the general tendency for
CDBG funding to weaken the positive eﬀects of civil society. I turn to those now. First, the
local results from Chapter 6 show that organizational density actually has a negative eﬀect
on population change in the Northcentral neighborhoods of Detroit. In this region, a larger
organizational resource base does not keep residents tied to the community to such an extent
that exit is prevented. Of the three regions examined in greater detail at the end of Chapter
6, the Northcentral averages the highest initial level of organizational density. Thus, the
negative result may indicate that brokering institutions are ineﬀective in the region because
they are unable to form eﬀective coalitions. Alternatively, there may simply be too many of
them. Residential interactions and organizational inﬂuence alike may be spread too thin to
give any one institution—or, more likely, a subset of institutions—any real power. Furthermore, there may be additional competition for resources that are limiting the eﬀectiveness
of the institutions in the area. Notably, public improvement projects in the region actually
weaken the negative impact of organizational density. This may suggest that when an organization does eﬀectively broker resources, residents take notice and community attachments
are strengthened. The negative eﬀect is reduced but not eliminated, implying that there are
still too many ineﬀective organizations to completely halt the exodus of residents.
Given the region’s history of activism (recall the Northcentral region is home to the Eight
Mile–Wyoming neighborhood), it is surprising that the measures of civil society are not more
inﬂuential. Additional research on community organizing in the area is required to determine
if any of the speculation in the preceding paragraph plays out or if there is another reason
for why civil society is less inﬂuential in the area.
There are two instances where CDBG investments strengthen the relationship between
civil society and population change rather than weaken it; both occur in the Southwest.
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First, collective capacity’s positive eﬀect on population change is strengthened by public
improvement projects. Second, investing in public service projects strengthens organizational
density’s positive inﬂuence on population change in the Southwest. Neighborhoods in the
region are home to a large Hispanic population with a long history of community organizing
through local churches. Over the last few decades, the area has used congregation-based
organizing to successfully secure urban goods and services (Rusch 2008).
Many of the congregations in the Northeast (and some in the Northcentral) are also
connected to the broader network of organizations created through MOSES; yet, these congregations have never been as successful or organized as those in the Southwest (Rusch 2008,
2010, 2012).1 According to Temkin and Rohe (1998), “institutional infrastructure relates not
only to the presence of community groups but also to the existence of communication links
between neighborhood and the larger city” (Temkin and Rohe 70). In trying to explain why
the Northeast has been less successful, Rusch (2008) notes that the region may not have
had “enough time to establish its own relational base before...oﬃcially join[ing] forces” with
the other regional organizations under the umbrella of MOSES (188). Rusch (2008) also explains how the Northeast region “lost some member congregations due to poor relationships
or racial tensions” (188). In a piece in 2010, Rusch connects the issue to a larger problem,
writing that “in Detroit, a history of inequality and the self-serving rhetoric of political
leaders have perpetuated a climate of mistrust and encouraged a preference for race-focused
activism” (490). And so, history repeats itself.
Additional research at the local level is needed to determine just how racial tensions
and other local forces weaken the network’s capacity to broker resources and connections.
Speciﬁcally, what is it about these networks that makes them ineﬀective? What caused
racial tensions in the process of organizing? And why were these tensions absent in the
Southwest region? Based on Rusch’s work, there seems to be issues with racial inequality
even within these local social networks. There is still much work to be done in an eﬀort to
1

Recall from Chapter 6 that the Jeremiah Project (in the Southwest), the West Detroit Interfaith Community
Organization (WDICO), and the Northeast Organization Allied for Hope (NOAH) are the three district
networks in Detroit that joined together to form the Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength
(MOSES).

178
ﬁnd the ideal institutional design principles to create eﬀective brokering networks for urban
neighborhoods.

7.2

Final Thoughts

Local models like geographically weighted regression make it diﬃcult to give general
conclusions, especially when multiple explanatory variables are nonstationary. While some
may see this as a drawback of the technique, it is really what makes this methodological
tool so powerful. Consistently ﬁnding nonstationary relationships at the local level calls
into question work that makes sweeping generalizations about cities, leading to results that
may be inaccurate for all but a handful of neighborhoods. In the introduction, I noted an
important point made by Weaver and Holtkamp (2015): “analyzing urban change demands
attention to multiple spatial scales and location-speciﬁc features, particularly the distribution
of social capital within a city” (286). More emphasis needs to be placed on spatial context
and neighborhood eﬀects. A key ﬁnding of this dissertation is that spatial dynamics matter,
especially when they interact with neighborhood social structures.
Past policy decisions produce constraints and opportunity structures that favor groups
with more power and resources over those that have historically been marginalized. Rothstein
(2017) writes that “today’s residential segregation...is not the unintended consequence of
individual choices and of otherwise well-meaning law or regulation but of unhidden public
policy that explicitly segregated every metropolitan area in the United States” (vii-viii). As
cities age, it becomes ever clearer that continued segregation and the concentrations of other
social and economic ills that come with it are not good for the long-term viability of cities.
Given the history of urban policy in this country and the changing demographic character
of its people, it seems clear that urban policy is in dire need of a long overdue makeover.
But, if history is any indication, large-scale policy change seems unlikely to happen anytime
soon.
Cities brimming with disadvantaged residents are often deemed undesirable places to live.
So, how can a city like Detroit, characterized by severe disadvantage, possibly hope to turn
its situation around? Taking a long hard look at past policy decisions would be a good start.
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Local leaders need to ask themselves: after 40 years of the CDBG program, have our local
implementation strategies made a diﬀerence? And if so, where and why? But ultimately, it
may be local citizens and organizations that bring about any real change. Civil society has
proved a powerful force against decline, but it is less successful in gaining resources, at least
in Detroit. Working on the eﬀectiveness and inclusiveness of neighborhood organizations
seems like an appropriate next step.

APPENDIX

Constant
Components of socioeconomic disadvantage a
% Black
% Poverty
% Single mothers
Unemployment
Other socioeconomic characteristics
% Hispanic
% Over 65
Physical characteristics
Surrounding Cnty pop chg
Economic/ﬁnancial characteristics
Economic diversity
Property tax per capitab
Total debt per capitab
Government responsiveness
Housing & com dev per capitab
CDBG per capita
Strength of civil society
Voter turnout
Voter turnout2
% Adherents
Large city [dummy]
Rustbelt [dummy]
Census region c
Northeast
Midwest
West

s.e.

(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.023)
(0.006)

(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.029)
(0.007)

(0.614)

s.e.

0.049∗∗
−0.000∗∗
−0.006∗∗

0.031∗
−0.000∗
−0.007∗∗∗
−0.112∗∗
−0.170∗∗
−0.195∗
(0.085)
−0.242∗∗∗ (0.061)
−0.153∗∗ (0.050)

(0.018)
(0.000)
(0.002)

−0.000
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)

−0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
(0.014)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.035)
(0.060)

0.007
(0.004)
0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(0.063)

0.004
0.000∗
0.000∗∗

0.047

(0.051)

−0.004
(0.002)
−0.081∗∗∗ (0.006)

−0.007
−0.016∗∗
−0.006
0.008

2.013∗∗

β

Longitudinal

0.028

−0.001
(0.001)
−0.059∗∗∗ (0.004)

−0.010∗∗∗
−0.009∗
−0.013
0.001

0.559∗∗∗ (0.049)

β

Model 4.1a (RI)

(0.002)
(0.005)
(0.034)
(0.013)

s.e.

(0.004)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(0.193)

0.020
−0.137∗
0.003

−0.024
0.000
−0.008∗∗∗
−0.110∗∗∗
−0.087

(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.045)
(0.015)

s.e.

(0.006)
(0.000)
(0.000)

−0.003
−0.000∗∗
0.000

−0.073∗∗
0.001∗∗
−0.002

(0.026)
(0.000)
(0.002)

−0.001∗
(0.000)
−0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)

(0.226)

−0.044

(0.003)
0.006∗
0.047∗∗∗ (0.008)

−0.001
0.018∗
0.042
−0.055∗∗∗

β

Diﬀerence Test
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(0.087)
(0.063)
(0.059)

(0.019)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.033)
(0.057)

−0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
−0.003∗
(0.001)

0.004
0.000
0.000∗

0.003

0.002
(0.001)
−0.034∗∗∗ (0.005)

−0.007∗∗∗
0.001
0.036
−0.047∗∗∗

β

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2a (Mean/Dev)

Table A.1.: Chapter 4 Models with Components of Socioeconomic Disadvantage
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(0.052)
(0.042)
(0.049)
(0.062)

1110
−354.041
762.083
897.410

0.157∗∗∗ (0.014)
0.306∗∗∗ (0.007)

−0.374∗∗∗
−0.039
−0.038
−0.098

s.e.
(0.056)
(0.050)
(0.069)
(0.090)

s.e.

1110
−310.356
704.713
915.222

0.127∗∗∗ (0.013)
0.300∗∗∗ (0.007)

−0.382∗∗∗
0.001
0.029
0.001

β

Longitudinal
β

s.e.

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2 (Mean/Dev)
β

s.e.

Diﬀerence Test

Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log of true population change. Covariates for Model 4.1a are grand-mean centered.
Covariates for Model 4.2a are city-mean centered. Coeﬃcients are estimated via Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Standard Errors are
in parentheses. † p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
a
Median income is not included because it is highly correlated with the other socioeconomic disadvantage components.
b
City ﬁnancial variables are in 2010 inﬂation adjusted dollars per capita.
c
South is the reference category for census region.
d
1970 is the reference category for year.

N
Log likelihood
AIC
BIC

Random eﬀects (variance components)
Between-city SD [Intercept] σζ0
Within-city SD [Residual] σ

Time/Decade (1970=0) d
1980
1990
2000
2010

β

Model 4.1 (RI)

Table A.1.: continued

181

Constant
Socioeconomic characteristics
Socioeconomic Disadvantage
% Hispanic
% Over 65
Physical characteristics
Surrounding Cnty pop chg
Economic/ﬁnancial characteristics
Economic diversity
Property tax per capitaa
Total debt per capitaa
Government responsiveness
Housing & com dev per capitaa
CDBG per capita
Strength of civil society
Voter turnout
Voter turnout2
% Adherents
Large city [dummy]
Rustbelt [dummy]
Census region b
Northeast
Midwest
West
Time/Decade (1970=0) d
1980
1990
2000
2010

s.e.

(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.018)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.035)
(0.058)

0.005
−0.000
0.000
−0.000
0.001∗∗
0.058∗∗
−0.001∗∗
−0.007∗∗∗
−0.117∗∗∗
−0.122∗

−0.303∗∗∗
0.075
0.090
0.090

(0.061)
(0.052)
(0.059)
(0.070)

−0.077
(0.079)
−0.238∗∗∗ (0.065)
−0.264∗∗∗ (0.060)

(0.227)

0.452∗

−0.221∗∗∗ (0.018)
0.003∗∗ (0.001)
−0.035∗∗∗ (0.005)

0.347∗∗∗ (0.055)

β

Model 4.1b (RI)

(0.836)

s.e.

(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.000)

−0.000
−0.000
0.000

−0.364∗∗∗
0.016
0.012
−0.011

0.054∗
−0.001∗
−0.006∗∗

(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.086)
(0.113)

(0.024)
(0.000)
(0.002)

−0.000
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)

(0.244)

0.425

−0.183∗∗∗ (0.037)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.052∗∗∗ (0.008)

−0.154

β

Longitudinal
s.e.

(0.028)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.035)
(0.057)

(0.000)
(0.001)

(0.004)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(0.557)

s.e.

(0.007)
(0.000)
(0.000)

(0.609)

−0.029
0.000
−0.001

(0.037)
(0.000)
(0.003)

0.000
(0.000)
−0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)

0.004
0.000
0.000

−0.007

0.024
(0.045)
0.005
(0.003)
0.036∗∗∗ (0.010)

β

Diﬀerence Test
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−0.034
(0.087)
−0.222∗∗ (0.070)
−0.241∗∗∗ (0.067)

0.026
−0.000
−0.007∗∗∗
−0.100∗∗
−0.129∗

−0.000
−0.003∗

0.004
0.000
0.000

0.417

−0.159∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.005∗∗ (0.002)
−0.016∗
(0.006)

β

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2b (Mean/Dev)

Table A.2.: Chapter 4 Models with Cities with at Least One Year of Decline Only
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s.e.

624
−145.919
339.838
446.306

s.e.

624
−128.636
329.273
488.974

0.064∗∗∗ (0.022)
0.291∗∗∗ (0.009)

β

Longitudinal
β

s.e.

Cross-sectional

Model 4.2 (Mean/Dev)
β

s.e.

Diﬀerence Test

Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log of true population change. Covariates for Model 4.1b are grand-mean
centered. Covariates for Model 4.2b are city-mean centered. Coeﬃcients are estimated via Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
Standard Errors are in parentheses. † p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
a
Median income is not included because it is highly correlated with the other socioeconomic disadvantage components.
b
City ﬁnancial variables are in 2010 inﬂation adjusted dollars per capita.
c
South is the reference category for census region.
d
1970 is the reference category for year.

N
Log likelihood
AIC
BIC

Random eﬀects (variance components)
0.087∗∗∗ (0.020)
Between-city SD [Intercept] σζ0
0.295∗∗∗ (0.009)
Within-city SD [Residual] σ

β

Model 4.1 (RI)
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